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CONSTITUTIONAL RELIGIOUS PROTECTION: ANTIQUATED
ODDITY OR VITAL REALITY?
Copyright © 1972 by
WILLIAM G. HOLLINGSWORTH*
The common tendency to define religion in terms of a single type of
religion, implicitly rejecting all other cults as nonreligious, may be
observed in any group of otherwise intelligent people.1

The public schools in New Haven, Connecticut, in cooperation with a
private insurance company, offer student accident insurance for those students whose parents wish to purchase it. The "School-Time" plan also
insures the child for accidental bodily injury "while attending religious service or instruction, including travel directly between such service or instruction and home or school." Johnnie Doe's parents enroll him in this plan.
Johnnie is hit by a car on the way to attend a Junior Atheism and Philosophical Society meeting. Johnnie's parents attempt to collect under the
policy. Would the insurer be justified in refusing to pay on the ground
that Johnnie was not traveling to a "religious service or instruction"?
By virtue of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is an unlawful employment practice for a covered employer to discriminate against an employee
or job applicant because of the employee's or applicant's religion.2 However, religious and educational bodies are exempt from this requirement in
that they may employ persons of a particular religion to perform work connected with their religious or educational activities.3 What organizations
and enterprises would qualify for this exemption by virtue of their being
"religious" in nature? By what criteria are they to be identified as such?
And what aspects of employees' moral and ideological beliefs, personal
lives, and even personality traits are matters of religion and thus not to be
considered by covered employers in their hiring, firing, and other job decisions? Again, by what criteria should the law determine what in a person's life involves his religion and what does not?
Suppose that in your state a statute provides that a physician may refrain on religious grounds from performing a legal abortion on his patient without being criminally or civilly liable for any injury that may result to the patient from his refusal. Patient Jane Doe requires an emergency
abortion to save her life. Her physician, Dr. John Smith, is the only available doctor in their remote community, and there isn't time to transport
Assistant Professor of Law, Holland Law Center, University of Florida.
K. DUNLAP, RELIGION: ITS FUNCTION IN HUMAN LIFE 3 (1946) [hereinafter referred

to as K. DUNLAP].
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970).
3Id. § 20003-1.
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Jane elsewhere. Dr. Smith refuses to perform the operation, feeling deeply that to destroy an unborn child would morally constitute murder. As
a result, Jane dies. On the question of the doctor's immunity from liability, should it matter whether he: (1) was a member of a religious sect that
officially views the intentional taking of an unborn life under any circumstances as being contrary to divine law; or (2) was a self-proclaimed agnostic, with an often expressed hostility for "all religions" as being "a
curse to human progress," who sincerely feels that medical science ought
never presume to sacrifice one life to preserve another?
The above examples suggest the need for a legal definition of religion.
They further suggest that this need is not confined to the more noticed
areas of "church and state" concerns such as state aid to parochial schools
and school prayer and Bible reading. The problem of legally defining religion can arise in virtually any area of the law at any level of government.
Another way of describing the problem is to ask: What does the first
amendment to the United States Constitution mean by "religion" when it
says, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof"? In the United States, the quest
for a legal definition of religion and the quest for the meaning of religion
in the first amendment are essentially the same for this reason: If the federal government or a state were to define religion more restrictively than
contemplated by the first amendment, a party aggrieved by the more restrictive definition (by being denied some benefit or immunity accorded
those who did meet its more rigid requirements) would have a constitutional objection to the federal or state action. This objection would rest
on the establishment clause and, depending on the facts, could rest on
the free exercise clause as well.4 Thus the quest for a legal definition of religion must be a quest for a constitutionally valid legal definition. And
"constitutional validity" requires a legal definition of religion at least as
nonpartisan, that is, at least as inclusive, as that of the religion protected
by the first amendment. For most purposes it therefore makes sense to
speak of a legal definition and a constitutional definition of religion interchangeably. This essay will do just that.
Since religion in the first- amendment does not define itself, we must
4 Although originally applicable only to the federal government, both the nonestablishment
and religious freedom clauses are now also applicable to the respective state governments by
virtue of the fourteenth amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940)
(applying the religious freedom guarantee to the states); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of
Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (applying nonestablishment to the states). Where no governmental action is involved, the Constitution does not appear to prohibit the use of a highly restrictive definition of religion in dealings between private parties. Such "private" definitions,
even if encompassed in a legally enforceable contract, are excluded from this essay's considerations, its scope being confined to seeking a legal definition of a religion that can be utilized by
government itself. The "government" versus "private" demarcation is, of course, no easy task.
See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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finally depend on the United States Supreme Court to insure that religion
is defined so as to maximize the constitutional values of genuine religious
freedom and nonestablishment. Using these values as the basis for its
assessment, this essay will analyze and evaluate recent progress by the Court
toward a satisfactory definition of religion. The analysis and evaluation
will both draw upon the views of other commentators in the church and
state arena and offer this essay's own constructive position on legally defining religion.
I.

THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
AND THE DEFINITIONAL PROBLEM

The matter of defining religion has been noticed by the United States
Supreme Court in dealing with the first amendment, 5 though much less
often than might be expected. One federal court has suggested that the
Supreme Court "appears to have avoided the problem with studied frequency in recent years."" Whether or not that is so, the most fruitful contribution by the Supreme Court toward a first amendment definition of religion has not occurred from an explicit attempt to formulate one. Rather,
the Court's contribution has been made indirectly, and probably unintentionally, by its interpretation of § 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 19487 in United States v. Seeger8 and, five years later,
in Welsh v. United States."
The pertinent language of that section of the Act reads as follows:
Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to require any person to
be subject to combatant training and service in the armed forces of the
United States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. Religious training and
belief in this connection means an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.' 0
Since § 6(j) provides an exemption from combatant military conscription only for religiously grounded conscientious objectors, the matter of
defining religion or, more accurately, "religious training and belief" in §
5 E.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 465-66 (1961)
(Frankfurter & Harlan, JJ.,
concurring); United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1931) (Hughes, C.J., dis-

senting); David v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890).
6
United States v. Kuch, 288 Supp. 439, 443 (D.D.C. 1968).
7 Ch.

625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 612 (1948), as amended 50 U.S.C. § 456(j) (App. 1970).

8380 U.S. 163 (1965).
9 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
10This quoted language from § 6(j) of the Act was amended in 1967 so as to delete the
reference to a "Supreme Being." Act of June 30, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-40 § 7, 81 Star. 104,
amending 50 U.S.C. § 456(j) (App. 1964). Both United States v. Seeger and Welsh v. United
States were decided with respect to the pre-1967 version of § 6(j) as quoted above in the text.
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6(j) is of obvious importance. An operative definition of religion will
determine which conscientious objectors who otherwise meet the statutory
requisites are includable in the provided exemption from combatant training and service. 1
The Congressional definition of "religious training and belief," quoted
above, contains both a positive and a negative component. The positive
component requires "belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving
duties superior to . . . any human relation." The negative component
excludes "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a
merely personal moral code." Obviously, to read "belief in a relation to'
a Supreme Being" as requiring belief in a supernatural deity raises a serious establishment of religion problem, and probably a free exercise problem as well.12 This illustrates the ever present dilemma of any legal definition, constitutional or otherwise. If the definition is too narrow, its application in a rule of law may violate one or both of the first amendment
religion clauses by excluding those religions not satisfying the definition
from whatever benefit or immunity the particular law provides.' 3 And
yet, it is apt to be asked, how broadly must we legally define religion to satisfy the first amendment? Potentially, anything and everything could
qualify as religion in someone's subjective reference. The fear exists that,
with such potential, the first amendment religion clauses could encompass
so much of human experience as to undermine the state's necessary sphere
of social control.' 4 Conversely, first amendment religion might mean nothing in a practical sense if judicial restraint in applying so broad a definition
were the final product.
A.

United States v. Seeger

The "too narrow" side of this definitional dilemma confronted the
Court in United States v. Seeger. Daniel Andrew Seeger had been convicted in district court' 5 for refusing to submit to induction in the armed
forces. His claim for conscientious objector status had been denied solely
"1 Additionally, § 6 (j) provides for "civilian work contributing to the maintenance of the
national health, safety, or interest" if the person's religiously based conscientious objection extends to noncombatant military service as well. 50 U.S.C. § 456(j) (App. 1970).
' 2 The Court had already recognized the existence in America of religions that "do not
teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God." Torcaso v. Watkins,
367 U.S. 488, 495n. (1961).
13 The Supreme Court itself may violate the Constitution by positing a constitutional definition of religion or by upholding a statutory definition, either of which fails to do justice to the
theological neutrality required by both religious clauses. As Justice Jackson rightly confessed,
"We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final."
'Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
'4 See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 658-59 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
15 United States v. Seeger, 216 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), rev'd, 326 F.2d 846 (2d
Cir. 1964), aff'd on other grounds, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
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because it was not based on "belief in a relation to a Supreme Being;"
therefore, according to § 6(j), Seeger's opposition to w(rar was not "by reason of religious training and belief." Despite a strong factual indication
to the contrary,'" the Court determined that Congress' intent was not to confine belief relating to a "Supreme Being" to belief "in a traditional
God."'1 7 Accordingly, the Court sought to define the positive component
in the Act's definition of "religious training and belief" broadly enough
to include all religions.' 8 The Court did so by construing religious belief
"in a relation to a Supreme Being" as belief "that is sincere and meaningful [which] occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that
filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the
exemption."' 9 But what class of beliefs can be said to occupy a place
in the believer "parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God"?
Apparently, it would be "all sincere religious beliefs which are based upon
a power or being, or upon a faith, to which all else is subordinate or upon
which all else is ultimately dependent." 20 This would include "externally
and internally derived beliefs."'
(The statutory term "training' in "religious training and belief" therefore seems to have been disregarded.22 )
In Seeger's case then, as well as in the two other cases consolidated with
his for argument, § 6(j) was thus construed broadly enough to include
these men as religiously grounded conscientious objectors, invalidating
their convictions in the district courts for refusal to submit to military induction.23
The following points must initially be conceded: first, the Seeger
L6 See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 348-54 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
17 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 178 (1965).
181d. at 165.

19Id. at 165-66; see also id. at 183-84, 176. Unlike the first two passages cited, which
speak of the place filled by orthodox belief in God, the passage at 176 speaks of the place filled
"by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption." The Seeger Court's language
may be compared with the following earlier effort toward a definition of religion by a state court:
Thus the only inquiry... is the objective one of whether or not the belief occupies the
same place in the lives of its holders that the orthodox beliefs occupy in the lives of
believing majorities, and whether a given group that claims the [tax] exemption conducts itself the way groups conceded to be religious conduct themselves. The content
of the belief, under such test, is not a matter of governmental concern.
Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 692, 315 P.2d 394, 406
(1957) (lack of theistic belief does not disqualify nonprofit corporation for tax exemption
on property used for religious worship).
20 380 U.S. at 176. This language just quoted may be said to be the "substance" of the
Court's definition of religious belief or belief in relation to a Supreme Being. It assigns content to the merely formal "place parallel to that filled by the [traditional] God" by telling
what place.
211d. at 186.
2 Otherwise, serious first amendment problems would exist in excluding from § 6(j) any
religion (s) without overt communal indoctrination.
23 The court of appeals' reversals of Seeger's and Jakobson's district court convictions, United
States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964), and United States v. Jakobson, 325 F.2d 409
(2d Cir. 1963), were thus affirmed. The court of appeals' affirmance of Peter's conviction in
Peter v. United States, 324 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1963), was therefore reversed. *
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Court's definition of "religious training and belief" was produced by construing an act of Congress (but undeniably with the aim of saving the statute's constitutionality!); second, "religious belief" (forgetting the now
inoperative term "training") may not necessarily be synonymous with the
broader term "religion." Despite these concessions, one ought still ask
this question: Is the definition in Seeger, regardless of the Court's original purpose, a step toward a general definition of religion as used in the
first amendment? If it is, there are at least two readily apparent problems
in the Seeger formula.
The first problem involves the negative component in the § 6(j) definition of religious belief. This component, which the Seeger Court purported to have upheld, excluded "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code" from religious training
and belief. This exclusion is utterly inconsistent with the Court's positive description of religious beliefs. Political, sociological, philosophical
and "personal moral" convictions can function in one's life so as to occupy
a place "parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God." They can
subjectively function as "a faith, to which all else is subordinated or upon
which all else is ultimately dependent." Though it failed to resolve it, the
Court in Seeger does appear to have been aware of the inconsistency. In
describing what beliefs are religious beliefs, the Court felt compelled to
include only "all sincere religious beliefs which are based upon a power or
being, or upon a faith, to which all else is subordinate ....24 It had to use
the limiting adjective "religious" in defining "religious beliefs" in order to
adhere verbally to the act's exclusion of political, sociological, philosophical and personal, moral views!
The second difficulty, which may be but another way of describing the
first, is this: It is not clear whether the Court was positing a totally subjective standard for religious belief or whether there is still some required
dimension (however broad) concerning the belief's objective content. The
Court itself did not clarify this matter when it stated as follows:
While the applicant's words may differ, the test is simple of application.
It is essentially an objective one, namely, does the claimed belief occupy
the same place in the life of the objector as an orthodox belief in God
holds in the life of one dearly qualified for exemption?25
The test may be deemed "essentially an objective one" in that the factfinder rather than the claimant of the exemption makes the ultimate determination. But what does the factfinder determine? Is it simply how important the belief is to the claimant that determines whether it fills a place
parallel to orthodox belief in God? Or must there be some content to the
24

380 U.S. at 176 (emphasis supplied).

25Id. at 184.
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object or grounds of the claimant's belief that can be deemed parallel to
orthodox belief in God?
Mansfield opts for the latter conclusion, arguing that intensity of belief
is not enough.2 The truths believed should "address themselves to basic
questions about the nature of reality and the meaning of human existence .
-27 This, he argues, constitutes the primary reason for characterizing them as religious. However, there are indications in Seeger that the
Court's test for religious beliefs is more subjective than Mansfield concludes. First, the registrant's own claim "that his belief is an essential part
of a religious faith must be given great weight."2 8 Second, the registrant's
own "faith" rather than some "power or being" may be the basis of religious belief. 29 Third, local boards and courts are not even free to reject
beliefs they find "incomprehensible."
Rather, says the Court in Seeger,
"[t]heir task is to decide whether the beliefs professed by a registrant are
sincerely held and whether they are, in his own scheme of things, religious."'" But how could a board or court ascertain the objective religious
content of an incomprehensible belief ? These statements can hardly be said
to resolve the difficulty clearly in favor of finding religious belief purely on
the basis of the registrant's sincerity and intensity of commitment. What
then, if any, is the rudimentary content. requirement concerning the
ground or object of a belief in order for it to be deemed religious?
B.

Welsh v. United States

The above two (and any other) difficulties with the Seeger understanding of religious belief remained unmet by the Supreme Court until Welsh
v. United States, which, by vote of five justices to three, invalidated petitioner's conviction for refusing to submit to military induction. 2 In his
conscientious objector's application, Seeger had struck out "training and,"
and placed quotation marks around the word "religious" on the printed
Selective Service form.33 Elliott A-hton Welsh, II, struck out "religious
training and," thus his application claimed conscientious opposition to
war "by reason of my belief."-" Welsh was denied a § 6(j) conscientious objector exemption because his appeal board and the Department of
Justice hearing officer "could find no religious basis for the registrant's be26

Mansfield, Conscientious Objection--1964 Term, 1965

ORDER 3, 9-10.

RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC

See also id. at 29.

27d. at 10.
28 380 U.S. at 184.
29 Id. at 176.
3Old. at 184-85.
31 Id. at 185 (emphasis supplied).
32 398 U.S. 333 (1970), rev'g 404 F.2d 1078 (9th Cir. 1968).
33 The printed form read as follows: "I am, by reason of my religious training and belief,
conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form." Id. at 336-37.
34 Id.
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lief, opinions and convictions."3 5 Like Seeger, Welsh claimed to have sincere and deeply felt conscientious scruples against killing in war. The government conceded that Welsh's beliefs were "held with the strength of
more traditional religious convictions,"36 but it sought, unsuccessfully at the
Supreme Court level, to have upheld the "no religious basis" finding of the
lower court and Welsh's consequent conviction for refusing induction by
37
distinguishing the Welsh facts from Seeger on two grounds.
First, it was argued that, unlike Seeger, Welsh had explicitly denied
that his views were religious. Justice Black, writing the four Justice plurality opinion, parried that argument by concluding that Welsh was thinking of "religious" in the narrower conventional sense rather than the
"broad scope" of that word as contemplated by § 6(j).
The second and more important ground argued by the government
was that Welsh's beliefs were "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code." If so then even under
the Seeger interpretation of § 6(j), Welsh would not qualify for the
exemption. In denying the validity of this argument, the plurality opinion conceded that Welsh's conscientious objection was in part based on
his perception of world politics, quoting from a letter by Welsh to his local board.
It reasoned, however, that the § 6(j) exclusion of views essentially political, etc., should not be read "to exclude those who hold
strong beliefs about our domestic and foreign affairs or even those whose
conscientious objection to participationin all wars is founded to a substantial extent upon considerationsof public policy." 9
What then is left in the § 6(j) exclusion, the negative component of
the Act's religious belief definition? Justice Black's answer would seem
to be contained in the language of this passage:
The two groups of registrants that obviously [Quaere, are there others less
obvious?] do fall within these exclusions from the exemption are [1] those
whose beliefs are not deeply held and [2] those whose objection to war
does not rest at all upon moral, ethical, or religious principle but instead
rests solely upon considerations of policy, pragmatism, or expediency. 40
The Welsh plurality opinion, as exemplified by the foregoing passage, is
something less than lucid in stating just how it has refined the interpretation of § 6(j)) from the Court's original formulation in Seeger. The
opinion's reluctance to display undue clarity here may well be produced by
an awareness that the clearer the opinion, the more obvious is the extent
S5 Id. at 338.
36 Id. at 337, quoting from 404 F.2d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 1968).
37 Id. at 340-44, which includes the response to both grounds in Justice Black's plurality
opinion, joined in by Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall.
381d.at 342.
39 Id. (emphasis supplied).
40 Id. at 342-43 (emphasis supplied).
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of the reworking of § 6(j) that was required in order to make it coherent
and constitutional.4 1 Although the opinion refuses to say so explicitly, it
seems to have cured the inconsistency of excluding "essentially political,
sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code" from
the otherwise broad Seeger definition of religious belief simply by denying this § 6(j) exclusion any real effect. This conclusion seems warranted in that the opinion only requires that the registrant's beliefs: (1)
be deeply held; and (2) rest at least in part upon moral, ethical, or religious principle.42 Therefore, it seems that within the opinion's broad delineation of religious belief there should be included conscientious objection
to participation in war even if the objection rests on wholly "political
views" or wholly "sociological views" or wholly "philosophical views" or
"a merely personal moral code," provided only that these views function in
the believer analogously to traditional orthodox belief in God, eliciting a
deep and profound commitment in the registrant's life. Any of the above
categories of views which imposes upon an individual a duty of conscience
to refrain from participating in war at any time would, in this context,
have to qualify (at least in part) as moral or ethical principles. In the
context of a conscientious objection to war (or any other behavior commanded by the state), views that compel one's objection must of necessity
be based in part on moral or ethical considerations. Further support for
the reading here espoused is the opinion's statement (again without excess
clarity) that "these exclusions [essentially political views, etc.] are definitional and do not therefore restrict the category of persons who are conscientious objectors by 'religious training and belief.' 43
The exclusion of views "essentially political," etc., has thus lost any special meaning and only has effect, along with all other views (of whatever
type), with respect to Justice Black's description, quoted earlier, of the two
groups of registrants which are still to be excluded. For example, registrants with views having a philosophical basis but not deeply held would
fit Black's first group of the "obviously" excluded. But so too would registrants with views having a traditional religious origin and content if they
were not deeply, that is "religiously," felt.
41 It is a small wonder that Justice Harlan, the fifth Justice voting against the validity of
Welsh's conviction, felt constrained to do so by declaring the "religious training and belief' requirement in § 6(j) unconstitutional rather than by the plurality's approach of reworking the
proviso.
42 398 U.S. at 342-44.
43 Id. at 343 (emphasis supplied).
Further, [o]nce the Selective Service System has taken the first step and determined
under the standards set out here and in Seeger that the registrant is a "religious" conscientious objector, it follows that his views cannot be "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical." Nor can they be a "merely personal moral code."
Id. In other words, even if the source and content of his views are, e.g., political, we won't deem
them as "political" for purposes of the § 6(j) exclusion from religious belief if the positive
component of the religious belief definition is met. Thus the exclusion becomes mere verbiagc.
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Whom Black means to place in the second group of those excluded is
quite unclear. Their objection to war, though deeply felt (else they would
fit the first group of excluded registrants), somehow "does not rest at
all upon moral, ethical, or religious principle but instead rests solely upon
considerations of policy, pragmatism, or expediency." 44 Whom does this
:exclude? Moral or ethical principles involve taking into account one's
assessment of the good and evil aspects of behavior (using whatever standards of good and evil to which one adheres45). But so do considerations
of "policy, pragmatism, or expediency." Any given instance of these latter judgments may be criticized as being immoral (or amoral) according
to any given set of ethical criteria, but such in no way distinguishes them
from "moral" or "ethical" judgments, which may be criticized on the same
grounds. Surely the opinion does not mean to grant objector status to a
registrant who wholly or partly reaches his position emotionally, intuitively, supernaturally, or dogmatically "on principle," and to deny such status
to one whose deeply felt (and thus religiously felt) views were solely
the result of an open-minded assessment of empirical data and a rational
weighing of alternatives or the result of a purely consequential or "pragmatic" type of ethics.4 6 Such would be the very kind of religious discrimination Seeger and the five Justice majority in Welsh were seeking to avoid.
This anti-discriminatory stance argues against our supposing that the
Welsh plurality opinion was suggesting some tenuous distinction between
"moral principle" and pragmatic "policy considerations" as such.
Instead, it is less implausible to understand Black's second group of
registrants denied conscientious objector status as being comprised of those
who are claiming exemption for the baser reason of self-preservation. This
is indeed a big jump from any explicit language in the opinion, but who
else is left to give any composition at all to Black's "obviously excluded"
second group? If only in desperation, then, objection to participation in
war based "solely upon considerations of policy, pragmatism, or expediency" could be understood to refer to the concerns of one who is objecting simply in order to avoid for himself the hardships and risk of death
and injury that necessarily accompany combatant service. This second
group of "obviously excluded" registrants would then involve the stereotype pseudo-conscientious objector to whom any board is determined to
deny § 6(j) status. In many cases this person would be excluded because
44 Id.
45
46

at 342-43.
See generally W. FRANKENA, ETHICS (1963).

Unlike the situation in Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971), here there are no
plausible "valid neutral reasons" for such religious discrimination. Gillette upheld the "de facto
discrimination among religions" caused by § 6(j)'s granting objector status only to those opposed to all wars because of the arguably real difficulty of "fairness and evenhanded decisionmaking" in administering a system of selective conscientious objection exemptions. Here,
however, no such difficulty exists; no matter how utilitarian or "pragmatic" are the objector's
grounds, he would still be "conscientiously opposed to participation" in war in any form.
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he does not hold beliefs deeply (Black's first group). But he is not necessarily excluded for this reason. One's concern for his own safety could
well meet the Seeger test of supreme importance to which all else is subordinate, that is, the self could function subjectively as one's "Supreme
Being." This would in a sense be the one "religion" that the Welsh plurality opinion would not recognize for exemption.
If the foregoing explication of the four Justices' refinement in Welsh
of the Seeger definition of § 6(j) "religious training and belief" is substantially correct, then both of the earlier discussed difficulties in the Seeger
formulation have been considerably lessened. The first difficulty, the retention in Seeger of the act's arbitrary and illogical exclusion of "essentially political views,,' etc., from "religious belief," has been met by making
the exclusion inoperative, provided the views are held with religious intensity. The second difficulty, the ambiguity concerning whether there is any
requirement for the content of the belief in order for it to be religious,
seems to have been pushed toward a more subjective approach. Indeed,
the beliefs need not be objectively "religious" at all (whatever that might
mean to whoever is making such a determination); they may be -purely
ethical or moral in source and content. ' 47 Although this latter language
may itself be said to constitute some content requirement, it adds nothing
to the requirement that the objection be conscientious, i.e., having to do
with one's conscience, with one's own view of rightness and wrongness.
Hence the need for a belief to meet any content requirement concerning
what one believes, in order for it to be deemed a religious belief under §.
6(j), is becoming unnecessary. Because of the danger of excluding religions that do not meet whatever object content requirement might be
formulated, this is a favorable development - one very much in harmony
with the first amendment religion clauses.
II. THE KEY CRITERION OF AN ADEQUATE DEFINITION:
DESCRIPTIVE OR "NEUTRAL" RATHER THAN NORMATIVE
There is one possible exception to the Welsh plurality's otherwise general lack of any restriction upon a belief's object content, allowing it to
qualify as a § 6(j) religious belief. The exception, already suggested,
involves the objector who is "religiously" concerned with saving his own
skin. One's immediate reaction to such a case, if he feels that such a person
should be denied an exemption, 8 is to base the denial on the ground that
the person is not a conscientious objector. Yet such an objection may well
be a matter of conscience. The registrant may well be making a moral
judgment that his own life is worth more than the cause for which he is
47 398 U.S. at 340.

48
A debatable but highly pragmatic ground exists for granting even this registrant an exemption; one who is "religiously" terrified of combat may well be a liability to the cause.
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called to fight. 49 This ethical judgment may be right or wrong, moral or
immoral, yet still a "conscientious" objection.
Perhaps such a registrant's claim for § 6(j) exemption is more logically
open to rejection because it (arguably) is not religious. True, it is "religiously" felt. But it might be said to lack any rudimentary religious content in the following sense: If there can be said to be any common characteristic to human religious behavior 0 other than a subjective commitment by the adherent, it would seem to be that the object of one's religious
commitment is something (real or imaginary) other than merely one's self.
For example, consider Carl Jung's general definition of religion:
Religion, as the Latin word denotes, is a careful and scrupulous observation
of what Rudolf Otto aptly termed the numinosum, that is, a dynamic agency
or effect not caused by an arbitrary act of will. On the contrary, it seizes
and controls the human subject, who is always rather its victim than its
creator. The numinosum - whatever its cause may be - is an experience
of the subject independent of his will. At all events, religious teaching
as well as the consensus gentium always and everywhere explain this experience as being due to a cause external to the individual. 51

Rudolf Otto, to whom Jung referred, spoke of religious experience as
"creature-consciousness" or "creature-feeling":
It is the emotion of a creature, submerged and overwhelmed by its own
nothingness in contrast to that which is supreme above all creatures.
tTlhe 'creature-feeling' is itself a first subjective concomitant and effect
of another feeling-element, which casts it like a shadow, but which in itself
indubitably has immediate and primary reference to an object outside the
self. 5 2

The "object outside the self," termed "the numinous" by Otto, is manifested (at least in part) as mysterium tremendum, characterized (in part)
as the "wholly other.""5
Both Jung's and Otto's suggestions of an "outside object" in religious
49
To include one's own welfare as a factor in weighing the good or bad in behavior is a
most respectable ethical position. The admonition to love one's neighbor as one's self prohibits
forgetting self-interest just as it prohibits giving self-preferential consideration.
50 Some scholars are reluctant or unwilling to posit any general essence to the varied forms
of religious experience. See, e.g., K. DUNLAP, supra note 1, at 1-10.
51
C. G. JUNG, Psychology and Religion: West and East in 11 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
C. G. JUNG 7 (1958).
There are, however, certain exceptions when it comes to the question of religious practice or ritual. A great many ritualistic performances are carried out for the sole purpose of producing at will the effect of the numinosum by means of certain devices of
a magical nature, such as invocation, incantation, sacrifice, meditation and other yoga
practices, self-inflicted tortures of various descriptions, and so forth. But a religious
belief in an external and objective divine cause is always prior to any such performance.
Id.
52 L OiTO, THE IDEA OF THE HOLY 10 (2d ed. 1950) (emphasis supplied) [hereinafter
referred to as R. OTro].
53 Id.at 25-30.
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experience are in accord with the probable origin of the Latin religio,
namely, the verb religare (to hold back, to bind fast) or ligare (to bind).
The root idea of religio was likely that of obligation; hence the relational
motif, from the self to something else, is etymologically present. 54 This
relational motif recurs in William James' definition of personal religion:
"[T~he feelings, acts, and experience of individual men in their solitude,
so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they
may consider the divine," 55 and again in Edgar Sheffield Brightman's explication of religious experience: "Religious experience is any experience
of any person taken in its relation to his God."5 6
This suggested necessity of an external referent for religious behavior
does not intend any theological or philosophical assertion. Rather, it is
merely a tentative attempt to posit a phenomenological, generic description of religion. The positing of an external referent should even be
able to accommodate a radically atheistic stance like that of the nineteenth
century thinker, Ludwig Feuerbach. Feuerbach argued that "[r]eligion
*

.

.[is] identical with self-consciousness -

with the consciousness which

man has of his nature [as a species]." 57 Thus, "the religious object is
within him .... Such as are a man's thoughts and dispositions, such is his
God ....,,8s Even Feuerbach's God, "the manifested inward nature [of

man],"5' could qualify as an external referent because it is subjectively understood as external:
But when religion - consciousness of God - is designated as the selfconsciousness of man, this is not to be understood as affirming that the religious man is directly aware of this identity; for, on the contrary, ignorance of it is fundamental to the peculiar nature of religion.
Religion, at least the Christian, is the relation of man to himself, or
more correctly to his own nature (i.e., his subjective nature); but a relation
to it, viewed as a nature apart from his own. 60
54See WEBSTER'S NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2105 (2d ed. 1934); C. LEwis
AND C. SHORT, A LATIN DICTIONARY 1556 (1879).

55 W. JAMEs, THE VARIEES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 31 (1902) (emphasis in original). James, however, is wary of a simple abstract definition. Id. at 26-52. Thus he offers
his definition merely "for the purpose of these lectures." Id. at 28.
56
E. S. BRIGHTMAN, A PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 415 (1940) (emphasis in original)
[hereinafter referred to as E. S. BRIGHTMAN].
57
L. FEUERBAcH, THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 2 (2d ed. 1957) [hereinafter referred
to as L. FEUERBACH].
58 Id.at 12.
59 Id. at 12-13.
6Old. at 13-14. Thus even Feuerbach's position would comport with Otto's claim that
"[t]he numinous is thus felt as objective and outside the self." R. OTTO,supra note 52, at 11.
An external referent of sorts may even be said to be objectively present in Feuerbach's description of religion. For the religious object for him is not the self qua individual but the self's
essential nature as the human species. L FEUERBACH, supra note 57, at 1-2. Interestingly,
Feuerbach later (ca. 1850) somewhat receded from his "God is really man" position to a "God
is really nature" view; thus the necessity for some kind of external referent became more crucial
for him. See L. FEUERBACH, LECTURES ON THE ESSENCE OF RELIGION 19-22 (1967).
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In view of the foregoing discussion, one might be tempted to suggest
that an essential (or the essential) characteristic of religion is commitment
to something that is subjectively understood by the believer to be other
than his own self. To infer such a requirement in the Welsh plurality's
definition of religion would be to posit (at long last) a minimal requirement of object content before a belief is to be deemed religious. Mere intensity of commitment would not be enough. The object of one's devotion would have to seem to the believer to be other than his own self.
However, the "locus" of this required objective content may remain in the
perception of the subject-believer.
Arguably then, a § 6(j) applicant whose "religiously-felt" grounds
for conscientious objection are either claimed (most unlikely!) or found
to be based on his own all-consuming desire for self-preservation could
be denied exemption status because his "self-worship" does not meet the
object content requirement of a religious belief. However, the danger of
even so modest a requirement must be recognized. The danger in narrowing one's legal definition of religion is indirectly suggested by Brightman's criteria for a definition of religion adequate for philosophical
study:
The definition of religion with which philosophy may start should, therefore, be one which notes not merely the characteristics of the definer's own
religion, but rather those which are common to all persons and groups
who experience what they regard as religion. This description should
be purely descriptive; that is, it should be quite neutral to the normative
question whether religion as it has been bears any resemblance to religion
as it ought to be. A proper descriptive definition, then, is neutral to all
inquiries on whether religion is true or false, helpful or harmful, illusory
or veridical. It will contain solely a concept of what religion, has actually
been, and, like any good definition, will distinguish the definiendum from
all other terms with which it might be confused.6 1
The same concern of the philosopher of religion, to posit a descriptive definition rather than his own normative one, 2 must also be the concern of
the jurist who is attempting to uphold religious nonestablishment and
religious freedom. Normative definitions of what is true religion or au-

thentic religion or healthy religion, etc., are not proper for actualizing the
first amendment. The danger, then,
that the religious object be perceived
be confusing an aspect of one's own
a purely descriptive one. Granted,

in positing the minimal requirement
as external is that even here one may
normative definition of religion with
a religion of self-worship would be

61E . S. BRIGHTMAN, supra note 56, at 14-15.
62
At least the scholar should be able to distinguish at all times between describing religion(s) and prescribing. Religious thinkers often speak of religion in both good and bad
senses. Thus, for example, "True religion [good sense] exists wherever the Unconditional is
affirmed as the Unconditional, and religion [bad sense] is abolished through its presence." P.
TILicH, WHAT IS RELIGION? 147 (1969).
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regarded by most as "inauthentic," "idolatrous," "demonic," (by definition) "narcissistic," .perverse," "abnormal," "pathological" or "anti-social," but these are all essentially normative judgments. Confronting
such a marginal example of religion as self-worship forces us to recognize what is at stake when one purports commitment to the idea of a
religiously neutral state. Nonestablishment and religious freedom have
as their ideological premise the possibly utopian idea that the state is to
leave the individual utterly alone to make his own spiritual choices. In
traditional language, this means that the individual is free to go to hell if
that is where he insists upon going. Nonestablishment and religious freedom also mean ideally that any legal benefits or immunities enjoyed by
healthy and wholesome religions also belong to loathsome and demonic
religions as well. This is not to suggest that any action doing real social
harm is ipso facto exempt or that it ought to be exempt from civil sanction
simply because that action (or refusal to do a legally required act) is based
upon religious belief. Reynolds v. United States63 long ago made explicit that such is not the case. 64 What is being suggested is that any privilege given to religion A plus must also be given to religion Z minus.
(There is admittedly very little at stake in the real world if it were legally
decided that "real religion" must involve a real or apparent external
referent. There is much at stake, however, if a legal definition of religion
becomes significantly more normative than that.)
This entire discussion would surely convey a sense of extreme unreality
to anyone involved in the incredibly difficult problem facing the factfinder who must ascertain the sincerity and the basis of any claim for
conscientious objector status. 65 If Justice Black's second group of obviously excluded registrants, whose objections to war rest "solely upon considerations of policy, pragmatism, or expediency" are understood simply
to mean those religiously interested in self-preservation, that is, if the possible distinction between "real religion," as relatedness to something perceived as beyond the self, and "pseudo-religion," as self-worship, were
accepted, such a category would be of precious little use to a board trying
to ascertain whether a valid § 6(j) exemption existed. Would, for exam6398 U. S. 145 (1878).
64 In addition to Reynolds, which held that religious conviction does not protect one who
practices polygamy from criminal prosecution for bigamy, see, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158 (1944) (child labor law overrides religiously grounded activity of the selling by a
minor of Jehovah Witness literature). "[T]he Amendment embraces two concepts,--freedom
to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society." Cantwell v. Con-

necticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
65 "The Act provides a comprehensive scheme for assisting the Appeal Board in making
[the sincerity] determination, placing at their service the facilities of the Department of Justice,
including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and hearing officers." United States v. Seeger,
380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965). The superhuman task of judging sincerity should not be any more
difficult due to Seeger and Welsh. It is equally difficult to judge the sincerity of conscientious
objection claims based upon traditional religious beliefs.
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pie, the married man qualify for the exemption if the "religiously felt"
source of his moral conviction not to fight were his duty to stay healthy
in order to be a good husband and father? And would the single man
fail to qualify because his moral conviction for self-preservation was totally self-centered and thus nonreligious? But what if he had a lover (or
lovers?) to whom all else was subordinate? Would we distinguish (if we
could) between one religiously and morally concerned with protecting
himself for altruistic reasons ("real" religion) and one conscientiously
concerned to save his own skin as, for him, the ultimate good in itself?
Seemingly, practicality argues for abolishing Black's second group, however understood. If that were done, then any religiously-felt ground for
conscientious objection to war would suffice for a § 6(j) exemption "by
reason of religious training and belief."
The concern of this essay, however, is not to evaluate the practicality
or impracticality of administering the various possible understandings of
the scope of § 6(j) conscientious objector status. Nor is it to judge the
wisdom of this or any other scheme for granting conscientious objector
exemptions. Rather, the aim here is to consider what contribution Seeger
and the four Justice plurality in Welsh may have made toward a constitutionally valid legal definition of religion. Admittedly, Seeger and the
Welsh plurality purported only to construe a particular statutory definition. But they were construing it so as to include all,religions6 in order
67
to save the statute's constitutionality.
III.

ASSESSING THE

"Seeger-Welsh"

DEFINITION OF RELIGION

The definition of religion or, more precisely, of religious belief that
emerges from Seeger and Welsh is marked by its sheer simplicity. A person's religion or his religious belief(s) is his commitment to whatever
operates in his life with supreme importance. This "whatever" might be
a single concept, ideal or value; seemingly, it could also be a composite
of various goals or values, possibly in harmonious unity, possibly in tension-filled conflict. It is the what or whats for which one lives-to which
one's life is functionally committed. Anything real or imaginary could
serve as one's god(s) for this purpose.68 Such a religion may be "otherworldly" or "this-worldly," "supernatural" or "natural," "emotional" or
"rational," or any combination of these and other categories.
What follows is an assessment of this understanding of religion, uti66

United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165, 175 (1965).

67 See id. at 188 (Douglas, J., concurring); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 344-45

(Harlan, J., concurring in result). In Welsh, Justice Harlan retreated from the Seeger approach
of construing § 6(j) to avoid any constitutional infirmity, and instead found the statutory requirement of theistic belief violative of the establishment clause.
68 There is the possible (and probably dubious) exception of the believer's own self, subjectively perceived as his own self, discussed earlier. This "exception" was not expressly mentioned anywhere in Seeger or Welsh.
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lized in Seeger and Welsh, as a possible tool of general use for the law in
dealing with religion in accordance with the first amendment. Unless
noted to the contrary, all references to Welsh will refer to Justice Black's
plurality opinion. For convenience, this essay's interpretation of the view
of religion that was espoused in Seeger and further developed by the Welsh
plurality will be designated the "Seeger-Welsh" definition of religion.
A.

The Definition as a Reflection of the CurrentEra

The Seeger-Welsh functional understanding of religion as adherence
to whatever one deems of supreme importance reflects well an essential
thrust of the scholarly study of religion and religions during and since
the Enlightenment. In addition to the massive works of theologians
"within" the various major faiths, the last two centuries or so have also
witnessed an intense interest in the (more or less) objective study of religion from various extra-ecclesiastical perspectives-"psychology of religion," historical and comparative studies, "sociology of religion," anthropology, and (of more ancient origin) "philosophy of religion." Though
one would not expect unanimity of religious understanding to result from
these endeavors, they have undoubtedly had a universalizing effect. Encounter with the immense panoply of human religious behavior in time
and space,69 whether by the social scientist, the philosopher, or even by
the apologist of a particular faith, has necessarily tended to subvert undue
provincialism. The definitions of religion earlier quoted from Jung,
Otto, James, and Brightman, alongside the Seeger-Welsh definition itself,
well reflect this thrust toward a description of religion hopefully able to
accommodate all shapes and sizes.
A particularly crucial and sensitive aspect of this "universalizing effect"
involves the concept of deity, a matter that cannot easily be separated from
the problem of defining religion. The issue in Seeger was, in part, exactly as the Court stated:
If we say that one religion, as an entity, is distinct from another when its pantheon, its ritual, its ethical commitments,
and its mythology are sufficiently different for its adherents to consider that the adherents of other religions are, in a general sense, "unorthodox" or "pagans" or "nonbelievers," then we must conclude that mankind has produced on the order of 100,000
different religions. This figure is based on several assumptions: first, that religion
began with the Neanderthals, who about 100,000 years ago were carefully burying
their dead with grave goods and building small altars of bear bones in caves; second,
that there have been at all times since the Neanderthals a thousand or more culturally
distinct human communities, each with its own religion; and third, that in any cultural
tradition, religions change into ethnographically distinct entities at least every thousand
years. Religion is a universal aspect of human culture. Furthermore, for every religion which has survived and been routinized, either as a small community faith or a
"great religion" such as Christianity or Islam, there are dozens of abortive efforts by
untimely prophets, victims of paranoid mental disorders, or cranks which are ignored
or suppressed by the community.
A. WALLACE, RELIGION: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL VIEW 3-4 (1966).
69 How many religions has mankind produced?
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Does the term "Supreme Being" as used in § 6(j) mean the orthodox God
or the broader concept of a power or being, or a faith, "to which all else is
subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent" ?70
In opting for the latter and "broader" concept, it is inconceivable that the

Seeger Court was not affected by the theological-philosophical climate of
the modern era.7 1 If Will Herberg's hints at a de factor Protestant-Catholic-Jewish "establishment" in America 2 were by 1965 anything more than
ancient history, then the Court was doing more than broadening the term
"Supreme Being" to accommodate the numerically small, traditionally nontheistic religions in America. It was also utilizing an understanding of
deity broad enough to include the contemporary liberal wings of the three
traditional mainline religious faiths that have dominated the American
scene.73 For one cannot adequately explain the difference in describing
religion in Seeger and Welsh from that of Davis v. Beason"4 without
noting the impact that Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment theological development has been having at the "grass roots" level of American
religion over the past few decades. 5 The impact of this development has
been experienced by the "liberal side" of all three major faiths, Protestant,76 Catholic, and Jewish, though generally sooner and more pronouncedly in Judaism77 and generally later and, so far, least pronouncedly in Roman Catholicism. What has occurred is a basic reunderstanding
both of Deity and of cosmology on the part of many adherents within
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 174 (1965), quoting from WEBSTER'S NEW IN2536 (2d ed. 1934).
71 The Seeger Court's own recognition of this is most candid.
"Moreover we believe [our]
construction embraces the ever-broadening understanding of the modern religious community."
380 U.S. at 180.
72
See W. HERBERG, PROTETANT-CATHOLIc-JEw 27-41, 56-57, 211, 242-46, 256-59
(rev. ed. 1960) [hereinafter referred to as W. HERBERG]. Herberg sees all three of these religions paying a high price for their sociologically established position; namely, their historicaltheological groundings are de-emphasized as each becomes a spiritual mouthpiece for what he
calls our common (and often quite intolerant) secular American religion, the American way of
70

TERNATIONAL DIcIoNARY

life. Id. at 72-90.
73 It is therefore not surprising that of the four religious authorities quoted in the Seeger

Court's opinion to lend support in some way to its definition of "Supreme Being," two were
Protestant theologians and one was a Roman Catholic declaration. 380 U.S. at 180-83.
74 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
There the court stated that "[t]he term 'religion' has reference
to one's views of his relations to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence
for his being and" character, and of obedience to his will." Id. at 342.
7
5 See generally R. STARK & C. GLOcK, AMERICAN PIETY: THE NATURE OF RELIGIOUS
COMMITMENT (1968) [hereinafter referred to as R. STARK & C. GLOCK]. The survey data
on which this volume's analysis rests was gathered in 1963-64.
76
However, within the many and diverse separate denominations customarily lumped into
the one composite term "Protestant," the timetable and effect has varied widely. Also a particular sect may polarize on the matter of "traditional" versus -"modern" views on God and
cosmology. Such polariy, along with a cleavage as to proper eccelsiastical, political and social
stances, seems to have underlain the dispute in Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Church, 393 U.S. 440, 442 n.1 (1969).
77
See W. HERBERG, supra note 72, 196-97, 208n. 65.
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each of these three Biblical faiths.7 For a portion of the members of the
three "quasi-established" religions in America, a view of "Supreme Being"
and of religion as broad as that encompassed in Seeger would be neces79
sary.
The above discussion suggests that, despite the constitutional ideal of
absolute neutrality regarding every conceivable variety of religious adherence, unorthodox views are most likely to receive constitutional protection when they become not quite so unusual. (It would be most unsurprising if this generalization could be extended to all forms of deviant
behavior ideally entitled to constitutional protection.) In other words,
our ability to delineate the scope of religion encompassed by the first
amendment is bound to be somewhat colored by the time and place from
which we attempt to perceive reality. The Seeger-Welsh definition of
religious belief, as with any likely alternative definition, is thus very
much a creature of its own time. Realizing that this is so compels us to
regard this definition or any other definition of religion as utterly tentative. That the definition reflects much contemporary thinking is not,
however, reason to preclude its being considered on its merits. To insist
that legal norms, including constitutional norms, not reflect the historical
situation is to insist upon the impossible (and possibly the undesirable as
well). Even so, one must be particularly aware that the Seeger-Welsh
definition reflects the thought processes of Western culture and, therefore,
runs the risk of failing to fully accommodate the vast spectrum of Oriental, African, and other religious traditions. Even this should be viewed
only as a possible danger, not as a foregone conclusion. For how truly
universal the Seeger-Welsh definition might prove itself to be, if it were
generally employed to interpret the first amendment religion clauses, would
in great part depend on how varied were the persons and groups who put
it to the test.80
B.

The Definitivn'sDelineativeEffect

Regardless of its special relevance to much contemporary philosophical and theological thinking, the Seeger-Welsh formula appears to fulfill
Brightman's criterion 8 that a definition of religion should be descriptive (and hence, hopefully, universal) rather than normative. The orthodox theist may readily suggest that the Seeger-Welsh view of religion re78 See, e.g., J.

ROBINSON, HONEST TO GOD (1963); R. BULTMAN, et al, KERYGMA AND
MYTH (1961). For post-Seeger-pre-Welsh insights (of a wide variety of sorts) into the contemporary religious scene, see generally 1968 & 1969 THE RELIGIOUS SITUATION (D. Cutler ed. 2 vols. 1976).
79
See R. STARK & C. GLOCK, supra note 75, at 25-32, and 204-11 in connection with
Christianity.
80 Quaere as to what modifications in such an attempted "universal" understanding of religion might be required by our encounter with intelligent fellow creatures from other planets.
81 See quotation in text accompanying note 61 supra.
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flects the contemporary secularism and "theological modernism" that
staunch orthodoxy would tend to deplore. But such a criticism could only
purport to fault the Seeger-Welsh definition's -broad inclusiveness: no
serious religionist appears to have been excluded by the definition; the
only change vis-i-vis a more theistic understanding of religion is the inclusion of additional people who purport to be serious even if they do
not necessarily purport to be, by conventional label, religious. It may
well be an indication of the required neutrality in a constitutionally valid
definition of religion that the locus of description be broad enough to
arouse the objection of undue broadness by some (or most?) of the included groups! The more likely basis of attack on the alleged neutrality
of the Seeger-Welsh definition would of course focus on what it classifies
as non-religious, for the definition does not label all human behavior or
even all human belief as religious, a point to be dealt with in the discussion that follows.
Two possible interpretations were previously offered concerning the
refinement of the Seeger definition by Justice Black's Welsh plurality
opinion. The first of these interpretations 2 excluded from the category of
religious beliefs: (1) beliefs not deeply held; and (2) beliefs that are
' with the
solely "considerations of policy, pragmatism, or expediency," 83
latter exclusion understood to involve only the circumstance of a "believer" primarily concerned with his own personal welfare. This understanding of "considerations of policy, pragmatism, or expediency" may be
deemed by the reader as either a clarification or a modifying refinement of
Justice Black's opinion in Welsh. Whichever it is, no broader scope of
this second exclusion can be allowed without: (1) directly contradicting
both the holding of the case and the remainder of the opinion, which refused to allow the political-sociological-philosophical-moral code clause
in § 6(j) to restrict the category of religiously grounded conscientious
objectors; 8 4 and (2) doing violence to the central motif in United States
v. Seeger8 5 and in the Welsh plurality opinion itself, which was to avoid
picking and choosing between different forms of religious-ethical thinking.86 If this interpretation of the Welsh plurality opinion is valid, then
the only beliefs excluded from the category of "religious beliefs" are: (1)
those that are not deeply held; and (2) those that relate only to the self
as one's supreme commitment. It was earlier suggested that even this
reading of Justice Black's second exclusion has the effect of adding a
normative restriction to the Welsh definition of religion.8 7 Therefore, a
text accompanying notes 44-49 supra.
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 343 (1970).
84 See id. at 343; see also text accompanying notes 38-43 supra.
82 See
83

85 See 380 U.S. at 165, 175, cited with approval, 398 U.S. at 338.
86
87

See text accompanying notes 44-46 supra.
See text accompanying notes 61-64 supra.
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second interpretation of the Welsh plurality opinion was advocated: abolish Justice Black's second category of excluded persons in toto. Religious
belief is then limited to commitment to whatever one considers of supreme
importance in life - period. This second interpretation deletes explicit
language from Justice Black's opinion in Welsh, but it does so only to
carry out fully the broad, neutral approach to defining religion that was
correctly espoused by the Seeger Court and the Welsh plurality. It is
this second interpretation of the Black opinion, then, that should be understood as the "Seeger-Welsh" definition of religious belief. Such will
be the understanding here, albeit nowhere else.
The Seeger-Welsh definition, even according to the broad interpretation just advocated, excludes from the category of "religious beliefs" all
beliefs that do not function in the person's life analogously to that of
"the God of those admittedly qualifying for the [conscientious objector]
exemption,""8 that is, beliefs that do not function as God" functions in
the life of the orthodox theist who bases his conscientious objection to
war on his understanding of (and his need to obey) divine will. In other
words, the definition excludes beliefs which are not "based upon a power
or being, or upon a faith, to which all else is subordinate or upon which
all else is ultimately dependent," 9 thus excluding from the category of
the "religious" all beliefs that are not based upon what one deems controlling in his life. This exclusion raises at least four major grounds for
criticism, now to be discussed.
1. A Normative Component?
The first such ground is this: By restricting religious beliefs to those
beliefs based on whatever one deems of ultimate concern, one is, after all,
introducing a normative factor. Must religious belief involve a totality of
commitment on the part of the believer? What of the half-hearted or
lukewarm or simply playful religious experiences? Shouldn't such "easygoing" religion be included in a descriptive (and supposedly universal)
definition, even if deemed excludable from a normative standpoint? Some
might consider the following formulation by Vergilus Ferm an improvement over Seeger-Welsh:
To be religious is to effect in some way and in some measure a vital adjustment (however tentative and incomplete) to w(W)hatever is reacted to
or regarded implicitly or explicitly as worthy of serious and ulterior concern.9 1

380 U.S. at 176.
89 Or "belief in God," if one prefers. Seeger states the matter both ways; see note 19 supra.
90 380 U.S. at 176.
88

91 V. FERM, FIRST CHAPTERS IN RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY 61 (1937)

inal).

(emphasis in orig-
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Though Ferm clearly makes allowance for the fickleness of human
commitment with his parenthetical "however tentative and incomplete,"
he still requires "a vital adjustment" to something subjectively deemed
"worthy of serious and ultimate concern." Thus, while conveying an
awareness of the frequent ambiguity of human commitments ("religious"
or other), Ferm's definition also conveys the idea that religion qua religion
(whether goQd or bad) is a matter of importance to the participant. As
the other definitions of religion previously quoted suggest, the idea that
religion involves real personal commitment is widely shared by those who
have endeavored to study the subject from various scholarly perspectives.
This requirement of deep commitment also has validity from the standpoint of common sense. The often heard demand for "authenticity," "credibility," and "sincerity" suggests that one's religious beliefs are not so much
what one says he believes (or even thinks he believes), but rather what
one does with his life at all significant points of decision. The values
one actually serves point to the nature of one's God or Gods.
A reasonable awareness of human frailty, and thus a reading of the
Seeger-Welsh definition that understands it to encompass something less
than "perfect" human religious commitment, is as far as one should go in
broadening further an already broad definition. Hopefully, we are moving toward a constitutional definition of religion capable of describing
what is functionally included in religious nonestablishment and, of particular relevance to the point now under discussion, what is functionally
included in religious freedom per the first amendment. If we are positing a legally and constitutionally significant dimension of human experience that might function effectively as a shield against unwarranted governmental interference, it is not too much to ask that the dimension itself
have more than superficial value to the persons asking for its protection.
Thus, the readily justifiable requirement that one who purports to be a religiously grounded conscientious objector to military service be sincerely
committed to deeply felt beliefs is apt to have validity in other areas of
first amendment religious protection.
This last statement does not mean that religious freedom would (or
should) receive less protection than it presently enjoys were the SeegerWelsh requirement of deep commitment generally employed by the courts
as a constitutional definition of religion. For in the protection of religious
freedom, there still would be no need to differentiate between "religious"
and "nonreligious" within the sphere of religious behavior that is also protected by first amendment and due process "freedom of expression" guarantees, which are not specifically religious in character. In other words,
since freedom of belief, speech, press, assembly, etc., are protected whether
or not religious, they would certainly remain protected whether or not the
beliefs, speech, etc., were deeply felt or, for that matter, were "felt" at all.
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Rather, the only spheres in which the Seeger-Welsh definition could have
any delineative effect between religion and nonreligion are: (1) free exercise protection going beyond belief, speech, etc.; and (2) possibly some
establishment clause concerns. Even in these spheres, it would not follow
that "profound commitment" would always be relevant to the decision in
question. The legal adjudicator would probably not be concerned with
ascertaining an individual's or religious group's intensity or depth of commitment in either of the following two instances.
a. When the secular interests in conflict with the religious claim are
slight.
In a situation in which little is at stake with respect to the state's or one
or more other individual's or group's interests of health, safety, economic
need, etc., the decisionmaker (whether legislature, court, administrator,
or whatever) might well find it more sensible to treat the religiously based
claim as sincerely and deeply felt without attempting to substantiate evidentially the religious claimant's intensity of subjective commitment. 2 Religiously grounded objection to serving on a jury or working on a religious
holiday might be examples of when, simply as a matter of resource allocation, it would seem foolish to engage in the difficult and problematic task
of assessing sincerity or subjective fervor. Particularly when the number
of likely claimants arguing a religiously based interest is expected to be
small, a presumption of sufficient commitment makes practical sense.
On the other hand, if a religiously grounded right is apt to be asserted
with significant frequency and the secular interests at stake are substantial,
an inquiry into depth of commitment is warranted. In certain situations,
even when the number of religiously grounded claims is proportionately
small, a valid (and politically felt) demand for fairness might require
factual inquiry into the sincerity and strength of religious commitment.
Purported fairness to those not making the religiously based claim would
require factual ascertainment that those whose religious scruples were
honored were intensely opposed to the required legal norm. Conscientious objection to compulsory combatant military service would seem to be
an obvious example of when society is unwilling to tolerate the granting
of exemptions without some inquiry into each claimant's subjective commitment.
This discussion may also imply that the quantum of subjective religious commitment required for a "beyond mere speech" free exercise claim
92The possibility exists that two or more competing parties could each advance "a religious
ground" for their position in a given dispute. The adjudicator would then have to decide whether
to treat these religious claims as bona fide, without taking proof of subjective commitment, or
to attempt to assess the sincerity and/or intensity of each. (Quaere, if the first approach is taken,
should he allow refutation of subjective adherence by proof of inconsistent speech or conduct
and then allow the claimant to rebut the evidence of inconsistency?) It is quite likely that the
decisionmaker's assessment of the "objective" importance of accompanying secular interests
relevant to the decision would decide which course should be taken (as well as carrying much
weight in determining the decisional outcome itself).
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should vary in direct proportion to the societal value of the competing
secular interests involved. 3 This, of course, does not mean that overwhelming religious conviction should justify heinous criminality. Rather, it
merely suggests that when competing secular interests are noncrucial
enough to allow for their possible deference to religious scruples, it would
be proper to require more fervent religious conviction as the importance of
the competing secular interests increases. Conversely it would be quite
proper to presume a sufficient commitment when a person claims religious
conviction 94 and the social cost of honoring his claim would be slight.
It might also be that, in terms of the competing secular interests, the
social cost of recognizing the religious claim would not be great enough
to lead us to require any minimal amount of "intensity" or "depth" of
commitment, but the cost would be enough to have us require a factfinding of mere "sincerity." This suggests that "intensity" or "depth"
("strength") of commitment is distinguishable from "sincerity" in some
real way. (For example, A could sincerely be opposed to serving on a
jury and "judging others" for "religious" and/or "ethical" reasons; however, A's opposition could be of minor concern to A.) Recognition of the
distinction could be given practical application by, for instance, requiring
affirmative evidence when "intensity" or "depth" was required, but placing the burden on the party or parties contesting the religiously grounded
interest to show evidence of insincerity if "mere sincerity" were deemed
sufficient to establish the bona fide status of the religious scruple in question.
The instant discussion would tend to apply, mutatis mutandis, to areas
more cognizable under the establishment clause. Consider the granting of
tax exemptions to religious organizations. In the context of a legislatively enacted, broad scope of categories of nonprofit organizations qualifying for a certain tax exemption, 5 it might well make sense not to test
the commitment of any group seeking exemption as a self-designated religious body. Other religiously neutral criteria (nonprofit operation, nonuse
of the exempted property primarily for a residence, etc.) could serve as
well or better to exclude legally undeserving applicants for tax exemption.
And these criteria do not involve government in the incredibly difficult
93 Concerning the immense difficulties both of positing religiously neutral criteria for
"measuring" subjective commitment and of making a factual determination in any given instance according to the criteria posited, see text accompanying notes 123-25 infra.
94 Any functional equivalent to the explicit term "religious" must of course suffice if the
claimant prefers not to designate himself as being religious. Cf. Welsh v. United States, 398
U.S. 333, 339-42 (1970).
95 For example, according to the Court in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970),
New York's property tax exemption is granted "to all houses of religious worship within a
broad class of property owned by nonprofit, quasi-public corporations which include hospitals,
libraries, playgrounds, scientific, professional, historical and patriotic groups." Id. at 673. Cf.
N.Y. REAL PROPERTY TAx LAW §§ 420-86-A (McKinney Supp. 1971-72), formerly §§
420-86 (McKinney Supp. 1969-70), the latter being in effect when Walz was decided.
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and dangerous (to religious liberty) project of determining which groups
purporting to be religious are hypocrites and which groups are sincere,
much less which groups are "deeply committed." Yet, the potential political turmoil notwithstanding, a political entity is not constitutionally
barred from announcing that henceforth its tax favors for religious groups
would be denied those groups whose overt behavior, empirically verifiable,
was, as to secularly cognizable matters,9 6 substantially contrary to its religious teaching. For example, X church preaches the obligation to share
wealth with the destitute, but its membership fails to do so in any significant way. To deny a tax exemption to X church along with all other religious groups who also fail to conform their secularly cognizable conduct to
their explicitly pronounced secular preachments would, in principle, be
little different from denying § 6(j) conscientious objector status to a registrant who is shown to have advocated the killing of defenseless people.
(This theoretical point is made with full knowledge that government has
enough evils to combat without engaging in a campaign against secular
hypocrisy in religious institutions.)
When no readily ascertainable, secularly cognizable behavior is involved, the constitutionality of deciding the existence of some stated requirement of subjective commitment would be much more problematic.
X religion's teachings might not cover any secularly cognizable matters
or, if they did, they might be too abstract for empirical assessment. In
such cases, it is virtually impossible to assess subjective commitment in a
religiously neutral way. This difficulty is not apt to arise in the free exercise area, where any question of commitment, such as "How deeply is A
opposed to participation in war?" or, "Is B sincere about being conscientiously opposed to serving as a juror?", would be tied to secularly cognizable, concrete behavior. (And, if the free exercise activity in question
did not go beyond protected free speech, etc., no showing of sincerity or
commitment would be required at all.) The difficulty is, therefore, peculiar to a matter involving the establishment clause when sincerity or depth
of commitment is sought to be made a requisite for any purportedly religious group's enjoyment of a constitutionally permissible, civil benefit
(such as a tax exemption), but when there is no secularly cognizable
referent for assessing the subjective commitment. In this category of establishment clause problems, the Seeger-Welsh emphasis on bona fide subjective commitment would not be a workable tool; instead, government
would, as suggested earlier, have to use other religiously neutral criteria
(bona fide nonprofit status, etc.) or else award the benefit to self-designated religious groups simply because they have applied. (Very little
96 .'Securlarly cognizable matters" refer to those aspects of human behavior and experience
properly cognizable even by a religiously neutral state (physical health, safety, economic necessities, etc.). A common accord as to what the outer limits of this sphere should be is, of course,
highly unlikely.
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governmental largess is apt to be issued on the latter basis.) This exception to the perfect universal applicability of the Seeger-Welsh definition
does not necessarily mean that it would have no value in the establishment
of religion area.9 7 It is important also to note that this exception to the
Seeger-Welsh definition's appropriateness must apply with equal force to
any other definition of religion. Since the exception only applies to religious behavior without any secularly cognizable referent, a religiously
neutral definition of religion with any delineative effect is inherently impossible in such cases.
b. When the self-designation of the party'sstance (as religious or nonreligious) and his other speech and conduct with respect to issues other
than his own subjective commitment tend to determine the outcome.
This second category of instances in which factual ascertainment of subjective commitment is not needed might include, for example, one who
98
consistently purported to be a "purely religious" faith healer, making
no claims of medical or scientific expertise, and confining his treatment to
non-physiological methods; he normally ought to be exempt from a medical licensing requirement." However, one who either designated himself
as having medical or scientific expertise or who intervened in the body's
97

See text accompanying notes 268-80 infra. There is one obvious instance of "special
inapplicability" of any requirement of subjective commitment in the nonestablishment area. It
would hardly do to argue that otherwise constitutionally impermissible state aid to religion
would be made permissible were the entity receiving the aid insincere or lukewarm as to its
alleged religious commitment. Forbidden aid to religion must cover hypocritical or pseudo
religion as well as devout religion, with a complete lack of discrimination.
98 Obviously, the ascertainment of the party's assertions about his stance's being religious or
not would not necessarily be confined to noting the position he takes before the decisionmaker;
i.e., a factual hearing as to his past self-characterizations in relevant situations would be appropriate.
99
This does not necessarily
See People v. Cole, 219 N.Y. 98, 113 N.E. 790 (1916).
mean that the religious healer's purportedly religious stance could not be subject to attack as
made in bad faith, e.g., by proof that it was purely a sham to disguise a commercial enterprise.
See also Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146, 1162 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969). And the religious grounding of a faith healer's claims need
not insulate him from criminal liability for particular acts of overt criminal behavior, including
fraud. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944), did not hold that a representation subject
to reasonably certain empirical disproof would be immune from liability for criminal fraud
simply because it was alleged to have religious meaning to the declarant. (Examples: (1) A
tells B that for $1000 he can unconditionally guarantee that B will live to age 90. B pays A
the money and dies of natural causes at age 50. A was aware of previous instances in which his
"longevity guarantees" had failed: (2) A tells B that for $1000 he can guarantee a cure for B's
cancer with absolute assurance. B pays A for the treatment, which fails. B dies of the cancer.
A was aware of having had other cancer patients who had not been cured by the same spiritual
treatment.) The Court in Ballard only held that the truth or falsity of religious doctrines or
beliefs should not be submitted to the factfinder in a criminal prosecuion for fraud. Id. at 8688. The Court's refusal to reverse Ballard's criminal conviction, contrary to dissenting Justice
Jackson's inclination, id. at 92-95, does suggest that when, as in the above two examples, a jury
could reasonably find that, beyond a reasonable doubt, the declarant himself did not believe
his own statement, a conviction for fraud may be constitutionally possible. However, the Supreme Court has never ruled on this question. (Obviously the reasonableness of the jury's certainty that the dedarant's religious representation was subjectively fraudulent is very much dependent on its ready empirical disproof.)
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physiology (such as by prescribing drugs) ought not be exempt from the
requirements of otherwise constitutional state regulation of medical practice; this would be so whether or not the practitioner had also characterized himself as a "religious" healer, for his other self-characterizations
and/or his actual method of treatment arguably bring him within the ambit of secular concern too crucial for religious exemptions. 1'0
Despite these instances in which sincerity or strength of subjective
commitment would probably not be employed to differentiate religion from
nonreligion, the positive value of the Seeger-Welsh definition's delineative effect still stands as a general principle. The subjective commitment
requirement would have maximal usefulness in the most crucial group of
"church and state" decisionmaking situations, namely, whenever free exercise of religion protection was claimed for an overt act (or refusal to
act), if such behavior were in conflict with one or more substantial, secular interests. In these instances both practical political reality and wise
policy making require that the religious scruples in question be felt strongly enough to justify the decisionmaker's consideration of them as a factor
in his decision. Thus, Brightman's second criterion for an initial philosophical definition of religion also has significance for the jurist. The definition, says Brightman, "like any good definition, will distinguish the
definiendum from all other terms with which it might be confused."''
The Seeger-Welsh definition of religion, as here interpreted, has quite properly refused to exclude any belief on the basis of its object content or the
grounds of the belief.' 2 This is absolutely essential if first amendment
religious protection is to acquire its intended meaning. The state cannot
legally "pick and choose" what it shall deem to be religion according to
the content, values, goals or rationales of people's commitments. However, the requirements of the first amendment religion clauses do not preclude a rational, theologically neutral delineation between what is religion
and what is not. Indeed, in a practical sense these clauses require it,1 3 lest
by allowing religion to include everything, it comes to have little or no
constitutional significance. Such a constitutionally unintended and undesirable result would be most probable; it is most likely that legislatures and
judges alike would be reluctant to take cognizance of religiously based
100See People v. Vogelgesang, 221 N.Y.
3.1E.S.BRIGHTMAN, supra note 56,at 15.

290, 116 N.E. 977 (1917).

102 Thus, the beliefs may be political, sociological, philosophical, moral or anything else, provided they are deeply held.
103 The analogy to the treatment of other first amendment concerns is clear. For example,
free speech requires that government not condition its protection of speech on the basis of what
is said (with certain ever perplexing exceptions, such as defamation, fraud and clear and present
danger of real injury). However, it is impossible for courts to protect freedom of speech without
delineating what speech is. See, e.g., Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970); Tinker v.
Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). See also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963) with respect to protecting the general first amendment right to peaceable political associa-

tion and expression.
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scruples, were the mere assertion of any such claim always enough to qualify it as religious. The tolerant subjectivism in the following statement
has its appeal:
Because religion can be in conflict with other disciplines, because it cuts
across everyday life, we can only know that a claim is based on religion
when we are told that it is. The legal basis for stating that a claim is in
the religious domain can be that it is held out as being religious in nature.104
Despite its libertarian intent, the literal adoption of such a nondefinition
of religion would have anything but a libertarian effect. Responsible (and
politically sensitive) decisionmakers, both legislative and judicial, are not
going to balance a religiously grounded interest against any but the most
trivial secular interest simply because the religious claimant tells us his
stance is a religious one, or because he "holds out" his behavior as being
religious in nature. However, by requiring some kind of showing of sincerity or deep commitment, a constitutionally valid basis exists for distinguishing in a given legislative, judicial or administrative decision what in
human experience is to be deemed legally religion (and thus, if relevant
to the decision, worthy of recognition qua religion as a factor in that decision) and what, because it lacks the requisite sincerity or commitment,
need not be legally recognized as religion for purposes of that decision.
(It may sound more neutral to ask, "How much religion is required for
legal recognition?" rather than asking, "What is religion for purposes of
legal recognition?" However, with the same subjective commitment test
being used to answer either question, the outcome would always be
identical.)
Probably no more significant testimonial to the genuine neutrality of
the Seeger-Welsh definition's delineative effect is available than that of
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Welsh. 10 5 Harlan's credentials for
strenuously opposing legal favoritism for certain religions over others and
for religion over nonreligion'0 are well established."0 7 The position he
took in the Welsh case is therefore of no small interest. As noted earlier,
he refused to go along with the Welsh plurality's decision to continue the
Seeger course of "rewriting" § 6(j)'s definition of religious belief in order
to save its constitutionality. 0 8 In Welsh, Justice Harlan not only found §
104 Weiss, Privilege, Posture and Protection:"Religion" in the Law, 73 YALE L.J. 593, 604
(1964). This quotation does not fully reflect the position Weiss takes in this article, but it is
discussed in the text accompanying notes 163-65,228-35 infra.
105 398 U.S. at 344-67.
10
6 The matter of favoritism for religion over "nonreligion" is treated in text accompanying
notes 177-89 and 259-67 infra.
107 See, e.g., Justice Harlan's dissent in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 418-23 (1963)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
108 In so doing, Justice Harlan explicitly receded from his stance in Seeger, where he had
joined in the construing-to-preserve-constitutionality approach. 398 U.S. at 344-45.
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6(j), as written, to describe an impermissible distinction in favor of theistic
over nontheistic religions; he also deemed unconstitutional its granting of
conscientious objector status only to religiously grounded opposition to war,
thus, according to his terminology, favoring religion over nonreligion.0 9
Despite his explicit rejection (on establishment of religion grounds)
of the granting of conscientious objector status only to those objecting
to war for religious reasons, Justice Harlan fully acceded to the operative
effect of the Welsh plurality's reconstructed § 6(j) definition of religion.
His full approval of the definition's operative effect means that Justice
Harlan was in agreement with the plurality's delineation of which registrants would legally be entitled to § 6(j) exemptions and which registrants
would not. He wrote:
Thus I am prepared to accept the prevailing opinion's conscientious objector test, not as a reflection of congressional statutory intent but as patchwork of judicial making that cures the defect of underinclusion in § 6(j)
and can be administered by local boards in the usual course of business." 0

He of course insisted that the § 6(j) exclusion from conscientious objector status of individuals "whose [deeply felt] beliefs emanate from a purely moral, ethical, or philosophical source" must be denied effect."' (The
Welsh plurality opinion did just that."') Therefore, except for disapproving of the tactic of reconstructing § 6(j) rather than admitting it was
unconstitutional as written, Justice Harlan's only disagreement with the
Welsh plurality opinion was that it called "religion" (or described as
"functionfing] as a religion in [one's] life"" 3 ) what Justice Harlan called
4
"conscience" or "personal ethical considerations.""
Deciding which of the above choice of words is preferable is not the
purpose of the present discussion. Rather, Justice Harlan's concurring
opinion in Welsh is considered here to show that the delineative effect
of the Welsh plurality's definition of religion (or whatever term the reader
prefers) was neutral enough to satisfy even the strict religious neutrality
required by Justice Harlan. Because the Seeger-Welsh functional definition of religion does not exclude any human concern on the basis of object
content, but instead excludes from religion when lack of subjective commitment to the chosen object is demonstrated, real neutrality is preserved
without renderingthe definition meaningless.
Id. at 357-58.
110 Id. at 366-67 (emphasis supplied).
"'1 Id. at 358.
112 See text accompanying notes 38-43 supra.
113 398 U.S. at 340.
114 See id. at 358-59 nn. 9 & 10. Thus, Justice Harlan deemed "the common denominator"
of those qualifying for § 6(j) exemption after Welsh to be "the intensity of moral conviction
with which a belief is held." Id. at 358.
109
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A Hidden Monotheism?

The second ground for criticizing the exclusionary aspect of the SeegerWelsh definition is a most perplexing one. In Justice Black's opinion in
6
Welsh, "deeply held" beliefs," 5 "deeply and sincerely" held beliefs," and
'' 7
"beliefs held with the strength of traditional religious convictions,
when they imposed a duty of conscience, were, as regarded the believer's
subjective commitment to his beliefs, equated with the Seeger concept of
beliefs occupying a place analogous to orthodox belief in God, that is
(per Seeger), beliefs based upon a faith to which all else is subordinate.
This equation was at work throughout Justice Black's Welsh opinion, and
at one point he expressly stated:
If an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs that are purely ethical
or moral in source and content but that nevertheless impose upon him a
duty of conscience to refrain from participating in any war at any time,
those beliefs certainly occupy in the life of that individual "a8 place parallel
to that filled by... God" in traditionally religious persons."
So far in this essay, the Welsh plurality's equation of depth or intensity of
belief that imposes a duty of conscience with belief-in-God-like commitment, has been uncritically accepted and utilized. But now the "Disturbing Question" must be faced: Is it the same thing (a) to require that conscientious beliefs must be deeply or strongly felt in order to be religious
and (b) to require that beliefs must be based on a faith to which all else
is subordinate,analogous to a deeply felt orthodox belief in God, in order
to be religious? (The problem is not so much that there is no end to the
number of meanings that could be given, and are given, to "orthodox belief in God." Seeger made it clear enough that all that is required is suprem9 Nor is the problem
acy over other commitments in the believer's life."
that of "lukewarm belief" in a supreme being, traditional or otherwise;
for even the most orthodox belief would have to satisfy the requirement
of real subjective commitment when and to the extent such a requirement
was appropriate to the particular decision in question. Nor is the problem
that of a person's having a weak conscientious scruple as to the particular
behavior legally required or forbidden, with the scruple grounded in a
strong faith, for example, deep belief in God as the ground for a "mild
opposition" to war. If strong, deeply felt commitment regarding the
particular behavior were lacking in the individual, but were required for
20
the religiously based legal exemption,' strong belief in whatever the weak
11Id. at 342.
116 Id. at 340.

7 Id. (emphasis supplied).
118 Id.

380 U.S. at 176.
Such a requirement does exist with respect to § 6(j) exemptions from combatant service,
as most anyone who has ever attempted to claim conscientious objector status will readily attest.
"19

120
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scruple was "grounded" upon would be immaterial; the individual would
therefore fail to qualify for that religious exemption.) The problem raised
in the question stated above is this: If we legally define religion as requiring commitment to something to which the believer deems all else subordinate, are we not, after all, smuggling in some quasi-theological content in
the sense that by requiring one controlling faith, we are requiring a kind
of "functional monotheism." Why not drop the Seeger "to which all else
is subordinate" requirement and simply use the Welsh plurality's "deeply-felt-beliefs-imposing-a-duty-of-conscience" test, understanding that the
individual may well serve a host of competing "deities"? If we don't go
that far, wouldn't the "delineative effect" of Seeger-Welsh serve mainly
to exclude functionally "polytheistic" religions? These questions suggest
both the obvious conclusion that parts (a) and (b) of the earlier posited
"Disturbing Question" do not constitute precisely the same test and the
less obvious conclusion that only requirement (a) is genuinely theologically neutral.
The second conclusion is less obvious for this reason: The "functional
monotheism" suggested by the Seeger "to-which-all-else-is-subordinate test"
need not be taken in a theological sense. In other words, no matter how
many "gods" one may serve, "one" is still himself, an individual. There is
a limit to the number of objects to which he can be deeply and intensely
("religiously") attached. Though this number may be more than one, the
believer is still one. His life may be torn between or among conflicting
commitments; to some extent we all are. The fracturing of one's personality by such conflicts may, of course, reach such proportions as to be a matter of psychiatric concern. However, most persons are able to integrate
somewhat their conflicting commitments. "Functional Polytheism," then,
often includes an overriding synthesis; not in the sense of the individual's
negating all conflict, but in the sense of his constructing a modus vivendi.
Consequently, in practice there should be much less difference between
requirement (a) (deeply felt conscientious beliefs) and requirement (b)
(all else subordinate) than might at first appear. Since humans have a
finite amount of energy, 121 there are limits as to how many things one can
feel intensely. More importantly, the Seeger "all else subordinate" test
does not require that the particular belief in question (such as objection to
participating in war) should be supreme to all else. What it does require
is that the power or being or faith or (Welsh) ethical stance upon which
the objection is based be of supreme importance. Even a "polytheistic"
synthesis of varying commitments could so function.
In the case of an exemption to required or prohibited conduct, claimed
on the basis of religion, if the relevant components of a "polytheistic"
121 The "amount" may vary with the individuals, but whatever the "amount" for any one

person, it is still finite.
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synthesis were too inconsistent to meet the "all else subordinate" test with
any coherence (for example, if a conscientious objector to war who also intensely believed in the propriety of genocide with respect to all defenseless people), it is most unlikely that the requisite beliefs for that particular
-religiously based exemption (such as conscientious objection to war) would
qualify as "deeply held" under requirement (a) anyway.
In situations in which religious scruples conflict with legally required or
forbidden behavior, the inquiry is thus apt to be focused up on the sincerity
and intensity of the scruple itself (the belief as to the propriety of that
particular behavior), rather than on the inner workings of one's grounds
for the belief. And as for possible situations in which scruples regarding
particular secularly cognizable behavior were not involved, the question
of the internal consistency of beliefs would not be relevant.
Thus, so-called tests (a) and (b) referred to in the "Disturbing Question" would in practice operate similarly if not always identically. If a
valid instance should arise in which, for other than religiously neutral
reasons, the "all else subordinate" test resulted in religious discrimination, then the Welsh "deeply held beliefs" test should prevail. It should
be noted that the "imposition of a duty of conscience" aspect, which is
the requirement that the strongly held beliefs be "conscientious" ones,
does not really help in applying the Welsh test previously referred to as
part (a) in the "Disturbing Question." Unless we wish to import the
psychoanalytically oriented idea that one's conscientiously felt duty must
stem from his superego demands, a matter as elusive of proof as any theological claim, stating that one's action or refusal to act must stem from
conscience tells us only that the person must deem his decision with respect to the behavior in question to be "right" or "good" or at least preferable to a contrary stance. The party in question could fulfill this "conscience" requirement simply by asserting that he did deem his decision to
be "right" or "good" or preferable to alternative courses. For us to go
further and declare that behavior is conscientious only when it relates to
some "higher" or "more fundamental" concern than some "lower" or
"less fundamental" concern is, functionally, to make the same mistake made
in constitutionally defining religion to mean belief in a traditionally understood Supreme Being. The mistake is this: Both approaches define
what can be religion, in one instance, conscience, in the other, according to the content of the object or ground of commitment. A realistic,
functional approach to first amendment religious protection prohibits both
approaches with equal vigor. The only religiously neutral delineation between religion and nonreligion or between conscientious and not conscientious is one confined solely to an assessment of one's subjective commitment. Such a neutral delineation is to be found in the "sincerely and
deeply felt" requirement, not in the requirement of "duty to conscience."
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All men act in accordance with what they deem to be "good," whatever
that term means to them. To deny this premise is to undercut the norms
of genuine religious liberty and nonestablishment. 122
Since the possibility of substantial conflict between tests (a) and (b)
in the "Disturbing Question" is more fantasy than likely reality, this essay
will continue to treat them as different ways of expressing the same result
- a delineation between religion and nonreligion that does not disciminate according to the grounds of one's beliefs. In other words, the definition of religion found in Welsh, test (a) above, is seen as carrying the
Seeger definition, test (b) above, to its logical conclusion, hence the appropriateness of the "Seeger-Welsh" label.
3.

Too Impractical?

Further considering the Seeger-Welsh definition's delineative effect, the
problem of administering a requirement of subjective commitment is now
to be recognized as a catch-all third ground of critique. To the extent that
a standard (or standards) of subjective commitment is (are) utilized in
dealing with "religion and state" situations, factual determinations of persons' religious commitment have to be made by various official bodies,
both judicial and administrative. Though the Seeger--Welsh approach to
determining whether a belief is "religious" seems simple enough, how well
would it function in day-to-day administration? How would a factfinder
determine whether a belief or set of beliefs functioned as a matter of
ultimate importance to the alleged believer(s)? Where would one draw
the line between ultimate, penultimate, antepenultimate, etc., if the individual or group possessed a scale of more or less deeply felt concerns?
When would the locus of decision involve ascertaining the "religion-ness"
of the individual or of some group? (All members? Most members?
Or a representative sample?)113 Another problem, that of divided or
conflicting deeply felt loyalties, was the concern of the previous ground of
critique. Even if the problem of "functional polytheism" is resolved in a
given case, the factfinder would still be confronted with the task of measuring the depth of commitment. How do we quantify the degree of one's
commitment? Is this a matter of common sense? ("Deep commitment
is deep; shallow commitment is shallow"?) What factors would lead us
to believe our chosen standard(s) of subjective adherence was (were) met?
Duration of commitment? But what of "recent converts"? For example,
in the conscientious objector situation, what if a registrant were shown to
have engaged in war-like behavior five years before claiming his objec122 The constitutional invalidity of limiting what can be "religion" in the free exercise area
by purporting to limit what beliefs can be "conscientious," is discussed in the text accompanying
notes 216-24 infra.
123 The individual-versus-group problem is apt to arise in connection with any legal definition
of religion one chooses, be it Seeger-Welsh or whatever.
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tion? Or two years before ?124 Even if a rule-of-thumb "cut-off date"
were established, what kind of behavior would prove insincerity or weak
commitment regarding a claimed religious belief? Again using § 6(j)
conscientious objection as an example, what kind of behavior should be
deemed sufficiently "war-like" to cause us to doubt a registrant's sincerity
or strength of belief? A conviction for criminal assault? Aggressive
speech? What if the registrant's sincere and deeply-felt scruples against
killing in war were the result of an agonizing spiritual and psychological
struggle to harness his own aggressive impulses of which he was either
consciously aware or which he had perhaps repressed from conscious
awareness ?125
One is, at this point, reminded of Whitehead's advice to seek simplicity
and then mistrust it. None of the above practical questions suggest easy,
intuitively attainable answers. However, it should not be the occasion for
undue dismay that these and other questions can be asked concerning this
or any attempt at a general formula to deal with an almost infinitely variable dimension of human experience. If-the theoretical simplicity of the
Seeger-Welsh definition is basically valid, this same simplicity should hardly be a hindrance to the development of acceptable refinements, which
should and would result from its case-by-case application. One senses that
the lack of such a theoretical tool leaves decisionmakers in a decidedly
worse situation.
Further regarding the problems of practicality, it should be recognized
that the burden the definition would place on the factfinder to ascertain
sincerity and even strength of subjective commitment is far from being
unique to the Seeger-Welsh formulation. The criminal law, the law of
contracts, indeed the legal system as a whole requires the factfinder to inquire (or purport to inquire) into the human psyche (Greek for "soul"
as well as mind) as a normal component of the system's day-by-day operation. The necessity to do so here is no more inherently difficult for the
factfinder than determining mens rea or even the "reasonable man standard
of due care."
4.

Oppressive?

A fourth possible means of criticizing the Seeger-Welsh definition's
delineative effect is to argue that the very process of determining whether
an individual's subjective commitment is of sufficient strength to qualify
as "religious" necessarily constitutes an unacceptable intervention by gov124 Concerning these practical considerations in general and the "duration of commitment"
problem in particular, I am indebted to Professor John Mansfield's oral discussion of the conscientious objector area in his Church and State course, Yale Law School, Fall, 1971. Blame for any
misuse is mine.
12 5
See generally Rapaport, The Autonomy of the Ego, 15 BULLETIN OF THE MENNINGER
CLINIC 113-23 (1951); the legend of Moses concludes with Moses' confession, "That's what I
was made of! I fought against it and that's how I became what I am." Id. at 113.
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eminent into a person's innermost domain of privacy. Even conceding
the religious neutrality of the Seeger-Welsh definition, this position would
deem any factual inquiry an inherently oppressive intrusion by the civil
order into an area (the human soul) about which the civil order has no
proper interest whatsoever. The answer to this argument must assume
(and require!) that any legal fact-finding process is conducted within the
limits of procedural due process generously defined in favor of respect
for the dignity of the person. (That this ideal is often not achieved in
practice is a problem applicable to the legal system generally rather than
peculiarly to matters explicitly regarded as within the "religion and state"
area.) With the assumption and requirement of adequate procedural due
process protection, the response to this fourth ground of critique is this
question: Which of the following two alternatives is more destructive of
individual freedom? Again using conscientious objection to military service as an example, the alternatives are as follows. First, conscientious
objector status may be denied in toto. Force even those whose very souls
are unalterably and fervently opposed to killing people into combatant
military service. If at any point they refuse to obey orders, punish them
according to law regardless of their deeply felt compunctions, thus treating everyone equally and blissfully avoiding governmental inquiry into
any individual's beliefs. Alternatively, conscientious objection to combatant or any military service could be allowed but with vigorous inquiry. 2
into the beliefs and feelings of those claiming to object' 27 in order to ferret
out pretenders who lack deeply-felt scruples against participating in war.
Even after having taken account of the substantial ambiguities and
sometimes grossly erroneous outcomes of any human factfinding enterprise, whether due to unconscious or deliberate bias or to a host of other
possible difficulties, and after having also recognized the special uncertainty in assessing any "state of mind," it is still difficult to believe that
the second alternative is not preferable to the first in terms of preserving
functional religious liberty or, if one prefers another term, human dignity.
It is no solution to the necessity of choosing between the alternatives to
posit a third alternative so as to allow the military draftee to claim conscientious objector status and be taken at his word without any factual
inquiry. That is a fine and easy answer in situations in which political reality and the policymaker's own sense of social responsibility would allow
him to treat the mere allegation of religiously based commitment as
enough to overcome all competing secular concerns. The hard question
posed by comparing the alternatives is: What do you do when the competing secular interests are, or are thought to be, great enough to require
126 The present machinery for doing this with respect to § 6(j) objectors is indicated at note
65 supra.
27
1 One who deemed the inquiry worse than having to fight is, of course, "free" to avoid the
inquiry by electing not to claim conscientious objector status.
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that real subjective religious commitment be established in order for the
religious claim to be worthy of legal deference? In such cases (whether
or not conscientious objector service is rightly included as one of them 2 8),
"inquiry intrusion" seems less objectionable to individual liberty than "conduct intrusion." (The "inquiry intrusion" can, of course, only occur when
the party himself elects to seek a religiously grounded benefit or immunity,
thus attempting to avoid "conduct intrusion.") It is better that government should try to decide whose claimed religious grounds are bona fide
according to a neutral standard of subjective commitment, than to force
people to behave in a way repugnant to their deepest beliefs when the social cost of deferring to their scruples is an acceptable one.
IV.

FURTHER THEORETICAL PROBLEMS
OF RELIGION AND THE STATE

A.

The "Religion-Blindness" of Kurland and Others

Probably no legal commentator's contribution to the American church
and state discussion has received more attention and generated more controversy than that of Professor Philip Kurland's thesis, which he has stated
as follows:
The freedom and separation clauses should be read as stating a single precept: that government cannot utilize religion as a standard for action or inaction because these clauses, read together as they should be, prohibit classification in terms of religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a burden. This test is meant to provide a starting point for the solution to
12 9
problems brought before the Court, not a mechanical answer to them.

Kurland's opposition to any "classification in terms of religion either to
confer a benefit or to impose a burden" may fairly be described as a plea
for "religion-blindness" on the part of government. 180 Kurland's thesis is
128A plausible argument can be made that in the case of conscientious objection to military
service, particularly when the nation is not involved in an attack on its homeland or in a declared
war, the registrant's decision to claim objector status itself ought to be evidence enough of sufficient commitment. This argument would rest in part on the supposition that sufficient extralegal sanctions exist to deter one from attaching the conscientious objector label to himself unless
his feelings against military service were deep. This argument may well apply to more types
of religiously based claims for immunity from civil norms than might at first appear. Anyone
claiming a religiously based exemption from socially approved and legally sanctioned norms
pays the price of somewhat setting himself apart from the majority merely by his act of asserting
the claim. It is, however, unrealistic to expect that this argument would carry the day legislatively or judicially in all cases; in other words, society is apt to grant religious exemption from
some civil norms only if it is satisfied that bona fide commitment has been established. (Even
if the process of ascertaining sincerity or strength of commitment gives no greater reliability
than the person's own assertion itself, the ritual serves a real function: it satisfies society's reluctance to grant too easily a license for substantial deviance.)
129 p. KuRtANi,
RELIGION AND THE LAw 112 (1962) [hereinafter referred to as P. KURLAND].

130 This most apt characterization of Kurland's position was used as the title of Leo Pfeffer's
review of the Kurland book; Pfeffer, Book Review, 15 STAN. L. REV. 389 (1963).
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a tempting one, for at first glance it appears to capture the essence of
neutrality and fair play between .religion and the state. Also tempting is
the apparent but not clearly stated implication that the need for a constitutionally valid legal definition of religion can be (always? usually? sometimes?) avoided, since government could not use religion as a standard
for governmental action or inaction. 131
The possibility of avoiding a first amendment definition of religion
even under a Kurland regime of "religion-blindness" is a highly debatable
matter.' 32 One wonders how the law would always have assurance that
it was not "utiliz[ing] religion as a standard for action or inaction" if the
law lacked any understanding of the term. Kurland dearly would not be
Satisfied with a test that simply asked whether the word "religion" appeared in the statute.' 3 To go much beyond such literalism would seem
to require a constitutional definition of religion in order to enforce effectively the prohibition of any religious classification. 3 4 Whether or not
one agrees with the prior assertion, the more important question to ask of
the Kurland thesis is this: Does it promise to effect the kind of "church
and state" configuration that would most fully actualize the constitutional
values of religious freedom and nonestablishment? Considered from this
perspective, Kurland's proposal seems inadvisable.
To begin with, there is no assurance that Kurland's laudable goal of
state neutrality with respect to religion will be fostered by government's
nonuse of "religion as a standard for action or inaction." Mansfield's
example of governmental support of military chaplains' 5 well illustrates
this lack of assurance. Despite all the constitutional and other questions
that may be raised about maintaining a military chaplaincy, Mansfield's
point has merit. Men are conscripted into the military and usually removed
from their home surroundings; consequently they are often deprived of,
among other things, the support of their religious community. This deprivation for some soldiers of their usual religious life comes at a time of
considerable physical danger, when religious support may be most needed.
This substantial burden on some soldiers' right of access to their religious
community is of course fully permissible under Kurland's formula, since
conscription into military service involves no "classification in terms of
religion" to grant a benefit or impose a burden. But the Kurland for131 So long as the Court may say what is and what is not a proper religious practice-

and it admitted that bigamy cannot be defended on that ground - it must reserve itself exactly that discretion which it forbade to the city officials in Cantwell: it "authorize[s] an official to determine whether the cause is a religious one ... thus establishing
a censorship of religion.
P. KURLANID, supra note 129, at 61, quoting from Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 596, 578
(1941).
.32 See, e.g., Mansfield, Book Review, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 212, 215-18 (1964).
133 See P. KURLAND, supra note 129, at 18.
134 See Kauper, Book Review, 41 TExAs L. REv. 467, 470-71 (1963).
135 Mansfield, supra note 132, at 220.
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mula appears to break down when one asks: Ought government be allowed
to alleviate its own burden upon religious exercise by providing, as it
now does, chaplains to make available religious support to those soldiers
who wish it? Since such support involves governmental action utilizing
the category of religion to confer a benefit, it would seem to violate
the Kurland proviso. Thus a substantial, implicit burden imposed on religion by government could not be corrected by that same government because to do so would require explicit governmental recognition of religion.
Another instance in which Kurland's formula has anything but a neutral result concerns the controversial matter of governmental aid to sectarian education. As Leo Pfeffer has observed, the "no religious classification test" would seem to legitimize tax-supported governmental aid to
parochial schools, provided the law authorizing such subsidies included
"secular" as well as church-related private schools." 6 There would, in fact,
seem to be no constitutional limit to the scope of such aid under the
Kurland thesis so long as the government did not use religion as a standard for its action or inaction. Thus, a broadly framed statute granting
aid to "all educational institutions" according to a religiously neutral formula (such as student enrollment) could, as applied, operate so that tax
monies could even support the total budget of sectarian theological seminaries. To posit any similarity between such a result and, for example,
the thinking of Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance would take a most
vivid imagination.
The above two examples, military chaplaincy and sectarian religious
education, 137 suggest that "religion-blindness" would have more of a helterskelter than neutral effect on religion-state relations. In the former example, the effect would be substantially burdensome on religion; in the latter,
substantial favoritism to religion on the part of government would be
permitted. The "blindness" metaphor is thus on point but incomplete;
not only would government be blind with respect to religion, it would
also be affecting religion in all sorts of ways, while being incapable of assessing the consequences of its actions with respect to religion. Perhaps
a more complete metaphor would be that of a blind giant walking through
a village. At one moment our blind giant might be ripping the roof
off the village church; in the next moment he might be physically supporting the roof from falling onto the pews. In both instances, he would
be blissfully oblivious of the consequences of his actions.
It should also be asked whether it is really possible for the giant (government) to be religion-blind. Consider again the question of state fi136 Pfeffer, supra note 130, at 392, 402.
137 After he had just considered 20 situations of church-state impact were Kurland's thesis to
be adopted, Pfeffer observed, "I could go on almost indefinitely. But this is a game any number
can play. Perhaps the reader may want to amuse himself by thinking up other instances in which
application of the Kurland imperative would wreak havoc with existing practices and patterns."
Id. at 406.
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nancial aid to private education. By authorizing grants to "all private educational institutions," wouldn't the state still have to "open its eyes" and
make a classification with respect to religion in order to confer (or not
confer) the benefit ?138 In granting aid to sectarian religious institutions,
wouldn't the state in effect be saying, "We officially recognize the teachings of X religion as includable within the larger category of 'education' "? If it excluded the religious institution from its general program
of aid to private education, the state would be saying, "We officially refuse to recognize the teachings of X religion as includable within the
general category of 'secular education' because these teachings are those
of a religious body." Whether the state includes or excludes religious institutions from its aid to education, it must, in effect, act with respect to the
category, "religious education." This is so even though the term "religious education" or some equivalent category is not expressly recited in
the statute.
The more important basis for rejecting the doctrine of religion-blindness is its potential adverse effect on religious freedom. Kurland and
those who concur with him rely on the speech, press, assembly, and petition for redress of grievances clauses in the first amendment as sufficient
to protect free exercise of religion. This position is harmless enough when
the matter at issue only involves religious belief, religious speech (including "symbolic speech"), religious publication, religious assembly, petition, or some combination of these. But reference must again be made to
the Seeger-Welsh understanding of religion as a commitment to what one
believes is of ultimate importance. Such commitment is not confined to
internal belief, speech, press, assembly, and petition for redress of grievances. Religious commitment involves the way one lives one's life, which
by definition must include more than one's beliefs and the communication
of ideas, Potentially, any human behavior is includable if the requisite
subjective commitment is present.
The idea of allowing a person's religious convictions to give him any
special consideration with respect to his legal duties in the civil order has
been rejected by others besides Kurland. No one's rejection of the idea
has been more vigorously presented than that of Justice Frankfurter:
The religious liberty which the Constitution protects has never excluded
legislation of general scope not directed against doctrinal loyalties of particular sects. Judicial nullification of legislation cannot be justified by attributing to the framers of the Bill of Rights views for which there is no
historic warrant. Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long
struggle for religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to
a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs.
The mere possession of religious convictions which contradict the relevant
138The discussion of this examp!e, for the remainder of this paragraph in the text, owes a
pervasive indebtedness to Mansfield, supra note 124; any misuse is mine.
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concerns of a political society does not relieve the citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities. The necessity for this adjustment has
again and again been recognized .... In all these cases the general laws in
question, upheld in their application to those who refused obedience from
religious conviction, were manifestations of specific powers of government
deemed by the legislature essential to secure and maintain that orderly,
tranquil, and free society without which religious toleration itself is unattainable.' 39
The Gobitis Court upheld the power of the public schools, pursuant to
state regulation, to expel children of the Jehovah's Witnesses sect for
refusing to salute and pledge allegiance to the American flag. When
the Supreme Court overruled its Gobitis holding in West Virginia State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,140 Justice Frankfurter vigorously reiterated his
earlier position, this time in a dissenting opinion:
Religious minorities as well as religious majorities were to be equal in the
eyes of the political state. But Jefferson and the others also knew that
minorities may disrupt society. It never would have occurred to them to
write into the Constitution the subordination of the general civil authority
of the state to sectarian scruples.
The constitutional protection of religious freedom terminated disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It gave religious equality, not civil
immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not
freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma. . . . Otherwise each individual could set up his own censor against obedience to laws
deemed for the public good by those whose business it is to
conscientiously
41
make laws.'
Justice Frankfurter went on to say that:
The individual conscience may profess what faith it chooses. It may affirm and promote that faith - in the language of the Constitution, it may
"exercise" it freely - but it cannot thereby restrict community action
through political organs in matters of community concern, so long as the
action is not asserted in a discriminatory way either openly or by stealth.
One may have the right to practice one's religion and at the same time owe
42
the duty of formal obedience to laws that run counter to one's beliefs.'
Justice Frankfurter's argumentation rests in part on his premise that
courts cannot exclude from a particular legal duty only those who religiously or conscientiously object; he saw only two possible choices-a
statute must either be upheld or struck down for all those within its intended scope. 143 This premise is rejected in this essay and, more imporMinersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594-95 (1940) (footnotes omitted).
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
141 Id. at 653.
142 d. at 655-56.
It cannot modify or qualify, it cannot make exceptions
143 "A court can only strike down ....
to a general requirement." Id. at 651-52.
139

140
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tantly, was rejected by the Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner.14
However, Justice Frankfurther's reasoning quoted above is still relevant
to the question of whether religious or conscientious objectors should be
allowed any special immunity from adherence to general legal norms.
His position centers upon the fear that taking into account a persons' religious/conscientious scruples vis-A-vis their legal duties would result in social chaos and in an intolerable burden upon the judiciary.'4 5 This fear
must be regarded as being grossly out of proportion to any conceivable
outcome for at least three reasons.
First, as already noted, it has been firmly (and rightly) decided that
religious or conscientious grounds do not excuse conduct resulting in substantial and genuine social harm. 46 The correctness of this proposition as
a controlling principle is virtually uncontested. Opinions do of course
differ as to exactly where "substantial and genuine" social harm should begin and thus where the domain of individual prerogatives should end.
The Supreme Court's marking of this domain has at times shown a tendency to find substantial social harm more readily than the actual situation seemed to indicate. 147 (However, there have been exceptions. 1 48)
Although any such assessment depends on one's own value judgments, it
would be difficult to convince most knowledgeable observers that the
Court has "over-protected" religious and conscientious idiosyncrasies to the
detriment of social control. The aforementioned principle that has
guided the Court, namely, that religious or conscientious commitments
do not excuse behavior causing real and significant social harm, would in
no way be undercut by anything being advocated in this essay.
Second, with reference to the fear of an undue burden on courts and
administrative agencies, it must be remembered that the idea of limited
religious/conscientious immunity to legal norms is being advocated in the
context of a democratic society. Even after allowing for its substantial
imperfections, a reasonably democratic government will not often promulgate legal norms contrary to the wishes of the majority of its citizens. (If
such norms do exist in significant dimension, one does not, by definition,
have even an approximate democracy.) Not only are most people in a
democracy usually in accord with most of its legal norms, but a democratic government is unlikely to adopt many legal norms that are contrary
144 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
145 Concerning Justice Frankfurter's qualms about the potential judicial burden, see 319 U.S.
at 658-61. "'[I]t
presents awful possibilities to try to encase the solution of these problems within the rigid prohibitions of unconstitutionality." Id. at 661.
146 E.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). Arguably, the state's restriction upon
religious freedom here was more onerous than a "substantial and genuine social harm" test would
prescribe.
147 E.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (child labor law overrides religiously
grounded activity of the selling by a minor of Jehovah Witness literature).
148 See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944), which is discussed in note 99 supra.
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to the deeply felt wishes of a numerically large minority of its citizens.
The political clout of a large enfranchised minority will usually require
political compromise on the part of the majority. Though the legislative outcome may not perfectly satisfy anyone, it is not apt to be strongly
antithetical to any large minority's demands. And the more intensely a
large minority feels about a particular issue, the more it is apt to make its
feelings count in the legislative process. Thus, to the extent that our
society's legislative process is democratically operated, the number of persons feeling intensely ("religiously") opposed to any given legal norm is
apt to be small.'49 The burden of administering claims of religiously
based immunity would be limited accordingly.
But, one might ask, what about the "Let George Do It" problem?
Wouldn't there be a large number of persons who, though not themselves
opposed to the enactment of a particular legal norm in general, would
be "religiously" opposed to its being applied to them personally? The
military draft in wartime should be a good example of this problem. Not
only is the legal duty involved uniquely onerous, but the government has
usually made some legislative provision for conscientious objection.
What more inviting situation for numerous claims could be envisioned?
We should therefore expect an onslaught of people religiously opposed
to their own personal participation in war and therefore an onslaught of
military conscientious objector claimants.
The experience of the nation in this area has not generally borne out
the above expectation. As Mansfield observes:
[A]t no time in the country's history, at least not since the Revolution, has
the refusal of conscientious objectors to perform military service constituted
a serious threat to the safety of the nation. The number of persons involved
has always been comparatively small, and the granting of an exemption
has never constituted a serious drain on the manpower necessary to carry
on military operations. This fact doubtless furnishes part of the explanation of why Congress has been willing to grant exemption and why the
public has by and large accepted the exemption. 50
149 A possible exception to the likelihood of the number being small is this. Situations could
arise in which there was intense feeling about an issue on the part of those deemed too young to
be entitled to have their wishes counted in the voting-political-legislative process. (This problem
was reduced, not eliminated, by lowering the voting age to 18.) When such situations do occur,

these persons, denied their day at the ballot box, seem especially entitled to present their reli-

giously grounded objections to whatever legal duty is being imposed on them--even at the cost
of a heavier administrative burden.
15 0 Mansfield, supra note 26, at 45. Precise figures are difficult to obtain. Concerning
the Civil War,
[the total of the figures available is 1,071 with 406 of that number representing noncombatants recorded in one eight month period. Speculation would put the total number of religious objectors in the Civil War at somewhere between 1,200 and 1,500
men-a small enough percentage of the more than two million men that the North
and the South committed to battle.
L. ScHLIsSEL, Preface in CONsciENcE IN AMRmIcA 91 (1968). Concerning World War II,
"[the Selective Service System's] own estimate is that there were 25,000 conscientious objectors.
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Exemption from wartime military service is dearly the "acid test" for
assessing the administrative feasibility of religiously based immunities
from legal norms. The incentives for claiming an exemption are at their
greatest here, yet even this experience suggests that most people will not
choose to attempt to exempt themselves from socially decided norms.
One can only speculate on the reasons for this.151 Whatever they are, sufficient extralegal sanctions, internal or external, are at work to generate
compliance with laws that are seen by a strong community majority as
reasonable and generally necessary for the social good. In a democratic
society, laws not commanding such compliance by the vast majority are
themselves in need of serious reappraisal.15
Despite the foregoing considerations, one may still decide, on a cost
versus benefit basis, that government cannot afford the administrative expense of taking individuals' deeply felt scruples into account. However,
that judgment ought to be made in the light of what other matters are
presently judged important enough to occupy the time of courts and administrators. 53
Third, intimations of sure social breakdown were every man allowed
to "censor" the demands of government according to his own conscience
serve only to knock down a straw man. The position at issue is not one of
government's abdicating its authoritative responsibility in the secular
sphere. It is government itself (via its own authoritative decisionmakers)
that must decide whether confficting secular interests are insubstantial
enough to allow taking a party's relevant religious/conscientious commitments into account in a given decision. And it is government itself that
must judge the sincerity and intensity of religious/conscientious commitments when it deems such a determination relevant. Even with its eyes
open as to persons' religious commitments, government is still the
"giant" in this world vis-a-vis conscience or church.15 4 This was so even
when the church was at its medieval height of power. Henry VIII was
Other researchers judge the number to have been closer to 50,000, a small percentage of the 13
million Americans who served in the armed forces between 1941 and 1945." Id. at 214. In
1965, there were
2,416 persons classified I-0 and performing civilian work of national importance and
8,745 classified I-0 but not yet called by their draft boards. In addition, there [were]
approximately 7,000 persons classified I-A-O for non-combatant service in the armed
forces. Fewer than 100 persons [were) "confirmed absolutists," who will not even register for the draft or refuse to cooperate in other ways that make them liable to prosecution.

Mansfield, supranote 26, at 45, citing Wall St. J. Sept. 22, 1965, at 16, cols. 4,5.
151 Cf. note 128 supra.

152 In view of the immense human and economic loss caused by war, any military activity
by the state lacking overwhelming popular support seems dearly unwarranted in a democratic
society.
15 3 See, e.g., text accompanying notes 159-61 infra.
154 That government may indeed appear dwarf-like in its attempt to regulate giant economic
interests should not cloud the metaphor appropriate to describing government vis-k-vis a human
conscience.
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hardly the first European monarch to realize his sovereignty over social
decisionmaking this side of heaven. He was only a bit more forthright
about the matter than were some others. Whether or not one agrees with
this historical judgment, one must concede that, as between government
and an individual conscience, government carries the club; it is government that can decapitate or imprison or deprive (or allow dominant economic power to deprive) an individual of freedom in a myriad of subtle
and not so subtle ways.
The viable alternative to Justice Frankfurter's position is merely this:
Let all authoritative secular decisionmakers take into account persons'
subjective religious scruples that are relevant to the decision at hand. This
obviously does not give the individual the legal right to exempt himself
from the requirements of law for religious reasons. Rather, it gives the
individual the right to have his religious scruples recognized as a legally
relevant factor along with all other pertinent factors to be weighed by
the governmental decisionmaker in deciding the outcome.
Actually it is quite misleading to speak of "special religious immunity" for persons with deeply felt scruples. The "special immunity" lan:
guage is misleading not only because it wrongly suggests that the immunity must follow automatically whenever religious grounds are claimed; it
is also misleading in that it suggests that categories of immunity (full
or partial) are something very rare in the legal system. Nothing could
be further from the truth. The criminal law, for example, is replete with
"special(?) exceptions" that can function to absolve one from liability or
to mitigate the severity of the offense or the sanction imposed or both.
Depending on the crime involved, such diverse factors as (among others)
ignorance or mistake, public or domestic authority, prevention of crime,
self-defense, defense of others, defense of home or other property, necessity, coercion, provocation, immaturity, mental disease or defect, record of
previous good character, peculiarities of an identifiable sub-culture, and
even entrapment may serve to eliminate or reduce criminal liability or
punishment for conduct generally deemed criminal.
A similar dimension of "special(?) exceptions" may be found in any
area of the law, from contract and property to constitutional law and taxation. (In the latter, it has developed into an inscrutable, if not perverse,
art.) These observations are hardly news to anyone who has gone past
the first month of the traditional law school exposure and seen one general rule of law after another crumble under the weight of exception after
exception, with exceptions to the exceptions, and on and on.
In the light of a legal system that is itself virtually a "law of exceptions," the question must be asked: Why then are at least some knowledgeable persons, themselves having a deeply felt commitment to libertarian values, opposed to having a court ever consider an individual's reli-
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gious scruples as a valid factor in its decisionmaking? The answer or
answers must lie somewhere else than in a fear of resultant civil chaos.
(Despite the immense diversity of religious sects and persuasions in this
country, civil disorder due to persons' engaging in the free exercise of religion has never ranked in our list of the top ten pressing social problems.)
Three possible answers other than fear of chaos invite consideration:
1. Governmental Ignorance About Religion
There appears to be a particularly frequent incidence of acute judicial
humility whenever matters of religion are, as they sometimes must be, interjected into litigation. The extreme reluctance of American courts to
decide the merits of a property dispute if ecclesiastical issues are involved' 55 exemplifies this humility. In Watson v. Jones the Supreme
Court verbalized its own doubts about being able to deal with ecclesiastical matters:
Nor do we see that justice would be likely to be promoted by submitting
those decisions [of an ecclesiastical body] to review in the ordinary judicial tribunals. Each of these large and influential bodies (to mention no
others, let reference be had to the Protestant Episcopal, the Methodist Episcopal, and the Presbyterian churches), has a body of constitutional and ecclesiastical law of its own, to be found in their written organic laws, their
books of discipline, in their collection of precedents, in their usage and customs, which as to each constitute a system of ecclesiastical law and religious
faith that tasks the ablest minds to become familiar with. It is not to be
supposed that the judges of the civil courts can be as competent in the ecclesiastical law and religious faith of all these bodies as the ablest men in
each are in reference to their own. It would therefore be an appeal from
the more learned tribunal in the law which should decide the case, to one
which is less so. 156
Whatever the possible spiritual value of such humility, one wonders
about its appropriateness on the part of those who are charged with deciding disputes between parties. In any intra-church property dispute, at
least one interested party feels anything but content with the decision of
that religious body's "ablest men." (Quaere, how does the Court ascertain who is the final earthly decisionmaker within a given religious
group?) Is it consistent for a court to say, "We are too untrained in ecclesiology to help private parties decide their disputes even though the decision would have secularly cognizable consequences (such as who gets some
valuable property)," while that same court engages daily in decisionmaking covering other fields in which it equally lacks expertise? Why not also
155 See Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hall Memorial
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian
Orthodox Church in North America, 34-4 U.S. 94 (1952); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
679 (1871).
158 Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1871).
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leave the compelling legal problems relating to nuclear energy, environmental pollution, medical care, patentability, automatic date processing, etc.,
to the best trained experts? The obvious answer, the need for a disinterested decisionmaker with an overall social sense, applies equally to ecclesiastical disputes involving secularly cognizable interests. (Hopefully,
courts are not saying to ecclesiastical bodies, "Your problems simply aren't
worth our trying to understand them; but other categories of disputes are.")
Even if courts continue to shy away from offering much help in adjudicating the secular consequences of spiritual factionalism within religious
associations, their intellectual humility has no application with respect to a
neutral, nontheological, nonecclesiastical definition of religion like SeegerWelsh. If one can understand what is meant by such profundities as, "Put
your money where your mouth is," or, "Religion is not what you do only
on Sunday morning, but how you live the rest of the week," one can understand the theoretical content of this essay's explication of the Seeger-Welsh
definition of religion.
2.

Governmental "Incompetence" as to Religion

A more valid reason for judicial reluctance to "meddle in religion" has
been alluded to earlier in this essay. It involves a second type of judicial
or, more broadly and more accurately, governmental, self-designated "incompetence." The law, and thus the judge and legislator, "knows no heresy" not because of theological ignorance, but because the first amendment
forbids religious prescription on the part of government. This concern
does constitute a cogent reason for judicial reluctance to delve into ecclesiastical disputes, even when real wealth is at stake. Unwarranted "judicial activism" here would create a real danger to religious freedom and
nonestablishment. A case from Great Britain 57 is illustrative of this danger. The Free Church of Scotland had merged with the United Presbyterian Church to form a new body, the United Free Church. However, dissident members of the pre-merger Free Church, who refused to accede to
the merger, sued for recovery of the Free Church's property on the ground
that its transfer to the newly created United Free Church constituted a
"breach of trust," Holding for the dissident Free Church group on appeal,
the House of Lords required that the pre-merger Free Church's property
then in the hands of the new United Free Church be returned to the pursuers as trustees and "lawful representatives" of the pre-merger denomination. The Lords reached this result essentially because they viewed the
newly formed United Free Church's failure to adhere to the pre-merger
Free Church of Scotland's position favoring state establishment (support)
of religion as a breach of faith with the wishes of the past donors of the
pre-merger church's property. In so holding, the Lords were in effect say157 General Assembly of Free Church of Scotland v. Overtoun, [1904) A.C. 515 (Scot.).
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ing that a church is (and ought to be?) a body of people professing belief
in a system of unchangeable doctrines. In arguing for the right of the Free
Church majority to effect the merger, with the consequent transfer of property to the newly created body despite some change in church doctrine, dissenting Lord Macnaghten was implicitly saying this: A church is (and
ought to be?) a body of people engaging in an ongoing corporate religious
experiment who can, in accordance with their own legislative procedure,
develop and alter their stated positions (Wholly? Or as to "non-essential"
matters only?) from time to time. Had this case been decided under the
first amendment, neither view of what is the nature of a church would have
been within the competence of government to espouse, unless the premerger Free Church itself had all along espoused a reasonably dear position on the scope of permitted and unpermitted ecclesiastical change.
American courts are scrupulously adhering to both the religious freedom
and nonestablishment clause when they refuse to do a religious group's
religious decisionmaking for them. However, situations can arise in
which the religious body's own position, arrived at in accordance with its
own procedural rules, is stated in such a way that government could determine whether or not the sect's own duly promulgated ecclesiastical law is
being flouted without the governmental decisionmaker's implicitly or explicitly making religious prescriptions. For example: Church Y's constitution reads as follows: "Y Church shall meet without fail at 11:00 a.m.
every Sunday morning. This policy can only be changed by unanimous
vote of all members." The majority of Y Church later vote to merge with
Z Church and agree that the new YZ Church shall meet only once a
month. In such a case, a court could intervene to prevent the transfer of
Y Church's property to the YZ Church without in any way prescribing
ecclesiology or theology. The court would simply be honoring the contractual intent underlying this voluntary association with respect only to the
secularly cognizable (here, property) consequences of that voluntary agreement. However, if the religious body's proviso at issue in the litigation
was, "This church shall always do God's will," or, "This church shall always
adhere to the Holy Bible," a governmental decisionmaker could only ascertain whether the association's own procedural ground rules for decisionmaking were being violated. For a court to go beyond that and determine
such substantive religious questions as adherence to a creedal statement
would amount to the state's becoming a theologian. The conclusion voiced
in this last statement, while appropriate to the examples contained therein,
should not be allowed to spill over into the type of situation reflected in the
11:00 Sunday morning example. There, a court's refusal to intervene in
the dispute on the substantive merits would deny "religiously-tainted" parties the same protection given all others, namely, the right to have lawful
contractual obligations honored with respect to their secularly cognizable
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consequences. In other words, an over-extension of the "governmental incompetence with respect to religion" rubric can result in the government's
doing what it also has no competence to do under the first amendment,
namely, to discriminate against religion.
Discrimination against religion by over-extending the idea of governmental incompetence would occur with respect to the free exercise of religion under Frankfurter-Kurlandian religion-blindness. There is simply no
way that the state can refuse to take into account aii individual's adherence
to his deeply-felt life commitment or commitments in any particular governmental decision and suppose itself to be a religiously "neutral" government. But by what understanding of "neutrality" could the government
treat substantially affected economic interests as legally relevant to a given
decision and treat substantially affected individual consciences as irrelevant? The "incompetence" argument simply won't do here. Government
is still the giant vis-a-vis the rest of us. 158 Either it will be a fair and just
giant or it will be an irresponsible one (whether by cruelty, favoritism,
neglect, ignorance or incapacity). The giant can no more protect religious
freedom by ignoring it than it can protect other personal liberties or economic rights by ignoring them.
Nor is the state justified in ignoring a person's subjective commitment
in social decisionmaking because its roots are too intangible, too "merely
mental" a matter. Acting under enabling constitutional authority, Congress has moved to protect the external manifestations of intellectual expression by providing patent and copyright protection. (Unlike the protection of religious freedom, patent and copyright protection is merely
permitted by the Constitution rather than being constitutionally required.
And unlike the protection of religious freedom, copyright protection always
necessarily and inherently conflicts with the public's first amendment freedoms of speech and press to the extent that we are forbidden to echo the
words, music, and visual expressions of their creators.) Prestigious courts
have found it a proper use of their time and authority to ask, for example,
whether "Captain Marvel" infringed upon the idea manifestations in the
"Superman" series of comic strips;' 5 9 whether a record of a team of persons' observations of horses' positions at the start, various intermediate
stages, and finish of horse races, including distances between horses at
each stage, would be entitled to the considerable economic protection pro168 Note that we tend only to object to the giantness of government when it acts to restrict
our activities. When we need a policeman, judge, or soldier to protect us from harm from
others, we tend to accept government's giantness with unquestioning enthusiasm. For those
who are generally unhappy with the government-as-giant motif, i.e., who are unhappy with any
mode of authority, the unhappy alternative is anarchy, in which an individual has one or more
substitute giants to fear. This is a poor alternative to an authority system in which the individual
can himself comprise a part of the giant's stature, i.e., can be a part of government.
159 National Comics Pub., Inc. v. Fawcett Pub., Inc., 93 F. Supp. 349 (S.D.N.Y. 1950),
rev'd, 191 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1951).
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vided by the copyright law;160 and whether Jerome Kern's use of an eight
note counterpoise to the chorus melody of "Kalua" was an infringement
of a "substantial component part" of plaintiff's song, "Dardanella."''
The external manifestations of psyches, dealt with by courts in the
above examples, were deemed interests worthy of "special (?) protection"
in governmental decisionmaking. Should the behavioral manifestations of
religious commitment be treated with less deference? Is "psyche as soul"
to be accorded less consideration than "psyche as mind"? If one argues:
(a) that the expressions of psyche in the copyright examples are entitled to
be taken seriously by the decisionmaker because substantial wealth allocation is at stake (which it very often is!); and (b) that the failure of the
religion-blindness school to take religious conviction into account in decisionmaking is justifiable if no economic detriment is visited upon the
religious claimant, then one is simply restating the functional bias of the
religion-blind stance's operative effect. Contrary to the humane values of
its advocates, the unintended but utterly real consequence of religionblindness is to favor material (economic) values and to discriminate against
the non-economic values of the human spirit.
It is no answer to this criticism to argue that the individual human
spirit has, already been sufficiently taken into account in the process of legislative disionmaking. In the first place, it is primarily economic interests and economic considerations that shape the legislative output. More
importantly, we are dealing here with a constitutional imperative: the
state must not piohibit religious free exercise. If the legislature fails to
treat individuals' religious scruples with due deference, then the courts
must correct the oversight. (Such judicial protection is the minimal requisite for any constitutional freedom, let alone for one that the Supreme
Court has described as standing, along with freedom of speech and press,
"in a preferred position.' 1 62 ) The free exercise clause must be understood
as invalidating any implicit application of the notion that external expressions of human psyches are worth governmental consideration only if they
carry a price tag, only if they have economic value. (Granted, the religionblindness approach does retain the general first amendment protection for
economically valueless belief and speech, provided there are no external
manifestations (overt acts) that conflict with other legally sanctioned interests, that is, as long as the belief and speech fail to have any tangible consequences that conflict with all other legalized social norms in the physical
world.)
160 Triangle Publications, Inc. v. New England Newspaper Pub. Co., 46 F. Supp. 198 (D.
Mass. 1942).
161 Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). (In this case and in those
just cited (in notes 159 & 160 supra) there were, of course, issues other than those mentioned
in the accompanying text.)
16 2 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943).
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The "material values bias" effect is illustrated by the position espoused
by Weiss. (It should be reiterated that this biased effect is an unintended
one. It is inherent in the religion-blindness approach, and ought not be
imputed to those who advocate governmental religion-blindness in the belief it will actualize religious neutrality.) The scope of religious freedom
recommended by Weiss is much the same as that prescribed by Justice
Frankfurter and Kurland. However, Weiss seeks to soften the effect of
Justice Frankfurter's judicial refusal to allow any religiously or conscientiously grounded immunity to what are otherwise constitutionally permissible legal requirements. Weiss argues:
[W]e have to distinguish three realms of behavior: (1) the realm of pure
belief that everybody would grant is private; (2) the realm of religious action which may have public manifestations; (3) the realm of action dearly

public. It is usually agreed that the law cannot trifle with the first -

no

legislature may pass a law commanding people to believe in God. The issue
is either to distinguish the latter two, or to provide principles to justify

legal regulation of the second. We will do the former.
The distinction in tentative form is: religious action is action the
function of which is only to establish and perpetuate a private meaning for
individuals - a meaning given to it by a religion. Religious actions create
results whose effects are private, felt only by those who believe or are con-

cerned with belief. Some actions will occur which have real meaning or
effect only in the world of ideas. Thus, purely symbolic actions may be distinguished from actions, such as polygamous cohabitation, which have tangible, worldly consequences. And among those actions which effect only
the world of ideas are religious actions, defined as such by the religion

which adopts them. That is, religious action takes place in but does not
exhaust the realm where actions induce, signify, or reject beliefs.

Public

action, on the other hand, is that which affects others in ways not limited
to their belief. Further, these effects, for the purpose of the law, must already have been described, prescribed, or proscribed by an authoritative
decision of the governing political powers....

Religion serves as no defense to a law regulating what we have defined
as public actions. Only if action can be seen to be exhausted in an individual's private affirmation, and relates to his assumption of a perspective,

is it religious action and thereby sacrosanct.16 3

Arguably, Weiss' formulation succeeds in somewhat liberalizing the Frankfurter-Kurlandian treatment of religious freedom. He "extends" the scope
of free exercise of religion to cover religious action with "public manifestations" but with only "private" effects (effects "only in the world of ideas").
Weiss is therefore able both to agree with the Barnette case's invalidation
of compulsory flag saluting and to concur substantially with dissenting
Justice Frankfurter's approach to religious freedom. True to the substance
of Justice Frankfurter's position, Weiss insists that in the realm of "public
action" (action "which affects others in ways not limited to their belief," or
163 Weiss, supra note 104, at 608 (emphasis in original).
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actions "which have tangible, worldly consequences" 6 '), religious belief
cannot serve as a defense. According to Weiss, "Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
argument that religious rights are irrelevant once one is securely in the
realm of public action is cogent."' 165
An initial response to Weiss' position is to note that the admittedly
needed improvement of Justice Frankfurter's approach in Barnette was a
needed correction applicable to all the first amendment freedom of expression guarantees, not just freedom of religion. Freedom of speech, press,
etc., mean very little if their scope does not include "public manifestations"
having only "private" (idea) effects. After allowing for limited exceptions, such as commercial fraud and certain instances of defamation, this
public-manifestations-private-effects scope provides the general first amendment guarantees of free expression with their minimum acceptable amount
of elbow room.
The basic criticism of Weiss' formula is simply this: It has unambiguously failed to correct the inherent bias of Frankfurter's and Kurland's
approach to the scope of religious freedom. Whenever one enters the
sphere of "public action," that is, exercises his deeply felt religious convictions so as to affect any other legal interest (other than merely possibly affecting the beliefs of others), one would, according to Weiss' proposal,
have to subordinate his religious convictions to all other secularly cognizable interests. By confining the sphere of religion to the "world of ideas,"
one makes a societal stepchild out of religious commitment vis-i.-vis all
other values, rights, and interests that the state favors enough to deem
relevant in its decisionmaking. Even when one enters the sphere of public action, he is entitled to have his religious commitments taken into account along with all other legally recognizable rights. If equal protection
and substantive due process (for some inscrutable reason) do not of themselves constitutionally require this, the free exercise of religion clause must.
It is in no way suggested here that the rights of individual conscience
are inherently superior to all other legal rights; rather, the plea is a much
more modest one. Don't treat religious/conscientious scruples as inherently inferior to all other legal interests simply because the expression of
these scruples operates in the "public sphere." Recognize that these scruples
are legally relevant and balance them against other personal and economic
rights that are at stake in the particular legislative, judicial, or administrative decision. Balancing religious/conscientious scruples against "secular
(?)" interests (and against other conflicting religious/conscientious scruples in some cases) is not to be regarded as an easy task. Attempting to do
justice amongst competing interests is never as simple as regarding one class
of interests as ipso facto inferior to others. However, adding religious/
Id.
265 Id.at 609 (emphasis supplied).
164

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 34

conscientious scruples to the already diverse collection of values that any
government in a complex society (or in any society) is responsible for protecting does not make the decisionmaker's "balancing act" a significantly
more difficult one than it already is. (It could even be' argued that the
job is made less difficult because taking into account people's deeply felt
beliefs is more in accord with the common sense inclination of any decisionmaker who is trying to be fair. "Being fair" in the most basic sense
means considering all values affected by the decision. It thus may well
be easier to reach a satisfactory outcome if one vital aspect of experience,
the subjective commitments of persons, is not artificially disregarded.)
It is essential to note further that, under the Seeger-Welsh approach to
legally recognizable religion, the only expressly "religious" criteria to be
used in the decisionmaker's balancing are siricerity and intensity of subjective commitment. 6 6 All other criteria must be secularly cognizable,
such as the following: Will anyone's physical safety be harmed or threatened, and to what extent?; Will anyone's right to peace and quiet, privacy, etc., be harmed or threatened, and to what extent?; Will the decision
enhance physical health, and to what extent?; and so on. Even the expressly religious criteria may be described as secularly cognizable: how
much emotional pain will be inflicted on the individual or individuals if
the state requires that their subjective commitments be violated in the matter in question?
In objecting to religion-blindness' inherent bias against the external
actualization of persons' individual religious scruples, one may be implying that his own position is "neutral" or value-free. Such an implication
would be sheer nonsense. There is nothing neutral about arguing for
legal protection for individual consciences. More than a few persons
would argue that there is already too much leeway allowed individual
idiosyncracy in our "permissive"(?) society. There is nothing neutral
about a commitment to actualizing the constitutional value of religious
liberty. The bias being advocated here is this: In a society that has succeeded in bestowing upon itself an overabundance of most material
goods,"~ the right question to ask is, "How do we move effectively to enhance religious freedom?" In other words, how do we move effectively
to provide the individual not merely freedom of belief, speech, etc., but to
provide him (or her) genuine way-of-life-freedom? Religious freedom
,either involves the way one lives one's life or it involves nothing of enough
importance to merit its special mention in the Bill of Rights. If we decide that religious freedom does not involve way-of-life-freedom, then we
may as well be honest enough to deny it any constitutional meaning of its
1660 Otherwise the decisionmaker, contrary to the establishment clause, would be evaluating
the social worth of religious claims according to what is believed.
167We have of course not succeeded in producing the goods humanely or in distributing
them justly. "Over-abundance" is thus an idea not yet experienced in certain sectors.
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own and rely solely on the other first amendment expression guarantees
(speech, press, etc.), thus concluding that the free exercise clause is itself
purely a matter of historical interest. In other words, we should make
explicit our judgment that free exercise of religion was given a special
place in the Bill of Rights for historical reasons now only of antiquarian
concern.
3. Nonestablishment Neutrality
The third and perhaps most important reason for a person's objection
to legal decisionmakers' taking individuals' religious scruples into account
is the fear that to do so would violate the establishment clause. Whether
this fear is justified depends very much on what is meant by the first
amendment admonition, "Congress [and, through the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment, the states] shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion. . ."..
The Supreme Court has stated clearly
that the establishment clause means more than "forbid[ding] . . . govern-

mental preference of one religion over another."' 16 8 Therefore a federal or
state law does not necessarily satisfy the establishment prohibition simply
because it "aid[s] all religions."' 6 9 Rather, the principle that nonestablishment of religion forbids nonincidental governmental aid to religion,
even when it offers the aid to "all religions" on a nondiscriminatory basis,
has been often espoused by the Court.'7" This principle need not be rejected in order to adhere to the additional principle argued for in this essay, namely, that decisionmakers should not exclude persons' relevant
religious commitments from consideration in their legal decisions. This is
so because the two principles do not necessarily conflict with each other.
On the same day that the Court in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp explicitly reaffirmed the principle that nonestablishment of religion is not
satisfied by aid to all religions,' it was able to apply the additional principle just stated above, holding in Sherbert v. Verner that the free exercise
clause forbids a state from denying unemployment compensation to one
whose religious scruples prevented her from accepting Saturday employment.12 Whether, as in Sherbert, the free exercise clause is deemed to
require the holding that the litigant's religious interest was sufficient to
override the state's regulatory interest or whether, as in the area of military conscientious objection, the judgment that the interest of persons'
religious liberty should override other state interests is deemed a constitutionally permissible decision of legislative policymaking,'
nether type
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216 (1963).
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
170 See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 210-12 (1948).
171374 U.S. 203, 216 (1963).
172 Sherbret v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
178 E.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (by implication).
We do not know
168

69
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protection of religious freedom need violate the establishment clause. This
is so for two reasons.
First, taking persons' religious scruples into account in decisionmaking
is not "aid to religion" in any sense contemplated by the establishment
clause or by the Supreme Court's interpretation of that clause in any case
to date. As already noted, two types of situations are possible in which
this "taking account" of religious scruples may result in free exercise protection. In the first, the free exercise clause is deemed to require the judgment that religious interest x must prevail over other interests. In the second, a legislative decision is made that religious interest y, involving the
protection of one or more persons' religious freedom, shall be allowed to
prevail over other interests of legislative concern. This legislative decision
can be actualizezd in one of two ways: the legislature can either decide not
to pass a statute at all, perhaps surmising that the particular religious scruple is too widespread to make a statute upholding the competing interest(s) practicable; or it can decide to carve out an exception to required
compliance for those whose religious scruples forbid their adherence.
(The second alternative is of course a more "visible" means of protecting
religious scruples; this does not mean that the first alternative occurs less
often.) Regardless of whether a given result deferring to a particular religious scruple is required by the free exercise clause or merely permitted by
it, in neither event is religion being treated more favorably than other in-

terests. Rather, in both cases, the free exercise clause theoretically requires
the comparison of the magnitude of the religious freedom interest with
other interests, else the free exercise of religion is being slighted.
The reasoning just offered does not mean that we should interpret the
establishment clause to say merely, "Government cannot aid religion any
more than it aids other secular interests." Such would indeed conflict with
the Court's insistence that aid to all religions does not pass the establishment clause prohibition. Rather, the argument is that government
protection of the right to free exercise of religion is no more to be thought
of as government "subsidization" than is government protection of free
speech. In other words, there is a difference between the state's subsidizing religious free exercise, either through nonincidental financial support" 4

what the Court would do if it were squarely faced with the question: Does the free exercise clause
require that government provide for conscientious objector exemption from combatant military
service? For a recent intimation that such a requirement would not be recognized, see Gillette

v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 4 6 1n.23 (1971) (dictum). For view that under certain circumstances, the free exercise and due process clauses require exemption from compulsory military
service, see United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902, 906-11 (D. Mass. 1919), appeal dismissed
399 U.S. 267 (1970). '"The chief reason for reaching this conclusion after examining the competing interests is the magnitude of Sisson's interest in not killing in the Vietnam conflict as
against the want of magnitude in the country's present need for him to be so employed." 297 F.
Supp. at 910.
174 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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or other means, such as implicitly sponsoring religious worship,175 and the
state's protecting the free exercise of religion as the first amendment clearly requires it to do.
Protecting free exercise of religion does of course cost the state some
money in much the same way that protecting free speech costs money
(for example, a police escort for a controversial speaker). However, as
long as this cost does not become more than "incidental" (admittedly a
less than precise term, but not an illusory one either), it is difficult to
believe that the establishment clause has been violated.
There sometimes exists the problem of a substantial corollary economic
or other advantage accruing to the successful claimant for religious exemption, even when no significant expense is incurred by the government. In
the military conscientious objector situation, this problem is partially
solved by the requirement of alternative service in a civilian or noncombatant military capacity. The imposition of an "alternative burden" to lessen or offset a comparative windfall resulting from the receipt of free exercise protection may be feasible in other areas as well. The general conclusion with respect to the often observed "tension" between the two religion clauses is this: There are other and better ways to deal with this tension than by the state's simply failing to protect people's interests in "beyond speech" free exercise.
The second reason that taking account of religious (way of life) commitments does not violate the establishment clause is both a reason and an
absolute condition for the conclusion that nonestablishment is preserved.
It has already been recognized that nonestablishment does not only mean
that there can be no governmental preference among different religions.
However, this recognition should in no way slight the widely accepted understanding that state nonfavoritism among different religions is the taproot of the nonestablishment idea. Therefore, in order to argue that taking account of religious commitments does not violate the establishment
clause, one must be using a definition of religion as broad as that argued
for in this essay. One cannot use a more restricted definition without discriminating among different religions by virtue of the content of their beliefs.
It is a fair guess that an awareness of the danger.of religious discrimination, more than any other factor, was the impetus for those who have
advocated an extension of the establishment clause to such a point that the
free exercise clause would become superfluous to the other first amendment freedoms. This religious discrimination, however, has more than
once been described as discrimination in favor of religious beliefs and
against beliefs of conscience. For example, Kurland's discussion of the
1917 draft law contained the following comment:
175 E.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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The statute did not exempt all whose consciences forbade them to fight.
It exempted only those with proper religious allegiances. It may be more

difficult for some than it was for Chief Justice White [in the Selective
Draft Law Cases176 ] to see why this classification was not a breach in the
high wall of separation. 77
Similar are Justice Harlan's comments in his Welsh concurrence, discussed
earlier, in which he argued:
The constitutional infirmity [of § 6(j)] cannot be cured, moreover,
even by . . . drawling] the line between religious and nonreligious. This

in my view offends the Establishment Clause ...
The common denominator [of those entitled to the exemption from
combatant service] must be the intensity of moral conviction with which a
belief is held. 178
In other words, all sincere conscientious objectors must be excluded in
order to avoid violating the establishment clause. As Justice Harlan himself explicitly recognized, the discrimination favoring "religious" belief
over "ethical" or "moral" belief in § 6(j) is fully cured by the Welsh
plurality's definition of religion. This broad definition of religion would
of course have cured Kurland's quoted objection to the 1917 draft law as
well. The Seeger-Welsh legal definition of religion is clearly broad enough
to include the kind of beliefs that Kurland and Justice Harlan describe
'as being merely ethical or conscientious and thus, in their lexicon, nonreligious. The controversy between the Welsh plurality and Justice Harlan therefore reduces to a dispute as to proper labeling. If this dispute
were merely an academic one, it might well be left alone here. However,
there are real-world reasons for concluding with the Welsh plurality that
what Justice Harlan chose to label as nonreligious ethical belief should
be legally understood as religious belief.
First, there is no religiously neutral way to distinguish between beliefs
that are purely moral or ethical but not religious and beliefs that are truly
religious. First amendment considerations aside, of what use is such a distinction to the legal system, when no one is capable of describing the
distinction so as to win the comprehension and assent of the rest of us?
It won't do, for example, to say that the belief must have some supernatural
ground or content in order for it to be religious. There are groups of
persons who unequivocally understand and describe themselves as being
fully religious, but who deny that their religion has any supernatural content whatsoever.
Second, and of much weightier import, Justice Harlan's lexicon is a potential dead-end street for the judicial protection of "beyond speech" religious freedom. The dead-end is reached thusly: (1) Justice Harlan, as
176 245

U.S. 366 (1918).

P. KURLAND, supra note 129, at 38.
178 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 357-58 (1970).
177
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already suggested, defines religion for first amendment purposes as "something less [broad] than mere adherence to ethical or moral beliefs in general or a certain belief such as conscientious objection;"' 79 (2) any concession to religious freedom (beyond the scope of free speech, etc.) violates
the establishment clause if it does not include those whose scruples are
merely conscientious but not religious; 8 ' (3) (not expressed by Justice
Harlan, but fully in accord with his position) since there is no constitutional protection of "beyond speech" free exercise of conscience, no court
on its own initiative would be justified in requiring conscientiously
grounded exemptions to otherwise constitutionally valid legal norms;
(4) since judicial intervention to protect religious freedom d la step two
would violate nonestablishment, and since any judicially initiated intervention e? la step three is without specific constitutional authorization, there is
simply no judicial protection for freedom of religion or freedom of conscience grounds for exemption from otherwise constitutional legislation.
Though the reasoning contained in this conclusion goes somewhat beyond
Justice Harlan's explicit statements, the result comports with them:
My own conclusion, to which I still adhere, is that the Free Exercise Clause
does not require a State to conform a neutral secular program to the dictates of religious conscience of any group. 181
In other words, according to Justice Harlan's dissent in Sherbert, courts
have no business carving out religious exceptions (or, impliedly, conscientious exceptions) to "neutral secular program[s]" enacted by the legislative branch. 82
Deviating from a consistent "religion-blindness" position, Justice Harlan does allow for the protection of religious and conscientious scruples
if a legislature chooses to carve out an exemption. 83 (If the exempted
group were defined so as to include fewer than all those having conscientious scruples, Justice Harlan would judicially intervene either to broaden
the definition of those qualifying for the exemption, as he voted to do in
Welsh, or else to nullify the exemption, the choice depending on which
course would best reflect legislative intent. 8 ) One ought first to endorse
Justice Harlan's willingness to concede to legislatures this role in actualizing religious freedom and his willingness to insure judicially that they extend any such freedom to all persons with the requisite subjective commitment to whatever scruples legislatures decide to protect.
79Id. at 358-59n. 10.
180 Id. at 357-58 (Harlan, J., concurring).
181Id. at 358n. 9.
182 It is most unlikely that Justice Harlan would have reached a contrary conclusion as to
"a neutral secular program" enacted at the federal level, for the logic of his position applies equally there. He clearly implies its applicability to federal law. Id. at 356.
183 374 U.S. at 423 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

184 See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 361-67 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Hopefully, substantial progress at achieving way-of-life freedom (religious freedom) will result from legislative initiative."8 5 However, it
would be folly to rely solely on the legislative branch to protect the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom. This is so for the same reason
that the legislative branch, both state and federal, has proved itself an inadequate protector of the constitutional rights of, for example, freedom of
speech, procedural due process, and equal protection. Active judicial vigilance has been (and still is) required to protect the rights of those who
lack the political power to demand and win legislative recognition of their interests. The poor record of the legislative branch (and the executive
branch as well) for being able to respond to the needs of the deviant and
powerless members of our society has required judicial activism. For these
people, courageous courts are the last legal resort. One can think of no
area of human experience in which the tyranny of the majority has been
more of a threat to the rights of the minority than in the matter of religion. In religion, even if nowhere else, a constitutionally activist judiciary
is needed to protect the rights of the unpopular and eccentric if and when
other branches of government fail to do so. It is on this basis that Justice
Harlan's approach to the protection of religious freedom must be faulted
as less than adequate.
In view of the above, it becomes important to insist that the Supreme
Court in Seeger and Welsh was in fact developing a legal definition of
religion. Courts and lawyers are prisoners of labels or "pmagic words," the
critiques of the most profound jurisprudential mindg notwithstanding.
And in the matter at hand, the "magic words," the constitutional label employable in the service of way-of-life freedom, can most readily be found
in the first amendment free exercise of religion guarantee. (Note, for example, the superior feasibility of the free exercise clause for protecting
way-of-life freedom over the "zones of privacy" approach of Griswold v.
Connecticut. 8' In the first place, religion is not constricted to the "private" aspects of life. Secondly, the tortuous "penumbras-emanations" judicial gyrations are not needed to arrive at the intended result - the protection of individual prerogatives in the absence of compelling counter
interests.)
185The legislature's constitutional responsibility for protecting way-of-life freedom is not
confined merely to carving out religious-conscientious exceptions to legal norms and simply abstaining from creating legal norms that unnecessarily impede way-of-life freedom generally.
The legislature can and should act positively to protect religious-conscientious freedom by
protecting the citizenry from physical peril and material deprivation. Assuring adequate food,
clothing, shelter, medical care, and healthful living conditions in the context of responsible

ecological maintenance serves directly to enhance persons' religious liberty. To the extent people are free from the struggle for material survival, they are free to shape their own lives in the
service of whatever God or gods they love.
186 381 U.S. 479 (1965). This is not to suggest that one must choose between the two.
Griswold and the free exercise clause may be viewed as complementary, if partially overlapping,
protections.

RELIGION
Freedom of conscience, therefore, ought not be understood as something
outside" the scope of freedom of religion. Freedom of conscience is necessarily included within freedom of religion: there is no way one can define religion (a) in a theologically neutral manner, and (b) in a rational
and intelligible way that even minimally takes account of the widespread
good faith attempt by scholars to study religion in a descriptive rather
than prescriptive manner, without including matters of conscience within
one's understanding of the scope of religion. Consider, for example,
Brightman's formulation:
Religion is concern about experiences which are regarded as of supreme

value; devotion toward a power or powers believed to originate, increase,
and conserve these values; and some suitable expression of this concern
and devotion, whether through symbolic rites or through other individual
and social conduct. Religion, then, is a total experience which includes this
87
concern, this devotion, and this expression.'
Or Harald Hbffding's:
That which expresses the innermost tendency of all religions is the axiom
88
of the conservation of values.'

Or Abraham Joshua Heschel's:
The root of religion is the question what to do with the feeling for the
mystery of living .... Religion, the end of isolation, begins with a consciousness that something is asked of us. It is in that tense, eternal asking
in which the soul is caught and in which man's answer is elicited. 89
The above quoted statements all suggest what is obvious - that religion includes matters of conscience. And the first amendment suggests
(or, rather, requires) this: No content of belief requirement may be added
on to a sincerely and deeply felt conscientious commitment in order for
it to qualify as religion so as to receive the same degree of free exercise
protection afforded a like commitment claimed to be supernaturally
grounded. All deeply felt conscientious commitments must be included in
a constitutionallyvalid legal definition of religion.
In arguing for the appropriateness of the Seeger-Welsh definition of
religion as a tool in actualizing religious freedom for conduct going beyond
that of free speech, etc., one does not have to slight the valid concern for
"nonestablishment neutrality." Rather, for the reasons discussed above,
one can do justice to the free exercise clause and to the establishment
clause as well. This ought to satisfy the libertarian and religious neutrality concerns of those who have mistakenly sought their realization by
advocating a stance of more or less "religion-blindness" on the part of
government.
187 E.S. BRIGHTMAN, supra note 56, at 17 (emphasis deleted).
(1906).
189 A. J. HESCHEL, MAN Is NOT ALONE: A PHILOSOPHY OF R13LIGION 68-69 (1951).

8 H.HbFFDING, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 215
18

(emphasis supplied).
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4. The Current Ambiguity
Perhaps the reader has noticed a continuing ambiguity in this essay.
The argument for a "beyond free speech, press, etc.," way-of-life understanding of religious liberty has been presented somewhat as if it were a
proposal for the courts to venture forth boldly and break new ground in
the realm of individual liberty. This same argument has also (even simultaneously) been presented as a defense of "the law" as it now exists, according to our always final if not always infallible authority, the United
States Supreme Court. The justification for both the ambiguity and the
discomfort it must cause the careful reader is that the ambiguity correctly
reflects the state of the law at the time of this writing.
In 1963, the Supreme Court rejected the Kurlandian religion-blindness
interpretation of the first amendment and granted a "beyond speech" scope
to the free exercise clause in Sherbert v. Verner.190 In doing so, the Court
protected the state unemployment compensation rights of a Seventh-Day
Adventist who refused to violate her religious convictions by accepting
employment that would have required her to work on her Sabbath. (In
addition to Sherbert, the Court in Seeger and Welsh upheld the legislative
granting of exemptions from combatant military service for religiously
grounded conscientious objectors as a matter of permissible legislative
policymaking rather than, as was the case in Sherbert, a requirement of
the free exercise clause.)
The Supreme Court of California in 1964 reversed the conviction of a
group of Navajos for illegal possession of narcotics, holding that this sanction against their use of peyote would violate their right to the free exercise of their religion.'9 1 However, neither the United States District Court
nor the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit accepted Dr. Timothy
Leary's contention that his prosecution for violations of federal criminal
statutes relating to marihuana contravened his free exercise of religion
192
rights.
In 1963, the Supreme Court of Minnesota had initially affirmed Mrs.
Owen Jenison's contempt conviction for refusing on religious grounds to
serve as a trial juror. 1 93 However, upon remand from the United States
Supreme Court 9 4 "for further consideration in light of Sherbert v. Verner," the Minnesota court decided that nonspurious religious scruples
against serving on a jury must be honored "until and unless further expe190 374 U.S. 398 (1963). I use the term "beyond speech" to denote religious expression
beyond the general (not specifically religious) first amendment free expression guarantees. This
"beyond speech" activity would include conduct (acts or omissions) violating civil or criminal
legal requirements.
191 People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
192 Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cit. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 395 U.S. 6
(1969).
193In re Jenison, 265 Minn.96, 120 N.W.2d 515 (1963).
194In re Jenison, 375 U.S. 14 (1963).
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rience indicates that the indiscriminate invoking of the First Amendment
poses a serious threat to the effective functioning of our jury system."' 95
These few instances comprise the most noteworthy applications thus
far of the principle that free exercise of religion protection goes beyond
freedom of belief, speech, etc. and extends to conduct deviating from legal norms.' 96 Contrary to the prior warnings of Justice Frankfurter and
others, the Supreme Court's adoption of this principle in 1963 has not resulted in all hell (or very much of heaven either) breaking loose and disrupting the body politic.
There is, however, no reason why the above minor adjustments of legal
norms to individual religious scruples need exhaust the meaning of the principle espoused in Sherbert. But the existence of an equally possible option for the judiciary must be admitted. Courts could let the Sherbert principle die a quiet and slow death simply by failing to apply it in significant
situations. Any court, if it wished to do so, is quite capable of distinguishing virtually any other fact situation from the trivial concession made by
the law to an unemployment compensation claimant who refused to work
on her Sabbath.19 7 There are very few matters of state regulation about
which no "compelling state interest"' 9 8 could be found or imagined;
courts could explicitly or implicitly define "compelling" as anything but the
most patently trivial. For example, Gray v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio Railroad
Co. held that the payment of union dues and fees under a union shop contract was a sufficiently compelling state interest so as to override an employee's religious scruples against supporting a labor union.'9 9 Plaintiff,
a devout Seventh Day Adventist, understood his faith to forbid his joining
195In re Jenison, 267 Minn. 136, 137, 125 N.W.2d 588, 589 (1963).
19
6 A more noteworthy application has recently occurred in the Amish schooling case, decided
after the text here was written; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (free exercise clause
violated by conviction of Amish parents under Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law
in which parents' religious beliefs dictated their refusal to send children past the eighth grade).
In negligence cases, religious beliefs have been taken into account sometimes in determining
whether conduct conformed to reasonable care, particularly with respect to contributory negligence. See Lange v. Hoyt, 114 Conn. 590, 159 A. 575 (1932) (jury entitled to consider plaintiff's conduct in procuring medical care for her injured daughter in the light of plaintiff's belief
in Christion Science doctrine).
7
19 The Yoder case hardly forecloses the option of letting "beyond speech" free exercise protection die a quiet and slow death. Its unique facts are also readily distinguishable from future
attempts to invoke its example. See 406 U.S. at 212-13, 216-19, 222-27, 234-36.
198 398 U.S. at 403, 406. The "compelling state interest" must be "in the regulation of
a subject within the state's constitutional power to regulate." Id. at 403. And "[tjhe conduct
or actions so regulated" must pose "some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order" in
order to justify an infringement on free exercise. Id. at 403. "[O]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation" of first amendment rights.
Id. at 406, citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1944). And finally, the state must show
"that no alternative forms of regulation would combat [the] abuses without infringing First
Amendment rights." Id. at 407 (footnote omitted). All of these partially overlapping characterizations and requirements in Sherbert are subject to a wide spectrum of interpretation. Other
courts and the Supreme Court itself are thus quite free to broaden or narrow the effect of Sherbert as they are so inclined.
'09 429 F.2d 1064, 1072 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1001 (1971).
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or supporting a group that might make moral decisions in his behalf contrary to his own convictions. He was dismissed from his job for failing
to pay union fees and dues, though he had offered to pay equal amounts
to a designated charity. Plaintiff is instead paying a high price for the exercise of his religious beliefs, namely, the loss of his job.
The bias of this paper in favor of enhancing religious liberty is one
that the reader may or may not find compatible with his own inclinations.
However, one point must be acknowledged regardless of one's biases (values) concerning the proper scope of religious liberty: As a society reaches
a post-industrial era of super-abundance, it can afford (if it wants) to grant
each individual more religious freedom qua way-of-life freedom. (It
thus may not be mere coincidence that judicial decisions granting a "beyond speech" scope to religious freedom are for the most part of relatively
recent occurrence.) A society as overflowing in material goods as ours
should be able to apply the Sherbert principle far beyond the minor but
2°° If Kurland's
possibly prophetic examples that have already occurred.
'
prescription for religion-blindness is "a doctrine in search of authority," '
Sherbert is, at this writing, authority in search of broader and more significant application.
As a possible example, imagine that A is married, the father of small
children, and a competent worker in his job. A is intensely devoted to
his family and deeply wishes to be able to give them more of himself than
what is left over after a long day at his office. A would like to work halftime at half his current pay in order to take his "fair share" (as he and his
wife, B, see it) of the physical and emotional responsibility (and joy!) of
raising children and keeping house. A, B, and the children are willing
to adjust their life style in accordance with the reduced income he would
earn under such a plan. However, B hopes to be able to pursue a parttime career of her own as well. A would be willing to work half days or
three days a week or six months per year or any other reasonable half-time
schedule his employer might prefer. It is not likely that A could effectuate
2 2 at least not without significant
such a plan in most employee situations,
sacrifices in rate of pay, tenure, position, chance for advancement, and type
of work - deprivations far out of proportion to any economic burden
A's way-of-life commitment would cause his employer.
If A is a federal, state, or local governmental employee, viable judicial
free exercise of religion protection should require that, absent the employThe pre-Yoder applications of Sherbcrt have been "minor" only with respect to the state
interests that have been required to yield to religious scruples. These cases were hardly "minor"
to the individuals whose religious commitments were at issue.
201 p. KTuRAND, supra note 129, at 16.
202 Cf. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd inem., 402 U.S.
689 (1971) (equally divided court). Plaintiff's discharge for refusing on religious grounds to
comply with his employer's compulsory Sunday overtime schedule was upheld. One can imagine
the likely business reaction to A's proposal in the text example.
200
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er's showing of clear unfeasibility, A be allowed to retain his employment
on a half-time basis-with no loss in rate of compensation, rights of tenure,
position, etc., not genuinely required by his reduced work schedule. Due
to the Supreme Court's narrow view of what constitutes state or governmental action, legislation would in most cases be needed to extend similar
protection to employees of our (so-called) "private" corporations. (However, using this essay's legal definition of religion, such protection ought
already be deemed to exist by virtue of the Civil Rights Act of 1964's prohibition against religious discrimination by covered employers.2 0 8
If the above example does not appeal to the reader, he is invited to
imagine other instances in which secular interests could readily bend to accommodate personal religious (way of life) commitments. This essay
deliberately chooses not to attempt a cataloguing of these various possibilities; that task is best done by a diverse array of future claimants themselves. Also, one today has little idea of what social uniformities are apt
to be imposed in the future as technological complexity increases and we
come into conformity with the needs of the machines we build. Whatever these imposed uniformities may be, basic humaneness will require that
the justification for any given norm be balanced against an objecting individual's deeply felt aversion.
Actualization of religious freedom qua way-of-life freedom cannot be
achieved if we adhere to the norm of governmental religion blindness,
either expressly or impliedly. 20 4 Religion blindness would forbid both
legislatures and courts from recognizing the constitutional norm of religious freedom beyond the general scope of freedom of inner belief, speech,
press, etc. By requiring that religion be made a legally irrelevant factor,
religion blindness makes the free exercise of religion a constitutionally irrelevant dimension of human experience. It is difficult to believe that
such a result does justice to the first amendment, which dealt with religious
freedom as distinct from, yet related and complementary to, freedom of
speech, press, assembly, and petition. Nor does such a result do justice to
any teleological dimension in the Constitution-the quest for a society that
actualizes the full realm of human dignity. Such dignity cannot be confined to verbal and symbolic expression; its culmination is in what one
becomes and what one does. A constitutional government, having human
dignity as its philosophical base, will move to guarantee human freedom
at the way-of-life (the religious) level. If legislators and judges are to
play an effective role in this endeavor, they will need a definitional tool
203 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970).
204 Although this essay, with others, has rejected Kurland's doctrine of religion-blindness,
such fact does not imply a lack of appreciation for the value of his contribution to the church
and state discussion. By lucidly articulating a novel and internally consistent approach, Kurland
has challenged and encouraged others to rethink their own positions and to attempt some doctrinal improvement to explicate and evaluate past authorities (cases) in the area.
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like that of Seeger-Wfelsh so that the protection of religious freedom can
be effected with the high degree of neutrality that both the free exercise
and the nonestablishment clauses require.
B.

Fear of the Broad Scope of Functionally Defined Religion
1. General Considerations

The Seeger-Welsh definition of religion is a "functional" one. It defines religion purely on the basis of what religions do, namely, serve as
the objects of people's life commitments. It intentionally avoids any description of the objective content of these commitments. The definition
is therefore subject to the criticism that it is simply too broad for the general legal and constitutional use being advocated in this essay. Writing
before the Welsh decision, Mansfield objected to a purely functional definition:
Is it not ... true that a belief that no one would dignify as religious may
occupy an important if not dominant place in a man's life, profoundly affecting his conduct, thoughts, and feelings? A person may make his pocketbook his master or his stomach a god, or consider that the highest virtue
is the preservation of his own life and the advancement of his own interests, but no one would say, except ironically, that because of his devotion
to these ends his belief in them is religious. 205
Likewise, John Richard Burkholder rejects a purely functional definition
and thus "avoids the anomaly of describing a baseball addict as religious. "206

In dealing with this line of criticism, it becomes important to ask,
What is it that those objecting to a functional definition are trying to
avoid? Are they simply reluctant to dignify human commitment to such
"gods" as money, appetite, self-preservation or baseball by according to
them the religion label, feeling that the term should be reserved for higher
concerns? Although I shall return to this as a possible ground of objection, it is more likely that what bothers those who fear a purely functional
definition is this: If religion were defined broadly enough to include any
subjectively intense human commitment, decisionmakers would be flooded
with free exercise of religion claims in every conceivable sphere of the
law. This would have the effect of either (a) so deadening the judicial ear
to free exercise claims that courts would be unable to hear a bona fide
spiritually based claim when one was offered or (b) bringing about the
general breakdown of social control that Justice Frankfurter and others
feared if individual consciences were required to be taken into account in
determining legal duties. The fear of such possible outcomes has some
205 Mansfield, supra note 26, at 10.
206

Burkholder, Religion in the First Amendment: A Social Theory Approach to Constitu-

tional Interpretation206 (1969) (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University).

See also id. at 162.
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validity, particularly in the area of economic regulation. One can imagine
the slumlord who asserts that running slums is his religion and that any
legal demands on him to improve the living conditions of his tenants
would violate his sphere of free exercise. Though the fear is a valid one,
the danger behind the fear can be alleviated without having to posit a narrower and therefore constitutionally invalid definition of religion.
In the first place, recognizing that the above danger does exist ought
not to encourage us to exaggerate its dimensions. There are a number of
human beings in our society who are not going to be willing to identify
themselves as religiously committed to making money or watching baseball
br lording over slums. To make a free-exercise-of-religion claim under a
Seeger-Welsh type test, one must meet whatever requisite degree of subjective commitment is required for exemption from the particular legal
duty in question. (As argued earlier, the subjective intensity requirement
should vary according to the magnitude of the secular interest at stake.
And some secular interests are too great to allow for any exemption.) To
make even a prima facie free-exercise-of-religion claim with respect to a
law that is abridging his moneymaking, slum lording or baseball watching, one must either allege that moneymaking, slum lording or baseball
functions in his life analogously to that of God in the life of an orthodox
believer, that is, that moneymaking, etc., is the ultimate source of meaning
for his life, or, in the alternative, allege that moneymaking, etc., is such an
integral expression of what he regards as "divine" (of ultimate importance
to him) that he is religiously committed to its practice as constituting all
207
or some part of his free exercise of religion.
One does not have to make an unduly optimistic assessment of humanity to predict that not everyone would be willing, in what would amount
to a public profession of one's religious faith, to categorize himself in any
such way as these. This prediction evidences a greater probability of correctness when one asks: How many people will be willing to so portray
themselves after a number of such claims have failed to override compelling secular needs, such as the health and safety of others? The problem
of bizarreness thus partially solves itself; the more implausible that a concern could be thought of by the rest of us as religious, the more unlikely
that there will be very many persons willing to make the claim.
The above argument, of course, leaves unresolved whatever danger of
"court-flooding ' ' 2 8 and/or "social chaos" in the economic sphere might
be posed by those (many or few) of us who would be quite willing to
wear any religious label in order to get what we want in the marketplace.20 9 Regarding this problem, it should first be recognized that there
207 One should of course not be obliged to use the term "religion" in his allegation.

Any

term or terms functionally equivalent to the idea of deep personal commitment should suffice.
208 "Trickling" is apt to convey a more accurate image than "flooding."
209 Though not particularly relevant to the matter under discussion, there could be a salu-
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is no separating religion from economics any more than there is separating religion from any other aspect of human behavior. There are valid
freedom of religion claims which directly clash with the society's economic
values. And because a free exercise claim may benefit the claimant economically, it does not follow that his claim is ipso facto insincere or irreligious. The subjective commitment requirement as such should not
weigh more heavily upon one whose religious interest happens to be mixed
in with his economic well-being.2 1 0 And the approach being taken in this
paper, which views genuine freedom of choice in religion as a highly preferred value, would allow one to make a free exercise claim that directly
or indirectly, explicitly or implicitly, involved one's economic livelihood.
One should be free to make his work his religion and to expect as much
constitutional protection for its free exercise as one would get from being
a Methodist or a Zen Buddhist.
The just stated goal can be realized without the "court-flooding" or
social chaos mistakenly feared if a functional definition of religion were
generally employed. The way to actualize genuine religious freedom
(way-of-life freedom), neutrally defined, and at the same time protect
equally deserving secular interests is not by restricting the definition of
what constitutes religion. Instead, courts can protect against "courtflooding" and against social chaos in the very same way that the Supreme
Court in the past has protected against these evils with respect to more
traditionally defined religion; courts can simply continue to uphold the
firmly entrenched view that the free exercise of religion guarantee is not
absolute when overt acts or refusals to act threaten compelling state interests. This rule of law, applied, for example, in Reynolds and probably
"over-applied" in Prince v. Massachusetts, was carried forward
in the
Sherbert v. Verner opinion. The Court in Sherbert was careful to indicate that, though religious scruples could now, under certain circumstances, require immunity from a legal duty, this more or less new development in actualizing constitutional religious freedom did not mean that
religious concerns would override compelling secular ones:
[We do not,] by our decision today, declare the existence of a constitutional right to unemployment benefits on the part of all persons whose religious convictions are the cause of their unemployment. This is not a case
tary by-product in such religious candor. Both the individuals involved and the society might
benefit from persons' publicly confessing their (our) commitments, whether they be gaining
wealth or whatever. Concrete applications are left to the reader's own imagination.
210 This does not mean that economic gain would be irrelevant in determining subjective
intensity. Where strong subjective commitment was required to excuse certain otherwise illegal behavior, the following possibility is conceivable: X seeks immunity for activity Y, alleging religious grounds. The only value to which X shows sufficient intensity of commitment is
wealth accumulation. X would qualify for possible religious exemption only if his expressly
alleged religious basis consisted of or included moneymaking as its object of ultimate concern.
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in which an employee's religious
convictions serve to make him a nonproductive member of society. 211
As suggested earlier, the question of what secular needs are sufficiently
compelling so as to justify abridgment of the free exercise of religion is
one upon which persons will certainly differ. Even the situation alluded
to by the Court, when someone refuses to work for religious reasons and
seeks governmental subsistence, is not a crystal clear case for denial of the
religious claim, though without added facts most of us would be inclined
to deny it. But quaere, is the work which that person is required to do in
lieu of being unemployed necessary? Is it to polish the brass rail in a luxury hotel? Or is it to collect refuse that would otherwise present a health
problem? The competing state interests in the refuse collection hypothetical is a bit more convincing than in the brass rail situation. It is of
course a respectable position to argue that any religious grounds for refusal to work at all must be routinely denied as a basis of entitlement
to state subsistence for the unemployed, lest a Pandora's box be opened
such that masses of persons might decide to become "religiously unemployed" and become an economic burden on the rest of us. Such a position is undercut, however, at least to the extent that the problem of "creating work" becomes more and more contrived as technology continues to
replace necessary human labor. However, the Pandora's box argument
would seem to have a longer life expectancy in the matter of religious
objection to the payment of taxes (for example, due to religious-conscientious objection to the government's use of the proceeds to kill people in
Southeast Asia). In the tax area, it is a particularly convincing argument
that 6xomptions for religious or conscientious scruples would be generally upw&kable because of the effect such a program would have on the
compelling need of government to be financed. 12 In other words, the
allegation that allowing such exemptions would wreak havoc on the taxation process is probably true. (This a mild way of saying that we hold
money as much too precious a thing to be able to allow such a tempting
form of religious free exercise as conscientious exemption from taxation.)
Regardless of where one draws the "compelling state interest" line,
the point is clear enough; one can protect such valid interests as economic
sustenance, health, safety, and ecological preservation (including the right
to reasonable peace and quiet) without having to narrow the scope of
what is religion in the first amendment. One protects these other human
interests simply by refusing to allow the free exercise of religion to run
211

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409-10 (1963).
here exceptions are possible. See Mansfield, supra note 26, at 54-56, for a discussion

212 Even

of the exemption from social security tax for members of "a recognized religious sect" conscientiously opposed to insurance, when the sect itself provides for the risks covered by the Social
Security System. See also INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1402(h). This exemption, passed in 1965
largely through the efforts of Senator Joseph Clark of Pennsylvania, was adopted with the Amish
in mind.
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over them, not by concluding that subjectively committed religious claimants are "not religious" (or "not conscientious") because the objects of their
commitments are "beneath" the religious standards most persons purport
;to hold.
Therefore, the moneylover, the baseball lover, or the self-lover should
get the same protection given the Orthodox Jew or the Southern Baptist or the Roman Catholic. All of these persons, for example, should
(by virtue of Sherbert) be -able to refuse to work on a given day of the
week without having to forfeit unemployment benefits that would otherwise be available to them. This should be so, provided each is willing to
make a prima facie allegation of their religious or conscientious objection
to working on that day, and provided each can satisfy factually whatever
degree of subjective commitment to their stance is deemed to be required.
The same is true with respect to § 6(j) exemption from compulsory military service, as interpreted by Seeger-W'elsh. Likewise as to any free
exercise exemption from military service that a court might deem to be
constitutionally required, even in the absence of legislative recognition.
And likewise as to any other legislative or judicial concessions to free
exercise of religion, as nearly as is reasonably possible. (One must posit
the ideal without expecting its perfect realization.) In other words, all
grounds of personal commitment should be treated equally in the sense
of being legally recognizable as aspects of religion or conscience if persons claim them to be so and can show the requisite adherence.
At the same time, neither moneylover qua moneylover nor orthodox
Christian qua orthodox Christian should be able to pollute the environment or evade taxes213 or lord slums contrary to otherwise constitutionally
valid legal norms. Thus, any "discrimination" in governmental treatment
is to be based solely on the overt act in question vis-A-vis its effect on secularly cognizable interests. As long as this "discrimination" fulfills the
213 The reference here is to the attempt to avoid tax liability by virtue of a religious-conscientious objection to the tax or to its use. Tax exemptions to religious groups in the context of a
broad legislative scheme of granting exemptions to varied types of nonprofit organizations raise
quite different problems
Such tax exemptions, in contemporary times, are not primarily
grounded in a conscientious opposition to the support of government on the part of the exempt
organizations. Rather, they represent legislative policy that, ideally stated, seeks to encourage
a wide variety of nonprofit nongovernmental entities serving a broad spectrum of human needs.
First amendment religion clause problems do exist when, in a tax exemption scheme, organizations traditionally understood as religions are: (1) favored vis-a-vis a wide spectrum of other
nonprofit organizations; (2) discriminated against vis-a-vis a wide spectrum of other nonprofit
organizations; or, more dramatically, (3) excluded in toto from an otherwise broad program of
exemptions for "nonreligious" nonprofit entities. A system of tax exemptions best reflects the
first amendment when it focuses on religiously neutral qualifying criteria, e.g., genuineness of
nonprofit status (reasonableness of compensation to top managerial personnel, etc.). If it is not
already the case, it soon will be that legislative policy in fostering a panoply of nonprofit entities is suffering a crisis of acute success. A nondiscriminatory tax on all such entities at some
fraction of the rates imposed on residences and profit-making businesses is going to be a necessary corrective. Some socially conscious churches, synagogues, and other organizations are now
making such payments on a voluntary basis.
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usual due process requirements of a rational secular basis, and no covert
free exercise or estabreligious discrimination is intended, no cognizable
2 14
lishment clause violation would appear to exist.
What is here submitted as the basis for protecting the secular (and
religious) rights of others from the individual's own free exercise prerogatives is much akin to Weiss' distinction between public and private spheres
discussed earlier. Only when one's free exercise activity goes outside the
private-symbolic-belief sphere must it be curtailed in deference to the
rights of others. (This essay differs from Weiss' position in its insistence
that even in the public sphere, religious rights ought not be treated as ipso
facto subordinate to secular ones.)
In curtailing free exercise that unduly affects the rights of others, the
advantage of using a "public sphere" or "compelling state interest" approach rather than an approach that restricts what is deemed religion according to content of belief is clear; the former approach avoids government's doing what it is without competence to do. It avoids government's
prescribing what range of beliefs are "high enough," "noble enough,"
"spiritual enough" or "good enough" to be deemed religious or conscientious. The former approach does allow government to do the one
thing it ought to be competent to do-adjudicate between and among
competing, secularly cognizable interests.
By virtue of the free exercise clause, religious and conscientious commitments are also ."secularly cognizable" interests. But government is
not competent to discriminate with respect to such commitments except
on the basis of differences in degrees of subjective commitment and the
secularly cognizable effects of overt behavior, but not the effects on what
Weiss calls the private belief sphere. However, even the governmental
task of adjudicating between secularly cognizable interests has profound
religious consequences, the establishment clause notwithstanding. A brief
look at this problem occurs later in this essay.
2.

The "Religious Wet Blanket" Problem

In trying to surmise the grounds for objection to a purely functional
definition of religion, it was earlier suggested that persons may well be
reluctant to dignify what they deem to be profane, crass, absurd or ridiculous. One suspects that there is more than personal aesthetic concern
in this reluctance. What is very likely at stake is a practical objection
to the broadness of the Seeger-Welsh understanding of religion. If we
insist that religious freedom and nonestablishment require too broad a
definition of religion, we risk throwing a "religious wet blanket" upon
even the present inclination (which is already weak enough) of legisla2-14 Concerning the relationship between the establishment clause and "secular" policymaking, see textual discussion accompanying notes 268-80 infra.
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tures and courts to grant religious-conscientious exemptions from otherwise compulsory legal norms. Though this concern does not tend to be acknowledged explicitly, it is difficult to believe that it does not enter into
the thinking of those who cherish the constitutional value of genuine religious freedom, but who are well aware that by asking for too much, they
may wind up with nothing; hence (in part) the prevalent tendency
amongst those writers in the "church and state" area who are daring
enough to risk attempting a definition of religion at all. Their proposals
in one way or another are apt to include some restriction as to allowable
content in order for a belief to qualify as a religious one. The followiag examples illustrate these restrictions on content.
John Mansfield's objection to a purely functional definition has already
been noted. His proposal for a definition of religion is as follows:
Religion cannot be satisfactorily defined merely by reference to the role
that a belief plays in the life of the believer. To some extent the idea of
religion depends on the nature of the questions to which the belief provides an answer and the fundamental character of the realities that the believer asserts. At the least one must say of religion that it directs itself
to those basic and universal questions that concern man's origin, destiny,
and the purpose of his existence.2 15
One initial response to Mansfield's definition is to ask what is meant by
"those basic and universal questions that concern man's origin." Are
these questions "universal" in that all persons ask them? Or would most
persons be sufficient? And do all (or most) persons ask them in essentially the same way? If all that Mansfield is suggesting here is that all
persons explicitly or implicitly ask what commitments are important in
their lives, there is no objection. Such a "universal question" is the underlying assumption of the Seeger-Welsh view of religion. However, the
formulation of a universal religious question is permissible state behavior
under the first amendment only if the formulation of the question in no
way limits the content of the answer. Although he does not offer his own
proposal for formulating these "universal questions," Mansfield dearly
wants them phrased in a way such that they will preclude such answers as
one's pocketbook, his stomach, or self-preservation.2 1 For the state to
limit the range of answers it will legally recognize as constituting religion by making a legal determination itself as to what are the basic questions of "man's origin, destiny, and the purpose of his existence" is to violate the first amendment. Not even by as plausible a means as this is the
state competent to pick and choose among individuals' deeply felt grounds
for their deviance from legal norms-not if genuine nonestablishment of
religion and free exercise are accorded their due.
2 15

Mansfield, supra note 26, at 33-34.

216 Id. at 9-10.
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There is also a related problem in defining "conscientious."

Whenever

his religious beliefs conflict with a legal norm, a problem of conscience
confronts an individual. In other words, the individual must decide which
is the greater good-to obey the law or to follow his own religious commitment. Thus, a free-exercise-of-religion claim asserted as an immunity to
a particular legal requirement is always a matter of "conscientious objection" as well. This presents a tempting vehicle for introducing a restriction on the allowable objective content of beliefs in order for them to
qualify for free exercise exemption from legal norms. Despite its speciousness, the argument could be hypothetically posed as follows:
We concede that the first amendment forbids a definition of religion that is
restricted as to allowable content. But we are not prescribing content for a
legal definition of religion. Therefore we are not violating the first amendment religion clauses. Rather, we are merely legally defining the objective content of conscientious beliefs. We can do that in order to administer
the (legislative or judicial) requirement that any objection to the particular
legal norm being resisted be a "conscientious" as well as a "religiously
grounded" one.
Before commenting directly on this argumentation, it should be noted
that the same general tendency exists with respect to attempts at defining
"conscientious belief" as exists with respect to defining "religious belief."
The tendency is to try to limit the allowable range of a belief's objective
content to "higher" concerns in order for the belief to qualify as, in this
case, conscientious or, in the other case, religious. Consider, in this respect, Mansfield's explication of conscientious objection:
There are certain forms of opposition to participation in war that it
would occur to no one to characterize as conscientious. Thus some persons are opposed to participation in war because they are afraid-they will be
killed or wounded or because they find army life unpleasant. Others object
because they must leave their families and private affairs. These objections
do not rank as conscientious primarily because they are not founded on
any notion of superior obligation or duty. It would not occur to most persons with feelings of this sort to dignify them by claiming that they are
grounded in a sense of obligation. If a man says that his highest obligation is to save his own skin or to pursue his own interests, he is probably
joking. Even if he is not, he will have difficulty in finding support for a
description of his position as one involving a superior obligation. A
philosophy that gives to self-interest and self-preservation the first place,
or a philosophy of hedonism or crude materialism, can furnish little footing
for the notion of duty or obligation that lies at the heart of the idea of
conscientious objection.
For objection to be conscientious, more perhaps is required than that
the objection be based on a sense of duty or obligation. The duty or obli-

gation must be rooted in a belief about fundamental realities and the nature and purpose of human existence. Only an obligation arising out of a
belief relating to such fundamentals is ordinarily thought of as "a matter
of conscience." Obligations deriving from more modest sources are not
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matters of conscience, although they may be obligations in some sense.

To engage in military activities would, the conscientious objector believes,
violate a duty that derives from a fundamental order of reality as he understands it.211
The similarity between Mansfield's definition of religion, quoted earlier,
and his definition of conscientious objection, just quoted, is both striking
and in accord with many persons' understanding of each term. Mansfield
dearly does not subscribe to the strained view that, though a limitation on
the term religion based on the content of belief is unconstitutional, such
a limitation is permissible in defining conscientious objection. His position is internally consistent in that he accedes to an objective content limitation with respect to both terms. Mansfield's definition of "conscientious"
was presented here to show how closely it approximates his definition of
religion and thus to suggest the following conclusion: It would be sheer
nonsense to take the position earlier referred to, namely, that one can avoid
impermissible religious discrimination by discriminating with respect to
one's definition of conscientious. As with religious belief, the only permissible discrimination concerning the "object" of a conscientious objection i with respect to the external behavior in question. In other words,
the state is only competent to ask: What legally required behavior is A
objecting to and must or ought we honor objections to that kind of external behavior? But, except with respect to the existence and degree of the
individual's subjective commitment, the state cannot constitutionally inquire as to what grounds of personal commitments are worthy of treatment by the state as truly conscientious ones. The equivalence of asking
that and inquiring into the content of beliefs to see if they meet the state's
view of what is religion should be obvious.""8 Thus, the state cannot apply Mansfield's definition of conscientious without itself determining what
grounds constitute a "superior obligation or duty." Genuine religious freedom and nonestablishment require that this determination be made by individuals for themselves, and likewise as to the determination of whether
the duty "derives from a fundamental order of reality."
Probably the underlying dynamic in attempts at reading more content
into the term conscientious than mere sincerity and intensity of commitment is this: Such attempts seek to limit conscientious behavior to situations in which persons purportedly are acting from relatively "altruistic"
or "unselfish" motives. However relevant one thinks a selfish versus unselfish delineation might be, the theoretical and practical barriers to mak217

Id. at 29.

See Mansfield's excek'nt discussion of the lack of justification for trying to posit a legal
distinction between religiously grounded objectors and "nonreligious conscientious objectors."
Id. at 28-35, 67-68. "[A]ny distinction between the two forms of objection is highly debatable
and largely a matter of degree." Id. at 76.
218
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ing such a distinction are simply insurmountable. 19 When does a person
act unselfishly? When are his motives free from self-enhancement?
(And by whose standards would we purport to ascertain "self-enhanceinent," his or ours?) It is impossible for us to judge our own motives on
any such altruistic scale. To think that we could evaluate someone else's
is sheer fantasy. 220 It would therefore introduce both greater rationality
and empirical humility into the conscientious/religious scruples arena to
confine ourselves to what we might have some chance of grossly assessing
-the degree of aversion persons have to complying with a particular exemptible legal norm.
Returning to the constitutional equivalence of limiting what can be conscientious belief with limiting what can be religious belief, it appears that
in the process of drafting the first amendment, freedom of religion and
freedom of conscience were either deemed synonymous or else so intertwined as to be indistinguishable. Thus Madison spoke of Congress' not
being able to "compel men to worship God in any manner contrary to
their conscience." 22 ' More on point for present consideration, if one purports to limit the definition of conscience according to the object of belief,
the functional effect on "beyond speech" free exercise of religion is exactly
the same as so limiting one's definition of religion. Such a verbal finesse
ought not serve to undermine the religious neutrality required by both
first amendment religion clauses. Yet, the tendency for us to apply our own
notions of what kinds of stances are "truly conscientious" is apt to spill
over into the formulation of a legal definition.
Consider, for example, the opinion of Judge Augustus N. Hand in
United States v. Kauten.2" Judge Hand rightly perceived that "a compelling voice of conscience" should be regarded as a "religious impulse" in
granting religiously grounded conscientious objector exemptions under the
Selective Training and Service Act of 1940. However, the opinion failed
to maintain its nondiscriminatory stance in its apparent conclusion (not
clearly enunciated) that a belief can neither be religious nor conscientious
unless: (1) its basis goes beyond reason or logic; and (2) it "categorically requires the believer to disregard elementary self-interest and to accept
219

Cf. the earlier discussion on this impracticality with respect to

§

6(j) religious beliefs

in the text following note 65 supra.
220 Even if we could make such an evaluation, it would be of dubious utility. Do we, for
example, really care whether those suffering severe and sometimes permanent emotional damage
from their past combat experiences are enduring the affects of (a) prolonged and intense anxiety
concerning their own safety or (b) intense guilt from having to inflict grievous harm on others?
Wouldn't we be equally interested in preventing such results in either "pure" type case (if such
purity of "base" or "noble" motives should ever exist)? Concerning the psychological effects of
combat, see generally R. GRINKER & J. SPIEGEL, MEN UNDER STRESS (1945); E. GINZBERG& ASSOCIATES, THE INEFFECTIVE SOLDIER (3 vols. 1959).
2 21
A. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 92-100 (rev. ed.

1964).
222 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943).
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martyrdom in preference to transgressing its tenets. ' 22 3 (Note that if the
court had only so limited "conscientious" the outcome would have been
identical to its actual outcome of its limiting both "conscientious" and "religious"; in neither case would the defendant have qualified for conscientious objector status.)
Even Justice Harlan, so vigilant against discrimination among religions
and against discrimination in favor of religion over what he regarded (contrary to this essay) as "nonreligious" conscientious objection, may have
lowered his guard as to discrimination among consciences. In concurring
with the operative effect of the Welsh plurality's delineation of who is entitled to a § 6(j) exemption, Justice Harlan observed that the delineation
does not "create an Establishment Clause problem in that it exempts all
war
sincere objectors but does not exempt others, e.g., those who object' to
224 If
creed.
their
is
pragmatism
that
contend
and
grounds
on pragmatic
all Justice Harlan meant here was that he concurred in the delineative effect of the Welsh plurality's definition with respect to its excluding those
not sincerely committed to their objection to war, then this essay fully
agrees with his statement. What casts doubt on this interpretation is that,
in his example, the individual honestly presented his "pragmatic grounds"
as his creed. Therefore, if this hypothetical individual were sufficiently
committed to the pragmatic grounds he asserted as a basis for his conscientious objection to all wars, he hardly deserves exclusion because he is
insincere. He can only be exluded if the state wishes to purport to delineate what is a conscientious belief according to the content of the belief.
Faithfulness to freedom of religion and nonestablishment would preclude
such governmental action.
Continuing the consideration of various church and state commentators' proposals for a legal definition of religion (and, in some cases, for a
definition of conscience), we view the formulation of John Burkholder:
Religion is the expression in human action of belief-attitudes of commitment to that which is conceived as ultimate in a nonempirical sense; these
patterns, institutionalized in society,
expressions are symbolized in cultural
225
and internalized in personalities.
For our purposes, the key component of this definition of religion is its
requirement that the object of one's commitment be "that which is conceived as ultimate in a nonempirical sense. 2 26 In positing this requirement, Burkholder purposefully incorporates Talcott Parsons' distinction
between the empirical and nonempirical that, when applied by Parsons to
"evaluative beliefs," becomes a distinction between "ideology" and "reli2
2 31d. at 708.
224 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 359n. 10 (1970).

225 Burkholder, supra note 206, at 208 (emphasis supplied).
226 Id. (emphasis supplied).
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'
gion."22
An appropriate response to the "nonempirical" requirement in
Burkholder's definition is to note what a philosophical hornet's nest one
enters when attempting to divide phenomena into empirical versus nonempirical. Even if one were willing to assume the likelihood of describing a demarcation between these two concepts that most or all of us could
understand and accept, the constitutional question would still remain.
How can this "conceived as ultimate in a nonempirical sense" requirement
be squared with religious freedom or nonestablishment? Why not go
further and restrict religion to that involving the supernatural? Or to belief in the God of somebody's understanding of classical theism? The
difference between these requisites and Burkholder's definition is merely
one of degree, not of principle. They all require the government to decide what can be deemed religion on the basis of the content of a belief.
Jonathan Weiss' aversion to governmental delineation of the bounds
of religion was discussed earlier. Except for this essay's advocacy of a
variable subjective intensity requirement, Weiss' aversion is shared here.
However, at one point Weiss appears to require a legal definition of sorts.
He writes:

To make a common sense decision whether a movement is a religion and a
claim clearly religious, we look in general to: (a) whether the movement
claims through an asking for assent (a rigorous proof of religion would
probably refer to grounds of assent); (b) "supernatural" claims traditionally connected with religion; (c) whether the traditional customary activities and trappings of "religion" are present. These forms of representation may be classed as "religious," even if not explicitly held out as related
to faith, because they are easily recognizable by the person represented to
as associated with such a form of assent.228
As indicated in the last sentence, Weiss finds it necessary (or desirable)
to posit these guideposts for our recognizing religion when, for one reason or another, a person has not expressly represented his stance as such.
In other words, these three objective guideposts serve as a functional synonym for behavior not subjectively labeled as religious.
The need for a functional synonym for the term religion is not to be
doubted. The objection here is to the particular content of the synonym
Weiss chooses. To begin with, it is not clear whether all three components are required for behavior to be deemed religious when not explicitly
so designated. It is strongly implied that, at the very least, in addition
to Weiss' component (a), which appears always to be required, either
component (b) or (c) must also be present unless the claimant explicitly
characterized his representation as a religious one. But even this latter
reading calls forth a constitutionally based objection: Why should behavior not explicitly labeled as religious be unable (or, if this is Weiss'
2 27

See T. PARSONs, THE SOCIAL SYsTEM 326-83 (1951).

228 Weiss, supra note 104, at 606.
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intent, be less likely) to receive legal recognition as religious if the person's stance lacks either a " 'supernatural' claim traditionally connected
with religion" or "the traditional customary activities and trappings of
'religion' "?
The impermissibility of the supernatural requirement is clear. The defect is not corrected by Weiss' limiting the supernatural component to
instances in which persons' stances are not explicitly self-designated as religious. Any system of definitional guideposts that serves to skew decisionmakers' findings of religious behavior toward behavior purporting to
involve the supernatural is subject to this objection: Where it results in supernaturally grounded beliefs being exempt from legal norms in preference to other equally devout beliefs, it violates the establishment clause
and may violate the free exercise clause as well.
In actualizing the first amendment religion clauses, courts should
guard against confining religion to any sort of "other-worldly" box, thereby
conveying most or all of social reality in "this world" to the state. Hence
one must object to Weiss' tentative formulation that "religious action is
action the function of which is only to establish and perpetuate a private
meaning for individuals-a meaning given to it by a religion." 229 Religious
action qua religious action may well have secular, physical consequences,
even in that transient veil of tears known as the secular world. That giant
we call the state neither needs nor deserves to be handed the bulk of social reality by limiting manifestations of religion or individual conscience
to matters supernatural or private. The seemingly eternal problems of
church and state are always subject to this easy (and totally one-sided)
solution. Such an outcome would do justice neither to the state nor to the
soul of man. (The tendency toward extreme state favoritism is presented
as only that. It is in no way meant to describe the actual position of any
commentator here discussed, least of all Weiss himself, who is explicitly
aware of the danger of statism. 23 0)
Regarding the alternative requirement or guidepost (c), "whether the
traditional customary activities and trappings of 'religion' are present,"
one must make two objections. First, such a guidepost doesn't really guide
us. What are these customary trappings? Snake handling? Hallucinogenic
drugs? Walking on hot coals? The "traditional activities" of religion are
as varied as human cultures and individuals. Which "trappings" do we
use as the basis of our comparison? The ones in our predominant religions? Establishment clause problems aside, what kinds of activities are
similar enough to the Sacraments of Holy Communion and Baptism to
qualify them for inclusion within the "traditional activities and trappings"
category? The other objection is that even if this guidepost could function
229
230

Id. at 608 (emphasis in original).
See, e.g., id. at 604.
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as an intelligible standard, its use "would tend to prejudice recognition of
novel or strange institutions of religion," '' thus hampering the goals of
religious freedom and nonestablishment.
32
In Washington Ethical Society v. District of Columbia,2
the court was
faced with an appeal from the District of Columbia Tax Court, which had
denied petitioner a church-or-religious-society property tax exemption on
the ground that the petitioner society did not believe in or teach "the existence of a Divinity." The court of appeals quite rightly reversed, holding
that petitioner was entitled to the exemption. However, a portion of the
opinion is troublesome in that the court felt it relevant to demonstrate
the extent to which the petitioner society's activities included those "familiar
in services of many formal or traditional church organizations." 3 3 Far
more appropriate was the additional reasoning in then Circuit Judge Burger's opinion that "also included [in addition to religions believing in a
divine or supernatural power] in these [standard] definitions [of religion]
is the idea of 'devotion to some principle; strict fidelity or faithfulness;
conscientiousness, pious affecting or attachment.' "234 These just-quoted
formulations closely resemble the pure subjective commitment test being
recommended in this essay as the preferred interpretation of Seeger-Welsh.
They suggest the constitutionally compelling reason for not restricting religious property tax exemptions according to the objective content of the
recipients' belief; to allow such a restriction would put government in the
utterly inappropriate position of determining that even though persons
may be religiously committed to certain beliefs, those beliefs are not, according to the government, religious.
Concerning Weiss' requirement or guidepost (a), the "assent" component, the proper response depends on what he means. If he is merely saying
that religious commitment requires some kind of belief, there is no problem. This "requirement" would add nothing to a purely subjective commitment test. If, however, he intends to restrict religious belief to beliefs
grounded in any prescribed way or ways (thus introducing some epistemological requisite), the objection is the same as for any restriction on the
content of belief, for content of belief necessarily includes the ground or
grounds for belief.
Weiss' formula for a functional synonym for religious behavior is, of
course, much less objectionable than it would have been if he had treated
it as always required rather than as only advisable when the party himself has failed to identify his stance explicitly as a religious one. Much
231 Boyan, Defining Religion in Operationaland Institutional Terms, 116 U. PA. L. REV.
479, 494 (1968).
232 249 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
233 ld. at 128.
234 Id. at 129.
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of the criticism stated here is directed against such a potential misuse of
Weiss' endeavor.
Also, Weiss was speaking in the context of the question of when a
"misrepresentation" would be protected as a religious one. The problem
is essentially the same as was discussed earlier in this essay as an instance
35
In
of when a subjective intensity test would probably not be required.?
or
criminal
the matter of whether A misled B so as to incur legal liability,
civil, it is relevant to ask, "In what mode was A purporting to speak ?" It
might well make a difference that A was purporting to speak with medical
or scientific expertise rather than purporting to speak purely on the basis
of personal convictions. However, even a representation made purely on
this latter basis ought not necessarily be free from liability. If A unconditionally promised B a cure from disease, knowing that he could not
guarantee such a result, and B was thereby defrauded of wealth and deterred from seeking medical advice, one is led to argue that one or more
"public" interests have been violated, even if A purported only to speak
via his religious beliefs. In such a case, conflicting interests should be
weighed against the free-exercise-of-religion interest of A, however A
characterizes his stance.
Whatever rubrics one finally adopts in the utterly perplexing area of
religious misrepresentation, Weiss' three-pronged supplement to an explicit religious self-designation has no applicability elsewhere, either in
actualizing free exercise or in balancing religious freedom against other
worthy concerns. (It is likely that he did not intend its use in areas other
than misrepresentation. Thus, again, the objection here is to the potential
misuse of his formulation.) The functional synonym for religion Weiss
rightly sought can be generally achieved so as also to adhere to the values
of religious liberty, state nonestablishment, and fairness to the interests of
others. These goals can all be fostered by using the Seeger-Welsh definition as that functional synonym, with a subjective intensity requirement
that varies with the import of whatever interests happen to conflict with
the individual's asserted religious-conscientious commitment.
Stephen Boyan has proposed a five-point legal definition of religion in
an "operational" sense:
[R]eligion is a belief which:
(1) is based not entirely on reason or empirical evidence;
(2) refers to a final or ultimate reality;
(3) relates the believer to his fellow men and the universe;
(4) finds expression in an attitude of veneration or devotion towards
the final reality;
(5) finds expression in an inward mentor called conscience. 23 6
See text accompanying notes 98-100 supra.
6 Boyan, supra note 231, at 486. Boyan supplements his "operational" definition with an
"institutional" definition: "a religious institution, or a religion in an institutional sense, con235
23
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Boyan's first requisite reflects an idea found both in the Kauten case,
already discussed, and in Berman v. United States.2" 7 To say that a belief
cannot be religious unless it is "based not entirely on reason or empirical
evidence" may or may not deserve assent as a theological claim. But it
dearly has no place in a legal definition of religion. Boyan expressly asserts that this first characteristic of religious belief "can be identified as
such by the outside observer. 23 8 If this characteristic were adopted as a
legal requisite of religious belief, then the state would assume the utterly
dubious function of determining if beliefs were supra-reasonable enough
or (or is it "and"?) supra-empirical enough to be religious.
Although the following comment has no applicability to Boyan's own
position, it must be noted that the distinction between a belief's having to
be "beyond" reason to be religious and its having to be unreasonable is
not one that offers us much assurance of being clear on all occasions.
Requiring persons to think more (or less?) than "reason" is able to think
or to see what empirical observation cannot see can readily degenerate into
a kind of "weirdo requirement" in the state's legal definition of religion.
In other words, from the point of view of secular, this-worldly courts or
other state functionaries, a person must be sufficiently "out of it" (from a
secular, this-worldly view) in order to receive whatever concessions are
made to the religious. If one is out of touch with secular reality and is also deemed dangerous to other interests, the state civilly commits him for
safe-keeping in an institution for the mentally incompetent. However, if
one is out of touch with secular reality but is nevertheless considered by
the state to be relatively harmless, the state may then simply classify his
behavior as religious and therefore excusable. While these suggestions
may themselves seem "out of it," the reader is invited to posit some rational justification for granting beyond speech free exercise of religion protection only to persons whose beliefs are not wholly grounded in reason or
empirical observation.
Returning to Boyan's definition, we consider his statement that "the
other four characteristics [(2) through (5) abovej are necessarily evident
only to the believer himself. ' 2' 39 This point is confusing in two respects.
First, why is requirement (4), which involves the believer's attitude of
veneration or devotion, only evident to the believer himself? Granted,
that X is in a better position than we are to tell us what he believes. Further granted, that what X tells us he believes is of no small import in developing our conclusions as to the matter. But we may also be in a position to make a tentative but reasonable judgment about what X deems
sists of any association of practices, rituals or ceremonies intended to confirm, manifest, express

or promote a belief, which for some persons is operationally religious." Id. at 487.
237 156 F.2d 377, 380-81 (9th Cir.), cert. dcnied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946).
238
Boyan, supra note 231, at 486.
239
1d.
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important or about whether what X says is important to him really is. We
can make such inferences from observing X's behavior. Secondly, Boyan's
aforementioned statement is confusing in this sense: If characteristics (2)
through (5) are only evident to the believer, then they really add nothing
to a purely functional definition that only inquires as to the reality of the
believer's subjective commitment. For example, if it is only necessary for
a deeply committed believer to state that the object of his devotion is for
him "a final or ultimate reality," then requirement (2) in Boyan's scheme
is merely a verbal one. Boyan himself seems undecided as to how subjective he means his latter four requisites to be. He appears to praise
United States v. Seeger for reaching a definition "so as to avoid a comparison of the content of one belief with that of another. ' 240 Yet (writing
before Welsh) he also offers the following as a further explication of
Seeger:
A zealously held belief in something does not necessarily occupy a place
parallel to the belief in God; rather, the key is the relationship between the
power or being or faith, on the one hand, and the universe, on the other.
This relationship will have an explanatory function for the believer; it
will put things in perspective much in the same way as a belief in God
does. It will serve to relate the individual believer to his fellow man and
the universe. Moreover, there is a limit to religion: it is a belief which has
an explanatory force to the believers and thereby involves2 a reality to which
everything else is subordinate or ultimately dependent. 41
What is the force of his insistence that a religious belief "will serve to
relate the individual believer to his fellow man and the universe"? How
much togetherness with fellow man is required? What if X's religion is
purely individualistic and utterly oblivious to the question of relating X
to other human beings? If such a religion would qualify, the "fellow
man" requirement means nothing. If X's religion would not qualify, the
state is imposing its own normative view of religion.
What about the relating-to-the-universe requirement? While it seems
harmless enough, consider what it would do to Daniel Andrew Seeger's
status as a religiously grounded conscientious objector:
The cosmic order does, perhaps, suggest a creative intelligence. But
considering the natural world outside of man, with its ceaseless struggle
for survival and its indiscriminate distribution of cataclysmic natural
phenomena, one may doubt that this intelligence is informed with a
moral purpose. Rather it would appear that in human history the principle of righteousness has emerged very gradually from man's own painful
efforts, uncertain and unblessed.
Personally, I do not believe that life derives any meaning from cosmic
design but I do believe that a person can give his life meaning by doing
something worthwhile with it, i.e., by relating his existence in a construcd. at 496.
411d. at 497.

240
2
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live and compassionate way to the problems of his social environment. In
this sense pacifism, among other things, is for me a transcendant concern
and it is in this respect that I consider myself religious.2 42
The above quoted statements are Seeger's own. If they do not disqualify
him according to Boyan's "universe" criterion, why don't they? Is it because Seeger has intelligently thought through the question of cosmic
morality and (perhaps tentatively) rejected the idea? What if he had
simply (consciously or unconsciously) deemed the question irrelevant to
his life commitments? Would this have made him less religious, or merely less of an abstract thinker? The conclusion with respect to all five of
Boyan's criteria, except for the subjective devotion component of (4), is
this: To the extent that they add meaning to a requirement of deep personal commitment, they are unconstitutional. They are thus constitutional
only to the extent that they are superfluous to the simpler Seeger-Welsh
formulation.
The following point is made with respect to any formulation that prefers to deem any component of a definition of religion as merely involving
the "grounds for belief" rather than the "content of belief." (Boyan's
first requisite is susceptible to this interpretation.) A grounds of belief
versus content of belief distinction particularly lacks merit with respect to
religious belief, because the grounds for belief are frequently inseparable
from their content. It is, for example, part of the content of X's religion
for him to believe (a) that his beliefs are grounded in his own reason
and observation, or (b) that his beliefs are grounded solely in divine revelation contained in the Holy Bible, or (c) that his beliefs are grounded in
an immediate mystical encounter with Deity, or whatever. The medium
is clearly a major part of the message. For the state to limit the grounds
of beliefs it will treat as religious is for the state to limit the content of
beliefs it will so recognize.
The following proposed definition concludes the sampling:
An individual or group belief is religious if it occupies the same place in
the lives of its adherents that orthodox beliefs occupy in the lives of their
adherents. Four characteristics should be present:
(1) a belief regarding the meaning of life;
(2) a psychological commitment by the individual adherent (or if a
group, by the members generally) to this belief;
(3) a system of moral practice resulting from adherence to this belief;
and,

(4) an acknowledgement by its adherents that the belief (or belief system) is their exclusive or supreme system of ultimate beliefs. 248
242 Record at 73, 99, United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), quoted in Mansfield,
supra note 26, at 4.
24
3 Comment, Defining Religion: Of God, the Constitution and the D.A.R., 32 U. CHI. L.
REV. 533, 550-51 (1965). One would be pleased to identify the author or authors of this excellent piece modestly labelled a "comment," but due to the utterly irrational and happily dying
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This formulation closely approximates a purely functional definition; just
how closely depends on nuances of interpretation. If adequate subjective
commitment exists such that items (2)-(4) are satisfied, there should be
no restrictive effect whatsoever from the "belief regarding the meaning of
life" initial requirement. To the extent that an individual commits his life
to any goal or goals, he thereby defines for himself the meaning of his life.
However, the meaning of item (3), a resultant "system of moral practice," is unclear. There is first the question of whether any content is
conveyed in the term "moral" other than that of the individual's choosing
what he deems to be good. If so, the earlier-argued prohibition against
limiting the content of "religious" by limiting the content of "moral" (or
"conscientious") would apply. Also, one is troubled by the use of the
term "system" with respect to moral practices. What content does this
convey? Hopefully, none. All that requisite (3) ought to mean is that
religious beliefs must be actualized to some substantial extent in the believer's life. If belief does not affect how one lives, it is not religious or,
more accurately, the believer is not religiously committed to his alleged
beliefs. There is ground for inferring that this is all that item (3) was
meant to convey, for the writer stresses that his definition of religion "does
not require any particular belief as a criterion of religion; it requires only
that the belief fulfill a certain psychological function. '2 4 4 With this interpretation, items (2), (3), and (4) are really only refinements of the
requirement of subjective commitment. If the earlier-advocated prescription of varying the severity of the required degree of commitment according to the import of competing values is accepted, then requisites (2)(4) should be understood as variable in the same way. The above fourpronged formulation is thus readily interpretable as simply a more elaborate construction of Seeger-Welsh (though written well before Welsh).
The only objection to the four-pronged formulation as thus interpreted is
that all four points should be stated so that they connote only the dimension of subjective adherence. As a possibility:
(1) a belief that has meaning for the believer concerning his life;
(2) (no alteration needed);
(3) some reflection of the person's asserted belief(s) in his actual behavior;
(4) an affirmation by the believer that his belief(s) constitutes all or
part of his supreme and ultimate life concern.
If there is some foolproof formulation, this does not purport to be it. The
point to be insisted upon, however, is as follows: The crucial yardstick for
tradition of not acknowledging the authorship of student law review work, no names appear
with the article.
2441d. at 551-52. "Under the definition suggested in this comment, . . .atheists (as that
term is commonly understood), as well as sincere and consistent Epicureans, could be religious."
1d. at 552-53.
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judging any formulation is its clarity as a guidepost in deterring governmental decisionmakers from introducing into their religious-nonreligious
delineations any sort of requirement as to the objects or grounds of be2 45
lief.
3.

An Answer to the "Wet Blanket" Problem

The just-concluded sampling of proposed formulations has demonstrated a tendency of varying strength on the part of commentators to
limit the definition of religion on the basis of the grounds or content of
belief. It was earlier suggested that such limitations are advocated, at
least in part, in order to avoid dampening decisionmakers' willingness to
recognize free exercise exceptions to legal norms. As with the converse
fear of social chaos, the fear that a broad functional definition will discourage the state from granting free exercise protection tends to be
greater than the actual danger warrants. For example, it would be simply
incorrect to say that under a Seeger-Wfelsh type functional definition, any
asserted belief can qualify as religion. Such a statement either omits or
underestimates the force of the variable subjective commitment requirement. This requirement of devotion to whatever is one's God or gods is
no incidental matter. It should reduce decisionmakers' qualms about
recognizing free exercise rights, for decisionmakers would know that they
could utilize this requirement to exclude the superficial and the halfhearted from religious-conscientious exemptions to the extent that affected
competing interests warranted their exclusion. (Such an exclusionary process is now being used in administering claims of conscientious objection
to military service.) It would therefore not necessarily be the case that
the number of religious exemptions from any given legal norm would be
greater under this essay's interpretation of Seeger-Welsh than under a
content restrictive definition.24 6 The number might be greater, the same,
or less, depending on, among other factors, the severity of the subjective
commitment standard for the scruple in question. What would and should
change is that the composition of the exempted group would be deter245 The range of possibily affected governmental decisionmakers includes "the cop on the
beat." Though he may appear at the bottom of the bureaucratic scheme, he makes more "legal
(law enforcement) decisions" than any other official of government. See generally J. Goldstein,
Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-visibility Decisions in the Administrationof Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960).
246 Statistical data comparing the incidence of military conscientious objection claims in years
prior to and following Seeger and Welsh would only be illuminating to the extent that a host of
other factors (number of inductions, public feelings about the Southeast Asia War, etc.) have
remained constant; but they have not generally done so. One would also have to take into account the actual religious belief definition (or definitions, implicit and explicit) being used at
different times in different localities throughout the judicial and administrative structure. These
cannot be assumed to be in accord with the prevailing pronouncement of whatever higher court
may have last spoken.
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mined solely on the basis of the intensity of objection to the legal duty in
question.
The conclusion just stated does not completely dispose of the "wet
blanket" problem. For some, it merely restates it. It can still be asserted
that legislatures and courts simply would not be willing to recognize free
exercise exemptions, even to laws lacking a compelling state interest, if
anyone deeply enough committed to not complying with such a law could
qualify for an exemption; therefore, the Supreme Court would never have
recognized any right to a once-a-week holy day had it thought a Sunday
afternoon professional football addict could possibly qualify. (Note,
however, that our football fan may have a horrendously difficult proofof-deep-commitment problem.) More seriously, Congress would never
allow conscientious objection to military service if a "devout coward" could
qualify. (Consider also, this person's proof-of-commitment problem,
which would itself require a kind of courage in large dosage.) At the
cost of giving these marginal examples more theoretical attention than
they are apt to receive in practice, it is appropriate to attempt a resolution
of the issue.
The central theme here has been that the human psyche as a determinant of external behavior deserves at least as much legal recognition in a
humane society as is afforded to all sorts of other interests, tangible and
intangible, sublime and ridiculous. Further, the free exercise of religion
guarantee requires that legislatures, administrative agencies, and courts take
this psyche-as-behavior-determinant into account in all decisionmaking.
However, the free exercise clause and the establishment clause require that
government not "discriminate between psyches" except on the following
bases: (1) according to external behavior which has secularly cognizable
consequences;24 7 and (2) according to the intensity of the person's commitment to behaving or not behaving in a particular way. This latter basis
was earlier expressed as involving the amount of emotional pain ("spiritual pain," "psychological pain," "guilt," "anxiety") that compelling an
individual to deviate from the guidance of his own "soul" (psyche) would
248
cause.
The response to the "wet blanket" argument, then, is this: Restricting
the range of objects of devotion that are legally recognizable as religion in
order to encourage greater governmental recognition of religious freedom
is a complete negation of the goal desired. Any such restriction results
in a special "freedom" for those religions (those way-of-life commitments)
that seem conventionally proper. If, for example, one has to choose either
to grant military conscientious objector status only to recognized pacifist re247 Even here there are other constitutional limitations-freedom of speech, due process,
equal protection, etc.
248 That our capability of predicting and measuring such pain is in its infancy is readily
conceded. Note, however, what future development the term "infancy" implies.

1973]

RELIGION

ligious groups or not to grant such status to anyone, the latter is clearly
less at odds with the meaning of the first amendment. The choice then
must always be between granting religious protection to all who have a
subjective religious interest at stake in the matter and granting beyond
speech religious protection to none. In other words, if the government is
going to protect psyche freedom ("soul freedom") in the realm of external behavior, it should do so on an utterly neutral basis with respect to
the content of beliefs. It thus ought only to discriminate with respect
to: (a) subjective intensity of belief; and (b) the external consequences
of overt behavior. Government does belong in the business of protecting religious freedom along with other human values. But if one
has to choose between biased protection and no protection, the latter is a
lesser evil than "protection" that is slanted in favor of conventional views
of what is religious or conscientious.2 49
For those who flinch at a legal definition of religion based solely on subjective commitment, it must be insisted that the question of overriding importance is this: Are the first amendment religion clauses to become in a
secular age merely a quaint sentimentalist memento of times past? If the
definition of religion is tied to what is now conventionally regarded as religious, then the likelihood of any future viability for first amendment
religious protections becomes problematic. The "is now" becomes "once
was" almost overnight. The unprecedented rate of social change we are
now experiencing has not failed to make its mark on religious existence,
nor will it cease to have its effect in the future. There are few spokesmen
of current religious institutions who, if pressed to utmost candor, will deny
their total uncertainty as to the religious future of man (much less their
uncertainty about the future of their own tradition). Somewhat akin to
249

A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier

to reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on purely secular considerations; to have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in
religious belief. Although a determination of what is a "religious" belief or practice entitled to constitutional protection may present a most delicate question, the very
concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own standards
•on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important interests. Thus, if the
Amish asserted their claimns [against post-eighth grade formal schooling] because of
their subjective evaluation and rejection of the contemporary secular values accepted
by the majority, much as Thoreau rejected the social values of his time and isolated himself at Walden Pond, their claim would not rest on a religious basis. Thoreau's choice
was philosophical and personal rather than religious, and such belief does not rise to the
demands of the Religion Clauses.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972). This reasoning particularly confuses the
problem of defining what can be an individual's religion with the problem of maintaining neces-

sary social control; deciding whether society's interests are important enough to override in-

dividual commitments is equally a problem, no matter whether the individual's substantive
grounds for his deeply felt position are deemed utterly supernatural or utterly secular. In failing to reaffirm the open range of religion as including whatever deep commitments persons
choose for themselves, Chief Justice Burger has put himself in the position of having either to
propound a content restrictive definition or to assume one without telling us what it is. He
seemingly has done the latter. Happily, though, the remarks quoted here are pure dicta.
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some of Bonhoeffer's wonderings as to the future of religion,2 50 one might
question the future of a functionally viable first amendment guarantee of
religious freedom and nonestablishment if what we now conventionally
regard as "religious" becomes nonexistent. The obsolescence of constitutional religious protection would be no great judicial or human tragedy unless there is a "religious" dimension to human experience beyond "internal
belief," "free speech" and "privacy" that is worthy and needful of legal
protection.
This essay has spoken of "way-of-life freedom" and of freedom of the
human psyche (mind, soul, personality) not merely as an internal thought
box (freedom of belief) and idea transmitter (freedom of speech, press,
etc.), but freedom of the psyche as a determinant of behavior. These
phrases are meant to connote what may be the most substantial aspect of
human dignity-the freedom and responsibility of persons, within the limits of their genetic and environmental situation, to create the content of
their own lives.
Is it merely playing word games to locate the constitutional recognition
of this component of human worth in the free-exercise-of-religion clause?
There are both historical and logical warrants for finding it there. What
religion has meant for man and what it still denotes is the quest for the
goals of living, for the purpose of one's existence. There would thus be
nothing revolutionary about "finding" way-of-life freedom within the meaning of religious freedom. The only revolutionary aspect of the matter is
the idea in the first amendment that government's role is one of protecting
individuals' and groups' right to seek and to exercise their own religiousconscientious commitments. Such an idea seemed (and was) revolutionary
in seventeenth and eighteenth century America. Freedom of religion, even
at the level of belief and symbolic communication, was a matter of intense
debate and controversy during our colonial existence; the attainment of
the constitutional guarantee of free exercise was hardly a victory without
prior battles. The reason religious freedom seems so bland and "safe" a
liberty today (and one that is hardly emphasized in a "with it," "relevant"
course in constitutional law) may be that we have ignored its potential
impact in an increasingly secular age.
To the extent that we ignore the "secular" relevance of the free exercise
clause, we deny ourselves its utility as a humane "regulator" between the
state and the individual. The need for state authority is grounded in the
reality that my "way-of-life freedom" must not impede unduly on your
"way-of-life freedom" and vice versa. The delineation of where state compulsion ought to restrict the scope of the individual's own choices must
take a host of secularly cognizable factors into account. It is axiomatic
that if the state excludes any substantial component of human need in strik2 50

See generally, D. BONHOEFFER, .,'

ERS AND PAPERs FROm PRIsoN (rev. ed. 1967).
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ing its balance between social control and individual liberty, the state acts
unjustly. (To exclude any such component would epitomize "arbitrariness.") Yet that is exactly what the state does when it ignores the intensity
of persons' commitments in prescribing their legal duties.
It may at first seem utterly fair to say, "The state will require nothing
of anyone that it does not require of everyone. Either a given requirement
of behavior will be compulsory for all, or the matter will be voluntary for
all." Yet almost immediately, further considerations of "fairness" or "humaneness" compel us to qualify the just-stated principle by taking into account differences in age (and thus one posits some minimum and sometimes even a maximum age for certain legal duties), physical and mental
health, etc. To maximize this kind of fairness-humaneness, one ought,
where feasible, also to take into account that different individuals may vary
widely in how much "psychic pain" they are apt to suffer if legally required
to engage in or not to engage in particular behavior.
One is not advocating optimum individual liberty by arguing merely
that the state should only use coercion when a compelling state interest
exists. Such an over-simplification ignores a substantial category of situations in which there is enough compelling state interest to require legal
coercion. (In other words, the state cannot rely on voluntary compliance to
meet a certain need.) However, there is no compelling state interest to
coerce those individuals who are both willing to identify themselves as religiously or conscientiously opposed to a given majority norm and, to the
extent warranted by competing interests, able to prove their commitment to
their deviant values. For the state to recognize this category of situations
whenever they exist 25' is to maximize the scope of individual freedom, allowing greater freedom in proportion to the importance individuals attach
to particular instances of liberty. The closer a government approaches
such an ideal, the more sensitive to individual differences and feelings (and
thus the more responsive to religious liberty) that government can claim to
be.
It must be conceded that our present relative ignorance in ascertaining
subjective commitment is an impediment to attaining the stated ideal. However, there are two qualifications to this concession. First, our present ignorance is not total. Ev en at a common sense level, what a person says he
deems important, coupled with evidence of his behavior, provides no small
clue as to what he deems of value and how strongly he feels about it. Secondly, the concession carries with it the expectation of future progress in
assessing psychological commitment. Such progress should enable way251 Situations already recognized in which state compulsion is deemed justified, but where religiously grounded exceptions are allowed, include military service, jury duty, nonuse of one type
of narcotic (peyote), availability for Saturday work to qualify for unemployment compensation,
and (in certain not yet defined instances) high schooling. See text accompanying notes 190-96
supra.
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of-life freedom to have more rather than less viability in the future than it
has had in the past. Whether our increased capacity to identify those persons most in need of stepping to a different drummer is utilized to enhance rather than to thwart individual freedom depends in part on the
breadth of commitments allowed to qualify for such consideration. Hence
the insistence on a view of religion whose content is as broad as human
commitment itself.
4. A Skinnerian Postscript to a Functional Definition
This essay has grounded its insistence on a broad, functional definition
of religion on the premise that government ought to protect the individual's freedom to form his own way of life. Further, it has suggested that
the freedom to create the content of one's life may well be.the most vital
aspect of human dignity. One does not toss about such concepts as "freedom" and "dignity" without having to face B. F. Skinner's onslaught
against such thinking. Beyond Freedom and Dignity is behaviorist Skinner's scientistic coup de grace to the "literature of freedom and dignity"
2 52
and to the "inner man."
In briefly responding to the Skinner book, it should first be noted that
Skinner's use of the term "dignity" is considerably different from the use
of that word in this essay. Skinner uses the concept to refer to the conviction that individuals are "deserving" of praise for doing good and "deserving" of blame when they do evil. His concept of dignity, which he
posits and then rejects, is thus one of earned merit. Dignity as earned
merit is quite a different thing from dignity as innate human worth.
The use of "human dignity" here is meant to refer to the innate value of
human qua human, a value every person is given as an intelligent human
being.
It was earlier suggested that part of innate human worth consists of
man's ability to play some creative role, to effect some choice in making
his life. Thus the human psyche was described as a determinant (not
the determinant) of external behavior. (The psyche itself is here conceived of as partly determined, partly free.) Though this viewpoint concedes great scope to the individual's genetic and environmental history as
limitations on his range of freedom, the concession is not enough to reconcile the thinking of this essay with Skinner's position, which he states
as follows:
In what we may call the prescientific view... a person's behavior is at least
to some extent his own achievement.... In the scientific view ... a person's behavior is determined by a genetic endowment traceable to the evolutionary history of the species and by the environmental circumstances to
252

See B. F. SKINNER, BEYoND FREDom AND DIGNITY 7-59 (1971) [hereinafter referred
to as B. F. SKnNER].
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which as an individual he has been exposed. Neither view can be proved,
but it is the nature of scientific inquiry that the evidence should shift in
favor of the second. As we learn more about the effects of the environment, we have less reason to attribute any part of human behavior to an
autonomous controlling agent.253
Earlier in his book, Skinner stated that:
Personal exemption from a complete determinism is revoked as a scientific
analysis progresses.... 254
As Skinner himself must and does confess, his statement of faith in complete determinism is no more provable than is a position of finite freedom
(partial determinism) .255 He might also have added that the philosophical problems are at least as troublesome in the former as in the latter. 58
Regardless of whether one adopts outright determinism as his working
assumption, he may still conclude that the state ought to see that persons
are left as free of social control in living their lives as is commensurate
with the valid physical and emotional needs of others. Thus, though one
rejects the reality of any psychic freedom, he might decide that the law
should not impose any unnecessary uniformity on the ground that it would
reduce our species' likelihood of surviving changes in, environmental contingencies. 57 This and other reasons could well lead a determinist to favor
avoiding man-made controls except when needed, thus deliberately leaving
individuals in substantial part subject to natural contingencies. Though
the determinist's grounds for what is here deemed way-of-life freedom
would differ from that of this essay, the outcome might well be the same.
The earlier discussed principle of limiting the scope of the individual's
religious (way-of-life) freedom according to the import of competing interests should cause no serious Skinnerian objection. It comports with
Skinner's insistence that social planning to enhance humanity's long term
survival ought not to be understood as an increase in control. In the
realm of economic necessity, Skinner is quite correct to claim that enlightened social planning would hardly result in increased control over
the individual. Rather, instead of being controlled by irrational and arbitrary economic forces, which are often not even recognized as controls
despite their effective tyranny, enlightened economic regulation would
constitute a qualitative difference in the content of control. Increased
social control to protect us from ecological devastation becomes a more
253 Id. at 101 (emphasis supplied).
25

41d. at 21.
B. F. SKINNER, supra note 252, contributes neither added data nor new logic to the
freedom-determinism conundrum.
256 For a cogently reasoned attempt at positing the existence of a finite amount of freedom
throughout all reality, see A. N. WHrrEHEAD, PRocEss AND REALITY, especially at 343-45,
373-75 (1930).
257 Cf. Skinner's case for "planted diversification," B. F. SKINNER, supra note 252, at 162-63.
2 55
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crucial prerequisite for religious freedom with each increment in technology, production, and population growth. It would thus be a gross misuse
of the idea of religious freedom qua way-of-life freedom for it to be used
reasonably needed to curtail any form of
to thwart social control which2 is
58
survival threatening pollution.
C. Protection for "Unbelief"?
Closely related both to the matter of how broad a legal definition of
religion is constitutionally required and to the perpetually haunting issue
of governmental religious neutrality is the following question: Do the
first amendment religion clauses protect persons' religious "unbelief"?
According to Justice Frankfurter, "[tjhe Establishment Clause withdrew from the sphere of legitimate legislative concern and competence
a specific, but comprehensive, area of human conduct: man's belief or
disbelief in the verity of some transcendental idea and man's expression in
action of that belief or disbelief. '259 Justice Frankfurter's statement suggests
what seems obvious enough, that the establishment clause does "protect"
disbelief in transcendental claims and the expression of such disbelief
in the sense that government is forbidden from lending its support to the
idea of transcendent reality. The question of protecting unbelief becomes
more problematic, however, in dealing with the free exercise clause.
When Maryland's requirement of a declaration of belief in God by persons
receiving a notary public commission or assuming other public office was
invalidated, the Supreme Court reasoned as follows:
This Maryland religious test for public office unconstitutionally invades the
of belief and religion and therefore cannot be enforced
appellant's freedom
260
him.
against
Despite the well-received outcome of the case, Justice Black's opinion has
been questioned in some quarters for needlessly invoking the free exercise
clause.2 " (Admittedly, the Maryland oath could have been voided via the
establishment, free speech, due process, or equal protection clauses, or
even by applying the article VI "no religious test" proviso to the states.)
Burkholder faults Justice Black's use of the free exercise clause as "thus
implying an equivalence of belief and disbelief in the whole sphere of
First Amendment religion." 262 And, says Burkholder, "[tjo bring 'irreliin the First Amendment, seems
gion' into parity with religion, as construed
26
to create more problems than it solves. 1
Even noise pollution has become a problem of medically significant dimension.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 465-66 (1961) (Frankfurther & Harlan, JJ., separate opinion).
260
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488,496 (1961) (emphasis supplied).
26 1
See Burkholder, supra note 206, at 212-14; cf. P. KAUPBR, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITuTiON 28-29 (1964).
262
Burkholder, supra note 206, at 214.
258
259

263

id.
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The alleged problem most pertinent to this essay is what Burkholder
calls "the absurdity of allowing irreligious claims for immunity [from
civil sanctionj under the free exercise provision. 264 It should be understood that the objection to the use of the religion clauses to protect "unbelief" does not suggest that governmental harassment of disbelief is constitutionally permissible. Rather, the objectors see the other first amendment guarantees and the equal protection and due process clauses as being
fully sufficient to protect the right of unbelief. 65 Sole reliance on these
other constitutional protections would, however, have the effect of denying any special beyond speech free exercise protection to action or inaction based on "irreligion" or "unbelief."
Both the view that unbelief is protected by the religion clauses and the
objection to this idea appear to need clarification. This could be fostered
by following through with an assumption that underlies this essay's general approval of the Seeger-Welsh view of religion. The assumption is
that all persons are necessarily committed to something(s). If this is so,
it makes little sense to speak of religious "unbelief" except with respect
to an individual's or group's explicit or implicit rejection of one or more
religious positions in favor of that individual's or group's own religious
stance. And it makes little sense to speak of "irreligion" or "nonreligious behavior" except with respect to that part of people's behavior not
grounded in their ultimate life commitments. In other words, there may
be nonreligious aspects to individual and group experience, but there are
no nonreligiouspeople.266 Such a view of man's nature is not merely playing word games, nor is it immune from strenuous attack. The idea of
"making believers" (of some sort) out of everyone is particularly distasteful to those who are devout about their explicit unbeliefs. But even deeply
felt "commitment to noncommitment" is a profoundly religious stance,
for it may well determine one's entire way of life. For any individual to
be required to affirm some other commitment not actually felt might well
be violative of his religious freedom (though also violative of not explicitly religious constitutional guarantees as well).
If the foregoing has validity, then it is quite misleading to say that
Justice Black's Torcaso opinion purported to extend free-exercise-of-religion
protection to unbelief. One may certainly refuse to swear his belief in
God for reasons grounded in his own religious commitment. Not concurring in what he understands the oath to mean by "belief in God," he
264 ld.
265
See M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 149-76, 156-57 (1965).

Included
is a delightful presentation of Howe's view that the use of the religion clauses to protect unbelief is historically inaccurate.
266 This approach is similar to that taken by the first National Study Conference on Church
and State, convened by the National Council of Churches in 1964, one year prior to the Seeger
decision. See Wogaman, The NCC NationalStudy Conference on Church and State, 1964 RELIGION AND THE PUB. ORDER

121, 143-44.
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may refuse because of his own deep sense of intellectual honesty. Or,
though believing in God, he might refuse on the ground that the state
has no business in asking the question. Whatever his grounds, if they
are deeply felt, his religious freedom is being protected by Torcaso's prohibition against a religious test for state office.
Characterizing all persons as religious has an obvious egalitarian function vis-&-vis the first amendment; it seeks to qualify all persons for substantive free exercise of religion protection. The subjective intensity requirement proposed in this essay is meant to be formulated and administered so as to comport as closely as possible to the ideal of equal treatment.
For that reason, the intensity-of-commitment requirement was not expressed solely in terms of "how deep" or "how strong" a commitment the
individual possessed. If the matter were left purely at the "how much"
level, there might indeed be a class of "unbelievers," persons of "weak
spirit" who lacked the "psychic power" to qualify as deeply committed to
anything. Therefore, intensity of commitment has also been given an individualistic referent, being defined as the "emotional pain" this individual
might suffer if required to violate his convictions. Thus a more fragile
personality, though lacking a high degree of ascertainable fervor, could
still be deemed deeply committed in the sense of being emotionally vulnerable were he required to deviate from his own scruples. 6 7
The Seeger test itself is highly individualistic. A belief is religious if
based on a faith to which all else is, for that person, subordinate or ultimately dependent. Intensity of commitment is thus relative to the individual person's own ordering.
There is, however, another type of individual yet to be considered-the
other-directed person who has neither inner direction of his own nor
subgroup allegiance that could ever place him in any stance contrary to
whatever legal norms that might happen to prevail at any given time.
However, even he is not properly characterized as an "unbeliever." Rather, his religion is or includes obedience to whatever society speaking
through the state tells him he must do. That he would never have occasion even to consider asserting a free exercise of religion claim is due
simply to the fact that he would never find the legally required behavior
267 This application of the subjective intensity determination does tend to overlap with
physical and mental health considerations as possible factors affecting an individual's legal duties.
Cf., as to compulsory military service, 32 C.F.R. § 1622.44 (1971) (Class 4-F registrants, who
under applicable physical, mental, and moral standards are found to be not qualified for military service). General medical, psychiatric, and psychological testimony could hardly be deemed
inappropriate in assessing the "emotional vulnerability" mode of subjective commitment where
a high degree of commitment was legally required. Yet one would hope that the experts would
not be put in the role of effectively making the social decisions rather than merely supplying a
part of the relevant data. There is also a danger of religiously based immunity being subsumed into some such category as "emotional unfitness," etc. Not only do such categories tend to
convey a stigma (however irrational), but also they tend to deny the possibility that the deviant
is acting as he is by choice rather than by behavioral determinants of which he is but a passive

victim.
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to be in conflict with his own commitments. It is in this sense that reli-gious exemptions, even under a neutral definition of religion, are "discriminatory"; they do excuse some persons from prescribed behavior while requiring that same behavior from others, the sole basis for the difference
in treatment being the differences in the subjective commitments of each
group. This discrimination is of course quite intentional. It actualizes the
conviction that it is "fairer" or "more humane" to take individuals' scruples into account. This particular view of fairness or humaneness is one
that many will find difficult to accept; it is apt to be least appealing to
those whose behavioral inclinations conflict least with currently prevailing
norms. And yet even these folks are potential religious-conscientious objectors, if future laws should conflict with their deeply felt beliefs.
D. Religious Nonestablishment-FunctionallyImpossible?
This essay has tended to emphasize the protection and enhancement
of religious freedom. We now look briefly at the relationship between a
broad definition like Seeger-Welsh and religious nonestablishment. The
essay has already argued for' an affinity between the establishment clause
and the Seeger-Welsh definition in two types of situations. First, when
government does grant constitutionally valid benefits (such as tax exemptions) to groups or activities conventionally recognized as religious, the
establishment clause should be understood as preventing the exclusion of
others from these benefits on the basis of the content of their beliefs.
Second (or, if one prefers, as a special instance of the first), when government acts legislatively to protect the free exercise of religion, even when
it is not constitutionally required to do so (for example, we assume, exemptions from military service in time of war), the establishment clause should
be understood as requiring this: Persons who do object (with whatever
showing, if any, of subjective commitment that is required) to the legal
norm in question must not be excluded from a religious or conscientious
exemption by virtue of the content of their beliefs. The Seeger and Welsh
definitions are thus very much the fruition of the establishment clause in
that they operate so as to prevent government from "picking and choosing" among religious beliefs 8 when government acts with respect to religion as such (as, despite the establishment clause, it sometimes can do).
But what is the relationship between Seeger-Welsh or any functional
definition of religion and the sphere of aid to religion prohibited by
the establishment clause? Various commentators have noted the dilemma seemingly posed by the establishment clause vis-11-vis any definition
208See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 356-58 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring). Cf.
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 175 (1965). Seeger and the Welsh plurality were of
course construing § 6(j) so as to avoid this establishment problem of "preferting] one religion
over another" (Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) and, arguably, so as to avoid
free exercise problems as well.
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of religion broad enough to include anything more than the conventionally identifiable religious bodies. 269 If religion can involve anything capable of being the object of deep personal commitment, then the establishment clause could be read so as to prevent government from doing just
about anything. Or, adopting a more "moderate" approach, any governmental action tending to inculcate ideals, values, and aspirations (the entire moral and cultural sphere of governmental activity) would be susceptible to challenge on establishment of religion grounds.
The logical consequence of even this "moderate" application of the establishment clause using a broad view of religion could finally limit government to the most obviously necessary matters of physical protection
and economic regulation at some minimum level of material necessity.
(And even these concerns, including decisions about what might constitute "obviously necessary matters," are inseparable from the spiritual or
value-oriented sphere.) Such a "functional religious nonestablishment"
would leave us with government at the federal, state, and local levels decidedly unlike what we now maintain. For example, state supported education might have to be limited to the teaching of economically, politically, and militarily (?) necessary skills. Philosophy, great literature,
moral values, music and the arts would have to be left to the private sector.
At least for the foreseeable future, any extensive move to "de-spiritualize" government is apt to meet with enthusiastic disapproval. Even if a
large dose of functional nonestablishment were less politically distasteful,
there remains the question of its feasibility. A respectable sociological position maintains that a society will have great difficulty in functioning without some "common religion" (without a consensus of basic value orientation) ." If that is so, government is hardly going to become oblivious
to the maintenance of some sort of unifying value structure.2 1' The dilemma posed by the establishment clause and a broad view of religion is,
for one reason or another, apt to remain with us.
289 E.g., Galanter, Religious Freedoms in the United States: A Turning Point?, 1966 Wis.
L. REV. 217, 265-68.
270 Insofar as religion represents a complex of ultimate value-orientations, it can never
be a neutral factor in social integration. Every functioning society has to an important
degree a common religion. The possession of a common set of ideas, rituals, and
symbols can supply an overarching sense of unity even in a society riddled with realistic conflicts....
I.

M. WILLIAMS, JR., AMERICAN SOCIETY: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 332 (2d ed.

1965) (emphasis deleted).
271 The ultimate foundation of a free society is the binding tie of cohesive sentiment.
Such a sentiment is fostered by all those agencies of the mind and spirit which may
serve to gather up the traditions of a people, transmit them from generation to generadon, and thereby create that continuity of a treasured common life which constitutes
a civilization.
Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 596 (1940). See also Bellah, Civil Religion
in America, 96 DADALuS 1 (1967).
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With the Supreme Court already moving toward a more universal concept of religion by the beginning of the 1960's,27 2 the dilemma was soon
to receive serious scholarly attention. Writing in 1963, William Van
Alstyne suggested that the Court had fashioned "a pragmatic response"
to the problem by "generally defin[ing] 'religion' in two different ways
under the First Amendment. ' 1 73 His description of these two definitions
of religion, one for the establishment clause and the other for free exercise abridgment, is as follows:
For purposes of the Establishment Clause, religion has pretty well been
confined to the preachments of organized groups-which groups may attempt td-manipulate the civil process to establish their own, distinct theology through the law or attempt to wrest benefits from the civil process
which are of special concern to them and not shared by a cross-section of
persons outside their particular church or band of churches. The laws requiring the saying of prayers or the reading of scriptures in class, for instance, are a clear example of distinct efforts at institutional religious aggrandizement, not primarily serving any needs or wants of others. More
to the point, if the Court were to find such practices compatible with the
Establishment Clause, such a finding would manifestly undercut the objective of the Amendment to withdraw incentives from religious organizations
to exert institutional pressures on the civil process.
Religion may be' a more inclusive thing, however, when the issue is
whether freedom to exercise religion has been abridged rather than
whether religion has been established. In this connection, the Court's suggestion that "religion" is not merely co-extensive with the better established
and more highly organized sects, may be taken more seriously. For while
the primary (although not exclusive) concern of the Establishment Clause
is to resist the importunities of distinctly institutional religious pressures,
the concern of the abridgment clause is to protect individual prerogatives of
conscience, and not merely to protect the freedom of institutionalized religion or conscience.274
Van Alstyne has thus placed the locus of establishment clause religion
primarily in institutionalized religion-the "preachments of organized
groups"-while noting that free exercise protection extends to the individual conscience. While his analysis is both accurate and helpful, it does
not fully capture what has thus far been the more restrictive scope of religion understood for purposes of the establishment clause. It does not
answer the question, which organized groups are to be deemed religious
272

See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). This case, with its broad view of what may
be deemed religion, is rightly regarded as the precursor of Seeger-Welsh; id. at 495-96n. 11.
273Van Alstyne, ConstitutionalSeparation of Church and State: The Quest for a Coherent
Position, 57 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 865, 873 (1963).
274 Id. at 873-74. For other examples of a "two definition approach" see Galanter, supra
note 269, at 265-68; Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ariz. 1963). "[itshould be observed that lack of violation of the 'establishment clause' does not ipso facto preclude violation
of the 'free-exercise clause.' For the former looks to the majority's concept of the term religion,
the latter the minority's." Id. at 774-75.
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groups in preventing governmental aid to religion? Nor does it tell us
what activities, functions, and concerns are to be deemed religious ones.
For example, Van Alstyne rightly argues that a major political objective
of the establishment clause was to prevent the divisive strife caused by
religious groups competing for governiental favoritism of one sort or
another. Yet, how is such competition to be distinguished from divisive
strife caused by competition between institutionalized music interests and
physical education interests for more emphasis (more money) in a public
school curriculum? Or from divisive competition between railroad interests and highway interests for greater subsidization?
To describe the establishment clause as it has functioned thus far in
the nation's history, one must say that the definition of religion utilized has
been restricted to groups and activities that either purport to involve supernatural or transcendent concerns, or at least are generally regarded as being
religious or "spiritually" oriented. (These terms are all elusive ones and
yet they or something like them must be employed in order to describe how
the establishment clause has so far been employed by the Court.) It is a
gross but permissible generalization to say that the establishment clause has
functioned (with expectable imperfection): (1) to discourage substantial
governmental aid to transcendental and other institutions or activities conventionally regarded as religious or "spiritual";2 7 5 and (2) to discourage
the substantial participation in or the positive or negative sanctioning or
special recognition by government (the "public-izing") of such activities
or institutions.Y
Religion under the establishment clause has thus been understood in a
quite conventional and traditional way. The main effect of this understanding has been for the clause to function somewhat so as to "secularize"
government, to divorce the this-worldly majesty of the state from explicit
religious symbolism of an absolutist-transcendent dimension.2 77 There are
275

Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Lemon v. Kurtzman,

403 27U.S.
602 (1971).
6

The school prayer and Bible reading cases are a prime (if somewhat tardy) example of
item (2). One may compare the two part summation of the establishment clause just stated in
the text with the more elaborate and often cited rendition by Justice Black, speaking for the
court in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947):
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither
can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will
or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished
for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or
non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they
may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups
and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion
by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation between church and State."
This full listing appears to comport with the two-part summary.
277 The

divorce has been a most friendly one, however. For example, American presidents
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compelling reasons for believing that this secularity of government is a
good thing for the traditional religionist as well as for the secularist.
First, though the establishment clause may require the government to
be secular, it makes no such demand of American society. The people
are (happily) free in the private sector to be as nonsecular as they wish
and are able to be. The free exercise clause thus serves as a counterforce
to nonestablishment; it requires that secular government be "neutral"
rather than anti-religious or anti-transcendent.
Second, the idea of the secularity of the state ought to be understood
and appreciated as a limitation on government; it seeks to deny the state
any competence in the supra-historical. It says that explicitly representing
eternity, if eternity is to be so represented, is the province of individuals
and voluntary groups. 8
Third, the use of the establishment clause to prevent government aid
to and meddling in transcendentalist institutions has special historical warrant. Van Alstyne rightly emphasized the political aim of discouraging
the strife from pressures upon government by these institutions for all
sorts of favors, direct and indirect. Having witnessed religious warring
drain Europe of blood and substance for much of the prior two and onehalf centuries, the proponents of nonestablishment had more than enough
practical political justification for their prescription for a secular government. Although transcendentalist religious strife is not so much a problem in the United States today (at least not in comparison with other
causes of conflict), the contrary situation in enough other nations is cause
for us to continue adherence to the judgment of our forefathers: When
political strife involving matters transcendent does exist, its capacity for
generating bitter and irreconcilable hatred seems unparalleled.
For the foregoing reasons, any broadening of the legal understanding
of what is religion should not (and need not) be allowed to invalidate
or in any way to undermine the Supreme Court's continuing responsibility
to uphold religious nonestablishment in the traditional sense. In other
words, the existing usage of the establishment clause to discourage governmental aid to and meddling in transcendental activities and institutions
continues to be justified-even though it involves a special and more narrow (and often elusive) concept of religion for this purpose. (And, at
have generally not seen fit to separate the use of explicitly transcendental language from their
official role as the nation's chief of state. See Bellah, note 271 supra.
278 Of special interest to the religionist is the idea that state secularity tends to encourage
religious vitality in the private sector. By protecting religious sects from state meddling, even
from "helpful meddling," transcendental religion may be benefitted in the long run. The experience of the established churches in Europe tends to suggest that government aid is a mixed

blessing, if a blessing at all. The move for a constitutional amendment to restore devotional
activity in the public schools (or, more accurately with respect to many "civilly disobedient"
public school classrooms, to legalize it) may thus be a blow rather than an aid to piety. For
more than a few young people, nothing is more likely to turn them off from prayer than to tell
them it is official state (or school) policy.
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the cost of adding to the elusiveness of definition, one must for the sake
of intuitively felt equity continue to extend these establishment prohibitions to groups who do not claim to be transcendental but who tend to
be generally thought of as being religious or spiritual. The criteria for
being so regarded must remain mysterious.)
The viable question is not whether a broad definition of religion should
be utilized to repeal past progress of religious nonestablishment, but rather
is whether such a definition should (and could) be used to give added
meaning to the nonestablishment idea. Specifically, should the logic of
Seeger-Welsh be employed with the establishment clause to restrict governmental activity in matters affecting purely secular ways of life? To accept the validity of this question is to forego any chance of ignoring the
dilemma discussed at the beginning of this section. The dilemma has in
fact been present throughout this essay. Earlier sections have spoken of
"secularly cognizable interests" about which the state must act, such as
physical security, ecological maintenance, health, etc. At the same time,
it has been insisted that any of these matters can indeed be the object of
an individual's religious devotion. (Few are so ascetic that mundane matters are of no consequence at all.) It has further been insisted that a person who commits his life solely to these material concerns is as legally
and constitutionally entitled to be deemed religious as is the most otherworldly-minded holy man.
Using as comprehensive an understanding of religion as that favored in
this essay, one is at least tentatively prone to say that the establishment of
religion clause must indeed be "violated" in a relatively narrow but utterly basic domain of secular necessity. Where reasonable safety, health,
material necessities, reasonable peace and quiet, and the right to selfgovernment itself are concerned, to a significant extent there may have to
be an "established" or common way of life-unless persons are to live on
separate, self-sufficient islands. A definitive treatment of this problem is,
however, admittedly beyond the scope of this endeavor.
Even if one concludes that some "way of life establishment" is inevitable, there is still the other side of the coin. Where there is no reasonably
compelling secular necessity for doing so, might it be, at least in principle,
a constitutionally impermissible establishment of religion for the state to
foster a certain secular way of life over other alternatives ?279 Whether
such a principle can be made into concrete issues litigable before courts is
a question to be answered by the future in general and by the creative
28
imagination of lawyer-advocates and their clients in particular. 1
279 Unlike the case with respect to transcendental and "spiritual" religion, the Everson idea of
prohibiting aid to "all religions" might have little or even no applicability in the area of secular
needs; i.e., with respect to secular needs, the establishment clause might be able to do no more
than to discourage unwarranted governmental preference of one way of life over another.
280 The following admittedly contrived example is presented only for possible heuristic val-
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ue: There would indeed be secularly cognizable justification tor the state to act to establish"
the use of public transportation, bicycles, etc., in preference to privately operated motor vehicles
such as automobiles, motorcycles, snowmobiles, motor boats, airplanes, etc. These latter contrivances have become such a menace to safety, health, and quiet that their outright abolition,
much less their discouragement by, for example, diverting all new road funds into funds for public transportation, would hardly be an inexcusable violation of either religion clause. However, there is no justification for the state's current policy of "establishing" private motor transportation, e.g., the fact that there are few streets in any city safe for biking (in the same sense of
being safe from cars, trucks, etc.). For those who deem the established religion of automobile
worship contrary to their own deeply felt convictions about this aspect of their way of life, a suit
to require a locality, a state or Congress to expend as much money and effort to provide safe
bikeways, convenient public transportation, etc., as has been expended in aiding the established vehicular religion seems less insane than the rites observable at any rush hour. The
point to be made is that the functional establishment by the state of even "secular" way-of-life
uniformities that are not reasonably necessary contains disadvantages similar to traditional religious establishment, from unnecessary strife accompanying institutional competition for governmental favor to an unduly majestic government. There also exists the danger that the idea of
religious freedom is compatible with an established religion, religious freedom in fact will suffer
if the established religion is unduly powerful. If this is true of traditional religious establishment, it is equally true of established religion in the broad way-of-life sense.

